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It is perhaps the business of the commentator and critic to 
point to resemblances, as well as to differences, between the 
form of thought of a poet of the past, and our own, for it seems 
that unless this is done, and done repeatedly from generation 
to generation, works of the past cease to have significance for 
the ordinary reader, which is tantamount to saying they cease 
to live.
— Barbara Reynolds, “Introduction” to Dante, Paradiso, 15
Ring the bells that still can ring.
Forget your perfect offering.
There is a crack, a crack in everything.
That’s how the light gets in.
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I have always been finding out my religion since I was a little girl.
— Dorothea in Middlemarch, 4:39, 387
When I think of how I came to produce this book, I find myself encounter-
ing a number of friends, mentors, colleagues, and family members who have 
lighted my way. I think of Teilhard de Chardin’s idea— whose affinity with 
George Eliot in reference to this and much else I discuss in chapter 5— that 
while each individual consciousness is an “absolutely original centre,” each 
center becomes more and more itself as it is drawn constantly and increas-
ingly “into association with all the centres”; each self becomes more and 
more, not less and less, itself “by convergence” with other selves.1
If I have become more myself by converging with other selves I have also 
come to understand, in the course of writing this book, more about conver-
gence itself, a concept that increasingly delighted and enthralled George Eliot 
and is a key theme in her last novel, Daniel Deronda. Convergence, Teilhard 
would say, increases complexity, and increased complexity leads, for those 
who are open to it, to increased consciousness. Indeed, coming to understand 
this and learning how to act upon this awareness is one way of describing the 
evolution that Dorothea undergoes in Middlemarch.
George Eliot’s ever- increasing understanding of and belief in convergence, 
which I explore mainly in chapter 4, is one of the key elements of what I am 
calling her “religious imagination.” Convergence is crucial to her religious 
imagination particularly because she sees it as affirming the power of imagi-
nation in various forms. Along with convergence, the three main components 
of her religious imagination are inwardness, incarnation, and integration. 
All four of these elements develop according to evolution, which Teilhard 
calls “the light illuminating all facts.”2 Inwardness and incarnation are my 
two main themes in chapter 1, but in chapter 2 I show how George Eliot’s 
understanding of them evolves such that they move from being themes in 
her work to becoming essential to her own being and practice. Another way 
to describe what she learns through her writing at this stage is the power of 
integration (my main focus in chapter 3), as she comes to experience her own 
integral relation with her characters and their stories. This insight comes at a 
cost, and underlying and informing George Eliot’s religious imagination in all 
four of these elements is an ever- evolving understanding of suffering. From 
the start of her career she shares Kierkegaard’s understanding that suffering, 
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when turned inward, constitutes growth; she furthers this understanding 
until she arrives at the insight that Teilhard will later develop, that suffering, 
turned inward, produces energy for good.
These four elements— inwardness, incarnation, integration, and con-
vergence, but in no particular order and often all at once— have also been 
fundamental to my experience of writing this book. That I was able to begin 
at all, at least as we conventionally understand beginning, was because of 
an insight that allowed me to recognize and to set free my own process of 
integration: this was the realization, initially only intuitive, that my schol-
arly journey and my spiritual journey were one and the same. Even the 
impulse to pursue that intuition until it became articulate and productive is 
a manifestation of the sense of convergence and the belief in a suprarational 
consciousness that George Eliot embraces. For key to my own process was 
the ongoing discovery of convergence between my work and hers.
Crucial to this insight into the convergence and integration of my schol-
arly and my spiritual lives was my compulsion— at first in spite of myself— to 
find spiritual retreats to be the sites of scholarly work and, conversely, to find 
in scholarly work much spiritual worth. On one such retreat, early in this 
process when I was working toward what turned out to be chapter 1, I was 
given instruction in inwardness by an unlikely teacher: walking meditatively 
and repetitively the winding, mulch- covered paths of the tiny but wondrous 
grounds of what was the Queenswood Centre in Victoria, British Columbia, 
I took a seat on a small makeshift wooden perch facing the pathway. Though 
my eyes were wide open all the while, it was nonetheless at least ten minutes 
before I realized that staring back at me from the other side of the pathway, 
nestled in his own comfy enclosure, was a large buck. Though it was not 
unusual to see deer even on the streets of Victoria (to the chagrin of gardeners 
and drivers), it was unusual to see a large, solitary buck, much less in peaceful 
repose. From this encounter I took the lesson that if I was intending to write 
about inwardness, I had better find out what it was.
There is no need to report on how I also needed to internalize and make 
my own the lesson I show George Eliot learning in chapter 2, that even fail-
ures can be prophecies, or the lesson of her whole career that suffering turned 
inward produces energy for good. It will already be clear, I think, that what I 
was learning in the course of my writing was the nature of my own religious 
imagination, or what a fellow traveler on another retreat called the spiritual-
ity of intellect.
It remains for me simply to thank those fellow travelers, dead and alive, 
who have played Virgil to my Dante and at times allowed me to do the 
same for them. Thank you for accompanying me on this journey, sharing 
your bread and wine with me and lightening my load by lighting my way 
with lots of alliterative love and laughter, mixed with tears too deep for 
words.
Preface xi
But as my sight by seeing learned to see
The transformation which in me took place
Transformed the single changeless form for me.




The lengthy time this project has taken to complete means that my list of peo-
ple to thank is also lengthy, but I will restrict myself here to identifying only 
a few, trusting that the others will hear their names implied in my “Preface.”
For generous encouragement and consistent support of my work over the 
years I thank my colleagues (and not least the secretarial staff) in the Depart-
ment of English and the Faculty of Humanities at Laurentian University. I am 
especially grateful to those who mapped out with me and enjoyed the terri-
tory where collegiality and friendship overlap. To Rachel Haliburton of the 
Department of Philosophy at the University of Sudbury at Laurentian and to 
Michael John DiSanto of the Department of English at Algoma University I 
offer thanks for their generous and incisive readings of a draft version of the 
major portion of this book; their comments helped sharpen and develop my 
analysis throughout. To Bruce Ward of the Department of Religious Studies 
at Thorneloe University at Laurentian I am grateful for practical advice and 
support when the project was little more than an idea. I am also grateful 
for the LURF grant I received from Laurentian University to help with costs 
related to publication.
My many long- suffering students also deserve thanks for their endur-
ance of my George Eliot passion; their insights and questions often helped 
to sharpen and deepen my reading, and their enthusiasm fueled mine. My 
own teachers also deserve grateful acknowledgment, but for special merit in 
this regard I must recognize Ina Ferris at the University of Ottawa, who has 
supported and encouraged my work since we first met as student and teacher 
decades ago. She continues to model for me what it means to be a fine scholar 
and a good friend. I am also grateful to the late D. Ruth Etchells, with regret 
that it was only with her loss that I began truly to recognize her gifts.
Over the years I have tried out ideas I was developing for this book on 
many academic audiences. I would particularly like to thank the members 
of the Christianity and Literature Study Group, which always provided a 
supportive and stimulating environment for my work. I also have benefited 
tremendously from the work of the George Eliot Fellowship. Particularly 
wonderful was a Study Day devoted to The Mill on the Floss; I am grateful to 
the Fellowship for allowing me to use material in chapter 2 that appeared as 
“ ‘Even our Failures are a Prophecy’: The Mill on the Floss and the 1860s” in 
The George Eliot Review no. 42 (2011): 38– 48. I would also like to thank the 
editors of Christianity and Literature for giving me permission to reproduce 
xiv Acknowledgments
here as chapter 1 a piece that appeared as “Incarnation, Inwardness, and 
Imagination in George Eliot’s Early Fiction,” Christianity and Literature 58, 
no. 3 (Spring 2009): 451– 81.
Like any profession, I suppose, academia is a mysterious domain to those 
outside of it. For this reason it is especially wonderful for me to have expe-
rienced support, encouragement, and even serious interest in my work from 
my family. I dedicate this book to the memory of my parents, Owen and Jose-
phine, and to my four siblings, their spouses, and their offspring, with love.





Writing is part of my religion.
— George Eliot, Letters, Haight edition, 2:377
This book reexamines religion and related questions in the work of George 
Eliot. It is conceived as a study of her “religious imagination” because at the 
center of the argument is the conviction that George Eliot’s idea of religion is 
an outgrowth of her imaginative work, which is in turn an outgrowth of her 
mind and life. One of the key principles of the present study imitates one of 
the key principles of George Eliot herself: integration. Middlemarch, gener-
ally held up as her masterpiece, represents the climax of her fictional work 
because it embodies this principle of integration almost as perfectly as any 
novel could. The web has long been noted as a predominant metaphor of 
Middlemarch, and it is so important exactly because it figures so beautifully 
the impossible complexity of the task before any writer— of George Eliot to 
explore the world of the recent past without unraveling it, and of the pres-
ent writer to explore the world of George Eliot’s writing life with a similar 
delicacy.
The project I have set myself is to take seriously George Eliot’s own words, 
first, as in the epigraph above, her deep conviction that her calling as a writer 
is a religious one. This book is an exploration of what she means by “religion.” 
At least as challenging is to take seriously her conviction of the unknow-
ability of human beings, including herself, even to herself. In her first story, 
“The Sad Fortunes of the Reverend Amos Barton,” her narrator exposes the 
myth of self- knowledge and the corresponding need for “dear friendly illu-
sion” to allow us “to dream that we are charming.” Here too she expresses 
the subjectivity of all of our knowledge and our reliance on one another’s 
faith: “no miracle can be wrought without faith— without the worker’s faith 
in himself, as well as the recipient’s faith in him. And the greater part of the 
worker’s faith in himself is made up of the faith that others believe in him.”1 
This epistemological paradox helps explain the intense difficulty of her writ-
ing process; this too speaks of integration in that “the mystery of human 
sorrow” she speaks of in her first novel and explores throughout her career 
is also her own.2
I focus on George Eliot’s religious imagination because she implicitly 
accepts the Romantic view of the imagination as the predominant human 
faculty, famously defined by Coleridge as the great repeater of the creator’s 
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power and the unifying force of all experience. Indeed, it is because of this 
imagination that George Eliot’s work can be both realistic and idealistic. It is 
because of this imagination, with its compulsion to think and feel together, 
that she has always been criticized by some purists for importing philosophy 
into fiction. Like Coleridge she sees life as an integrated whole, refusing to 
make a separation between mind and soul and heart. I call her work “theo-
poetical” because, rather than writing theology, she can be numbered among 
poets such as Coleridge, Shelley, Hopkins, Blake, and Dante, whose imagina-
tive work shapes and expresses their response to God.
George Eliot’s understanding of imagination is remarkably consistent 
throughout her career. In several of her early essays, as I discuss in chapter 1, 
she castigates writers who mistake weakened, fanciful intelligence for imagi-
nation. And in her very last essays, collected as Impressions of Theophrastus 
Such, she is only more articulate and pointed about this. In “How We Come 
to Give False Testimonials, and Believe in Them,” George Eliot uses the voice 
of Theophrastus to try once more to clarify that a “fine imagination” is not 
opposed to intelligent perception but is instead dependent upon it.3 Her reit-
eration of the point could readily pass for a gloss on Coleridge’s definition of 
imagination:
It is worth repeating that powerful imagination is not false outward 
vision, but intense inward representation, and a creative energy con-
stantly fed by susceptibility to the veriest minutiae of experience, 
which it reproduces and constructs in fresh and fresh wholes; not 
the habitual confusion of provable fact with the fictions of fancy 
and transient inclination, but a breadth of ideal association which 
informs every material object, every incidental fact with far- reaching 
memories and stored residues of passion, bringing into new light the 
less obvious relations of human existence.4
To illustrate this understanding of imagination, Theophrastus turns to Dante, 
further supporting the idea that George Eliot belongs among practitioners of 
theopoetics.
The principle of integration that undergirds the Coleridgean sense of 
wholeness of being and Dante’s artistic practice is fundamental to George 
Eliot’s religious imagination. Equally important is the notion of incarnation, 
both in its ethical and sacred modeling of integrated humanity and in its 
modeling of the aesthetic goal of making the words of her art become flesh, in 
a figurative sense. For, despite her withdrawal from the institutional church, 
she continues to believe in the incarnation as the basis for human values and 
relations. As an artist she believes not only in the ethical imperative to live 
one’s beliefs but also in the aesthetic imperative to “show, not tell” one’s ideas.
The interrelation of integration, integrity, and incarnation reveals itself as 
a deeply personal idea in the course of George Eliot’s writing: in the process 
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of bringing her characters and ideas to life in fiction, she discovers that she 
herself, as their creator, must bear their suffering in her own body. This pro-
cess is fundamentally integrating because it is not an idea that she decides to 
demonstrate; instead it is an experience that she learns to believe. In Chris-
tian terms, one might say that belief in the incarnation is fundamental to the 
possibility of integrated humanity; George Eliot lives out this notion in the 
course of her career. In the deepest sense then, her imagination is religious 
and her theopoetics is comprised of and energized by love.
The principle of integration also explains the deceptively simple design 
of this book, which takes seriously George Eliot’s own understanding of her 
career as a developing continuum. While interspersing comments on works 
from every period of her career, I trace the growth of her religious imagina-
tion as it evolves, with the exception of reserving my analysis of the early 
work Silas Marner for chapter 5. As I will try to show, her central beliefs— 
always founded on a sense of ultimate mystery— change only in the sense 
of growing and deepening, thereby demonstrating again the fundamental 
importance of integration.
Indeed, the other essential element of George Eliot’s religious imagination 
is her belief in evolution as fundamental to all of life, including consciousness. 
Failure to understand the importance of George Eliot’s belief in evolution is 
responsible for the notion that she “lost her faith” as a young woman, a view 
that has been the mainstay of a secular dismissal or misunderstanding of 
her serious religious concerns. Basil Willey seems to have lost the argument 
he took up in his Nineteenth- Century Studies, published in 1955, when he 
famously disputed Lord David Cecil’s claim that George Eliot was “not reli-
gious.” Willey argued that religious was “just what she was,” contending that 
“the whole predicament that she represents was that of the religious tempera-
ment cut off by the Zeitgeist from the traditional objects of veneration, and 
the traditional intellectual formulations.”5 His voice was drowned out in the 
secularizing tide, however, such that much critical work on George Eliot is 
founded on the assumption that Cecil was correct. As recently as 2001, for 
example, Barry Qualls’s chapter “George Eliot and Religion” in The Cam-
bridge Companion to George Eliot, while thorough and subtle, began by 
stating that George Eliot maintained her connection to biblical texts and 
language “when she lost her faith,” without his feeling the need to defend or 
explain this premise.6 Willey supported his claim by citing George Eliot’s sus-
tained attention to “righteousness,” “renunciation,” and “reverence.”7 These 
are key themes for my argument as well, and in a way I am able to take up 
where he left off because the Zeitgeist has shifted toward more openness to 
exploring religious experience and beliefs.
Indeed, while it is true that the discovery of evolution constituted the 
major challenge to traditional Christianity in the nineteenth century, this was 
only the beginning of a process of revisioning religious beliefs, experience, 
and consciousness in the context of scientific discoveries. For some, it is true, 
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the scientific challenge led to abandoning religion, as belief in reason replaced 
religious faith. The climate of intellectual skepticism did become widespread 
and came to feed the pervasive secularism following the World Wars; it is 
only now in the twenty- first century that what has been called “the religious 
turn” has given us a wider perspective in which to consider the nineteenth- 
century response to evolution. One of my aims is to contribute, along with 
such books as Peter Hodgson’s The Mystery Beneath the Real: Theology in 
the Fiction of George Eliot and J. Russell Perkin’s Theology and the Victorian 
Novel, to a reconsideration of the complexities of nineteenth- century reli-
gion, in the hope that we might begin to recognize that it is just as complex 
as that of our own century.
It is in the context of an evolutionary understanding that I try to clarify 
what George Eliot meant by faith and religion. By examining the way that 
she lived out their meaning in her writing, I wish to show how inadequate, 
even useless and misleading, is the concept of a lost faith as applied to George 
Eliot. Fundamental to my argument is the idea that in her work George Eliot 
is anticipating ways of reconciling faith and reason, mainly through the action 
of imagination, which had yet to be theorized or adequately understood. I 
therefore enlist the aid of several thinkers whose work she did not know, 
most because she predated them and, in the case of Kierkegaard, because 
she never happened (as far as I know) to encounter his work. Kierkegaard’s 
arguments for the truth of subjectivity and the subjectivity of truth are fun-
damental to my approach.
Since one of the most important catalysts of George Eliot’s evolution with 
regard to religion occurred when she encountered Roman Catholic art in 
Europe, it seems apt that most of the thinkers I invoke are from that tradi-
tion. My work benefits greatly from the insights of the Catholic philosopher 
Richard Kearney. I particularly draw from his understanding of imagination 
as a force that, in allowing for the possibility of the unseen, awakens the 
human potential for change by actualizing goodness, beauty, and truth, as 
well as his theory of “anatheism”— the process by which one may come back 
to God in a new way. Kearney’s teacher, Paul Ricoeur, helps me develop an 
idea of George Eliot’s “narrative identity” in chapter 2. For chapters 3 and 4 I 
rely on Karl Rahner and Evelyn Underhill (the latter a member of the Church 
of England) for their understanding of mysticism.
Perhaps most controversial is the use I make of the work of Pierre Teil-
hard de Chardin, since it is here that I act upon Kierkegaard’s affirmation of 
the subjectivity of truth to claim that Teilhard’s reconciliation of science and 
faith might have effected George Eliot’s own “anatheistic” return to a newly 
understood God. In my effort to support this claim I am grateful for the work 
of Dorothy L. Sayers and Barbara Reynolds on Dante’s Divine Comedy, as 
well as, of course, the work of the great Italian master himself. George Eliot 
did read and love Dante’s work, a fact that I read as testament to her intuition 
concerning what there was to believe and what it meant to believe.
Introduction 7
Chapter 1, “Incarnation and Inwardness: George Eliot’s Early Works in 
the Context of Contemporary Religious Debates,” begins with an outline of 
the early life of Mary Anne Evans— later George Eliot— and her movement 
from the evangelical Christianity of her youth toward the noninstitutional 
religious attitude of her mature life. I discuss several key essays she wrote 
before venturing into fiction. I refute the standard view that George Eliot 
accepted Strauss’s demythologized Jesus and embraced Feuerbach’s “reli-
gion of humanity”— both of whose key works she famously translated— by 
showing the importance to her of the individual as a spiritual being. While 
acknowledging that George Eliot did not know his work, I propose Kierke-
gaard’s idea of the individual as a better model. The chapter argues that two 
key concepts of Christianity, incarnation and inwardness, inform George 
Eliot’s work from the start. The importance of integration is evident from 
the beginning as well, as I show by introducing the notion of incarnation as 
a principle that underlies the understanding of fiction as well as the under-
standing of faith at this time. My main focuses for illustrative analysis in this 
chapter are “Janet’s Repentance” (the last story in the Scenes of Clerical Life), 
Adam Bede, and The Mill on the Floss.
Chapter 2, “ ‘Even Our Failures Are a Prophecy’: Toward a Post- Evangelical 
Aesthetic,” covers George Eliot’s middle period between two major successes, 
the publication of The Mill on the Floss in 1860 and that of Middlemarch 
in 1871– 72. Generally understood as a time of experiment if not outright 
failure, this period sees the publication of two major works that deal directly 
with religion in a historical, European context— the novel Romola and the 
long dramatic poem The Spanish Gypsy— as well as a novel, Felix Holt, the 
Radical, which seeks to create a secular saint in near- contemporary England. 
This is also the period when George Eliot writes lesser- known poetical works, 
several of which investigate the value of art and the role of the artist. My 
argument in this chapter is that, having finished in The Mill on the Floss with 
the evangelical Christian landscape of her youth, George Eliot is seeking in 
this period a new terrain for her fiction. Because, as quoted above, writing is 
part of her religion, this means seeking a religious terrain and a way to affirm 
the artist as a kind of religious figure. In this context, these works take on a 
profound importance in helping her to work out the implications of her call-
ing as an artist and in mapping out the landscape of future works.
Central to this chapter is a consideration of the idea of suffering, which, 
while a key theme from the beginning, takes on a new meaning in this con-
text. The major figure here is that of the martyr, and, as throughout the study, 
integration will be seen to be an important clue to how George Eliot’s reli-
gious imagination is developing in this period. Integration will also provide 
the clue as to why she begins to explore different literary forms: not only does 
she write more and more poems, but she also writes about tragedy. Incarna-
tion again comes into play in that, though she keeps at bay any suggestion 
that her own physical and emotional suffering has an ultimate meaning, we 
8 Introduction
see her own view of suffering change as her experience grows to embrace 
what might be seen as artistic failure.
In chapter 3, “Religion in a Secular World: Middlemarch and the Mysti-
cism of the Everyday,” I argue that Middlemarch, as an almost flawlessly 
integrated whole, demonstrates how central integration is to George Eliot’s 
religious imagination. Middlemarch not only explores the way in which 
integrity manifests as integration but also itself represents George Eliot’s own 
achievement of personal and artistic integration. Even its status as both a 
critical and popular success demonstrates a triumph of integration. As in the 
previous chapter, I turn first to two poems of this period— “The Legend of 
Jubal” and “Armgart ”— in this case poems that focus on the role of the artist. 
In them George Eliot expresses a Romantic, idealistic view of the artist so 
that she is able to ground her prose— or, in other words, to subordinate her 
own need for idealism— in order to incarnate her ideas and ideals in realistic 
characters and situations. This approach sets the pattern for her novel Mid-
dlemarch as Dorothea must learn a similar kind of grounding, which involves 
a shift in her understanding of religion when her experience with Casaubon 
drives her from the apostolic, idealistic, doctrinally pure Christianity of her 
youthful dreams to a religion that is based on love in action and practical 
goodness. I argue that in this Dorothea is learning what might be called the 
theology of integration that is the basis of the mysticism of everyday life.
This chapter also includes a brief survey of the clergy of nineteenth- century 
Britain and their representatives in George Eliot’s novelistic world. The the-
ology of integration is crucial again in that fundamental to her religious 
imagination at this time is the belief that religion is an integral part of soci-
ety. Through her fictional clerics in Middlemarch George Eliot demonstrates 
that the clergy are at their best integrated into society and that, like men and 
women of every profession and role, they are called to manifest integrity by 
living out their faith in their daily lives and integrating themselves into the 
life around them.
Chapter 4, “ ‘The Religion of the Future’: Daniel Deronda and the Mysti-
cal Imagination,” shows George Eliot further pursuing the ideas and concerns 
of Middlemarch as she sets a novel for the first time in her own time and city, 
confronting the sense of jaded purposelessness and anxious hopelessness that 
pervades her culture in the wake of its loss of a religious center. She offers 
religion as a solution by reclaiming three kinds of religious life— the every-
day mysticism modeled by Dorothea, the ancient Jewish mystical tradition, 
and the Romantic understanding of imagination. All three of these attitudes 
exemplify the mystical notion that faith transforms the ordinary world into a 
realm of poetry and possibility. With these three mystical possibilities George 
Eliot gestures toward “the religion of the future” that she refers to in a letter 
of this time. Her sense of the future clearly incorporates religious ideas from 
the past, is grounded in present action, and envisions the future as something 
other than the afterlife that is present- day religion’s preoccupation. In Daniel 
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Deronda we also see George Eliot furthering her efforts toward integration 
by writing a novel in which religion, poetry, art, and music are thematized.
In chapter 5, “Evolutionary Spirituality and the Theopoetical Imagina-
tion: George Eliot and Teilhard de Chardin,” I move to the conclusion of 
this study by speculating about how very deeply evolutionary and religious 
George Eliot’s attitude was. I do so by placing her in a continuum of theo-
poetical thinkers, with Dante as her ancestor and Teilhard de Chardin as 
her heir. I show in Daniel Deronda three specific cultural illustrations of 
the religious imagination at work, and I analyze Silas Marner in light of 
Teilhard’s evolutionary spirituality in order to show that underlying George 
Eliot’s novels is her appeal to ways of religious being that are at once ancient 
and ever- evolving. The discussion in this chapter is framed by my contention 
that Teilhard’s ideas on evolutionary spirituality, particularly those concern-
ing the convergence of science and faith and the evolution of consciousness, 
along with his radical perspectives on interpretation and on the meaning of 
suffering, can help us to understand George Eliot’s religious imagination. As 
I have argued from the beginning, George Eliot’s affirmation of subjective, 
individual, evolving ways of knowing is central to her religious imagination. 
Here, I develop this notion by briefly exploring some of the ways in which 
subjective, individual, evolving ways of interpretation have always been cen-
tral to Christian thought.
In a brief “Conclusion,” I suggest that George Eliot’s ever- evolving reli-






George Eliot’s Early Works in the Context 
of Contemporary Religious Debates
The secret of our emotions never lies in the bare object, but 
in its subtle relations to our own past: no wonder the secret 
escapes the unsympathising observer, who might as well put 
on spectacles to discern odours.
— George Eliot, Adam Bede, 2:18, 180
Is there not a spiritual existence that belongs to individuals?
— Søren Kierkegaard, Repetition
In the great age of religious questioning, which U. C. Knoepflmacher says was 
“obsessed with epistemology,”1 George Eliot’s importance was such that an 
early reviewer could call her “the emblem of a generation distracted between 
the intense need of believing and the difficulty of belief.”2 In the “conflict of 
interpretations” that David Carroll rightly sees as central to her narrative 
situations, George Eliot’s fiction reveals, I will argue, her own exploration of 
faith and imagination and her discovery of their inseparable connection as 
hermeneutical mind- sets.
It is impossible to read George Eliot’s novels without thinking about reli-
gion, one would think, since, even when they do not directly concern religious 
clerics, they focus on characters engaged in deeply religious struggles. George 
Eliot’s work is rich enough that astute readers can find material for almost 
any sophisticated reading, and it is perhaps not surprising that while critics in 
a secular culture have tended to follow the standard view that Marian Evans 
“lost her faith” as a young woman, there is increasing interest in the neces-
sary complexities of any such trajectory. While there have always been critics 
and readers speaking against the tide, the pervasive tendency has been to 
acknowledge her early piety and reiterate the “conventional wisdom”3 that 
after her encounter with Higher Criticism, firstly through Charles Hennell 
and then Strauss and Feuerbach, and with the Comte school, her Christian 
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beliefs were replaced by a Feuerbachian version of the religion of humanity. 
While the crucial influence of all of these is undeniable, I agree with Peter 
Hodgson when he argues that George Eliot never became a disciple of any 
system or ideology.4 Instead, I will argue, her views were deeply evolution-
ary. Rather like one of the mollusks which were the subject of her husband’s 
study, she accreted these beliefs like so many layers, with each new level of 
knowledge adding to and adapting, rather than displacing, her earlier views. 
While it is easy enough to find comments in her letters declaring her rejection 
of conventional forms of Christianity, it is not much harder to find as many 
comments that modify and complicate these declarations of unbelief.5
In his book, Hodgson briefly analyzes each of George Eliot’s novels for 
their Christian content, and extrapolates from this the principles of what 
he calls George Eliot’s “future religion,” a form of “revisionist postmodern” 
theology that he aligns with various theologians from Schleiermacher to 
Ricoeur.6 Hodgson’s idea that George Eliot practiced a “faith, which kept the 
reality of God in suspense”7 echoes ideas of the philosopher Richard Kear-
ney, himself a student of Ricoeur. Kearney’s recent work, as suggested by the 
title of his book The God Who May Be, analyzes the ways that modernist 
writers such as Joyce and Woolf invoke sacramental language that shadows 
forth a “possible” God. Kearney’s work on “narrative imagination” as the 
basis for the “narrative identity” that is acquired “in large part by receiving 
others’ narratives and re- narrating itself in turn to others” informs my whole 
argument.8 It seems to me that we might put George Eliot in the company of 
Kearney’s modernists of sacred possibility, for George Eliot’s religious imagi-
nation took her beyond Feuerbachian humanism toward a far more complex 
understanding of religious experience. The first stage of this development is 
enacted in her early fiction, in which she constructs an aesthetic that is deeply 
rooted in two fundamental elements of her early experience among Evangeli-
cal Christians, incarnation and inwardness.
A brief sketch of her religious history is in order. Mary Anne Evans (as she 
was christened) grew up in a middle- of- the road Anglican household but as a 
schoolgirl came under the powerful influence of intense Evangelicalism with 
a Calvinist/Puritan streak in the persons of a teacher and fellow students. Her 
youthful letters, which sound cringingly pious to most modern ears, reflect 
what one biographer calls an “unforgiving, damnation- conscious form of 
religion”9 and are a convenient source for any who are on a quest for evi-
dence of the pathologies of adolescent faith. For my purposes, they point to 
the way in which faith and imagination were already at odds in her thinking, 
for in them she records a suspicion of “imaginative literature, particularly fic-
tion,” which she overcomes out of a conviction of the necessity to be familiar 
with common references,10 and of musical settings of biblical passages, which 
she at once revels in and deplores.
The next landmark on her intellectual journey was her meeting with a 
warm and intelligent family of free- thinking Unitarians. While the Hennell 
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sisters became Mary Anne’s close and lifelong friends, their brother Charles 
Hennell’s Inquiry concerning the Origin of Christianity (1838) began what 
became the sea change in her thinking, as he carefully explained Christianity 
in entirely natural terms. The result was a temporary but hugely significant 
rift with her beloved father, whose housekeeper she was, when she refused to 
accompany him to church. Mary Anne relented after several weeks because, 
characteristically, her relationship with her father was more important to her 
than the principle of truth, once she had made sure to demonstrate it to him.11 
But the break was made, and not the least important development was her 
determination to become financially independent from her father and brother.
In 1851 she moved to London and became Marian Evans, writer of reviews 
and essays, the shadow editor of the Westminster Review, reading and writing 
prodigiously. The two most famous landmarks in her religious life bracket this 
move: her translations of Strauss’s Life of Jesus, published after almost two 
years of painstaking labor in 1846, and of Feuerbach’s Essence of Christianity 
in 1854. For now, I will just say in a sentence that Strauss’s work demytholo-
gized Christianity, taking earnest, sympathetic pains to do so, and Feuerbach’s 
work situated the origin of God- ideas in the human mind: “All religious cos-
mogonies,” writes Feuerbach, “are products of the imagination.”12
Before moving away from biography, it is important to note the most 
important presence in Marian Evans’s adult life, the man she would call her 
husband, George Henry Lewes, whom she met between the translating of 
these two tomes. And it is important to say as well that in the case of George 
Eliot, the intimate personal relations of her life as Mary Anne and then Mar-
ian Evans must be seen as the ground of her intellectual life. In other words, 
her ideas were always inseparable from her feelings, and from her body in 
the world: there were no words without flesh. This sense of the necessity to 
incarnate ideas is the basis of the embodied aesthetic of her fiction. For what 
early reviewers saw as what Carroll calls her “dissociated sensibility”— a con-
flict between George Eliot the artist and George Eliot the philosopher13— is 
what might also be called a paradoxical effect of her effort to incarnate her 
aesthetic.
In this study I am taking up George Eliot’s works more or less chrono-
logically because, as others have recognized, there is a deeply evolutionary 
quality to George Eliot’s career. Like many writers I suppose, she is loathe to 
repeat herself and, while readers might recognize characters and situations 
that she is revisiting, she always needs to believe in her own development as 
a writer. In her letters she repeatedly champions her first stories, for example, 
largely because they contain “ideas” that she doubts she “can ever embody 
again.”14 This is an important idea in a broader sense too in that her phi-
losophy was grounded in a belief in the idea of progress. This is most neatly 
exemplified in Silas Marner, which is often called a fable, but is a fable not 
just of one man’s life but of the progress of humanity and civilization, as 
reflected in the growth of a single consciousness and community. (I will save 
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further comment on Silas Marner until chapter 5, in which I will discuss more 
fully George Eliot’s work in the context of evolutionary ideas.)
Two of her earliest reviews reflect the importance of this belief in pro-
gressive thinking. In 1849, writing of Froude’s The Nemesis of Faith, she 
affirms “its suggestive hints as to the necessity of recasting the currency of 
our religion and virtue.”15 In an important essay of 1851, her review of R. W. 
Mackay’s The Progress of the Intellect, George Eliot explicitly refutes the 
Comtean view that “human progress” means “devot[ing our] energies to the 
actual rather than to the retrospective,” affirming instead Mackay’s “survey 
of the past,” which shows “how each age and each race has had a faith and 
a symbolism suited to its need and its stage of development.”16 It could be 
said, I think, that George Eliot’s whole opus demonstrates this view with 
regard not only to her characters but to herself. In the same essay she affirms 
“Mackay’s faith” in what theologians came to call progressive revelation, 
which he sees, she writes, as “co- extensive with the history of human devel-
opment.”17 She quotes Mackay at length on the alliance between religion and 
philosophy. Sounding very much like a prosaic version of the “Prologue” to 
Tennyson’s In Memoriam, Mackay writes:
Religion and science are inseparable. No object in nature, no subject 
of contemplation is destitute of a religious tendency and meaning. . . . 
Faith [is] the inseparable companion and offspring of knowledge . . . 
Faith, as opposed to that blind submission to inexplicable power 
which usurped its name in the ancient East, is an allegiance of the 
reason; and as the “evidence of things unseen,” stands on the verge 
of mysticism, its value must depend on the discretion with which it is 
formed and used.
In a statement resonating with Kearney’s ideas, Mackay states, “True faith 
is a belief in things probable.”18 Equally important to George Eliot’s work 
is Mackay’s criticism of the pervasive understanding of religion as having 
“nothing to do with the head” but rather as “exclusively an exercise of the 
heart and feelings” meant to train moral character yet leaving the feeling 
“uneducated,” abandoned by reason.19 It might not be overstating the case to 
cite this essay as the central text of George Eliot’s philosophy, except that to 
do so would contradict the philosophy it states. For, as I mentioned above, it 
is crucial to recognize how vital to her work is this belief in progress.20 And 
it is interesting to note that in her last novel, Daniel Deronda, as we will see 
in chapter 4, her religious revisioning finds her back before her own time, in 
a kind of mystical Judaism. In her own way, then, George Eliot was engaged 
in the work that Carlyle called retailoring the tailor, refashioning the myth 
for a new age. And as with Carlyle, Mackay’s mention of mysticism is apt, in 
that this is about a new way of seeing the “evidence of things unseen” which 
is faith.
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Incarnation
Another way of talking about this is in terms of “incarnation,” in Christian 
terms the doctrine that God took on human nature in Jesus Christ: the Word 
became flesh; the Idea became actual. This is of course the central doctrine 
of dispute at this time. Strauss takes enormous pains respectfully to debunk 
the possibility of a historical Jesus and reaffirms the Idea of Jesus despite 
his lack of historicity; he redefines the incarnation as the idea of humanity 
as a whole incarnating Christ, pointing to the evolution of an ideal human 
type. Feuerbach famously turns theology into anthropology, seeing the idea 
of God incarnate as a projection of human need and desire. It is primarily 
in her response to various works, mainly in the form of reviews and, in the 
case of Strauss and Feuerbach, in her translations, that the writer who would 
become George Eliot (hereafter referred to by that name) articulates her 
own understanding of the incarnation, but essential to her response is what 
Kierkegaard would call “indirection.” This approach is evident in two main 
ways: first, in her refusal to articulate a positive doctrine. As she writes in a 
letter in 1870, “I have an unreasonable aversion to personal statements. . . . 
I shrink from decided ‘deliverances’ on momentous subjects, from the dread 
of coming to swear by my own ‘deliverances’ and sinking into an insistent 
echo of myself.”21 Secondly, implicit throughout her fiction is the kind of 
secular faith expressed in my epigraph from Adam Bede: the belief that find-
ing the truth of things is a matter of discovering and interpreting what has 
been revealed to the individual heart and remains otherwise hidden. In Hen-
nell and Strauss she found an articulation of her own understanding of faith 
as a matter of mythical rather than historical truth, and this understanding 
of the power of story soon led to her own creation of stories that speak of 
and indeed seek to incarnate human and divine truths, their language redo-
lent with biblical echoes. But even when she agreed with them on important 
matters, none of the writers she studied satisfied her. While convinced of the 
merit of the scientific view of the fundamental power of nature, for example, 
she famously refused to embrace Darwin’s Origin of Species: “But to me the 
Development theory and all other explanations of processes by which things 
come to be, produce a feeble impression compared with the mystery that lies 
under the processes.”22
It is possible, then, to trace what we might call the progress of George 
Eliot’s own intellect and her understanding of faith through her works, and I 
would like now to highlight views that point to her understanding of incar-
nation. First, however, it is important to clarify how I am using the term 
“incarnation” for, as Gerald O’Collins points out as he begins his book of 
that title, the primary theological meaning of incarnation— that God became 
a man— needs to be distinguished from the common usage by which we 
describe someone as incarnating a particular quality.23 Yet, as the writer 
Kathleen Norris makes clear— beginning with her pointed indefinite article 
16 Chapter 1
in “A Word Made Flesh”— incarnation can be seen as the task of all writers, 
who are advised to “show, do not tell”: good fiction- writing aims to embody 
and reveal the truth, rather than argue it discursively.24 Further, related to 
this is the common understanding of the importance of matching actions to 
words, commonly called practicing what one preaches— an ethical demand 
that carries greater weight for writers, who, after all, live by words. It is for 
these reasons that, as A. S. Byatt notes in her discussion of George Eliot’s 
understanding of fiction, the question of how to write fiction— because it 
is a question of bringing together form and substance— became so pressing 
in the century that challenged the meaning of the Christian concept of the 
incarnation.25
As I hope will become clear, George Eliot’s struggles over the form of her 
fiction were always struggles to incarnate her ideas in Norris’s sense and 
were always, at least implicitly and often explicitly, deeply entangled with 
her own beliefs regarding the incarnation of Christ. In what follows I will 
highlight four main ways in which George Eliot’s complex understanding 
of incarnation emerges in her work: first, as suggested above, in the sense 
of nature itself manifesting the immanent presence of God; second, in her 
conviction that genuine Christians will put their beliefs into action in the 
form of love; third, in the way that she affirms the value of the lives and the 
words of ordinary folk; and, fourth— the foundation for her entire incar-
national aesthetic— in the way that she affirms empathetic understanding 
and ultimately suffering for others as the basis of ethical and fully human 
living.
George Eliot’s sense of the importance of incarnation and her struggles 
over its implications are evident in one or more of these four ways in all of 
her nonfiction. As I mentioned above, she takes from Hennell a completely 
naturalized, and then from Strauss a demythologized, view of the divine, but 
in the same year as her translation of Strauss’s Life of Jesus is published she 
speaks with conviction of “the grand law which God has impressed on all 
nature— the production and development of life.”26 While this is far from a 
belief in the incarnation of Christ of course, it does testify to her fundamental 
sense of nature’s giving physical form to the divine. More telling is George 
Eliot’s conflicted response to Strauss’s deconstruction of the idea of God 
becoming a man: throughout her work on Strauss George Eliot famously 
grieved for the image of Christ she was abetting him to desecrate. As her 
biographer Gordon Haight reports:
[She] had a cast about twenty inches high of Thorwaldsen’s “Risen 
Christ” standing in her study, and on the wall an engraving of Dela-
roche’s Christ, which she had once thought of using for a frontispiece. 
She told the Brays that “she was Strauss- sick— it made her ill dissect-
ing the beautiful story of the crucifixion, and only the sight of her 
Christ- image and picture made her endure it.”27
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It is interesting to note that her very body rebelled against the words that 
sought to demythologize the notion of an embodied God.
It is noteworthy that George Eliot’s reviews of Froude and Mackay, with 
her implied affirmation of their understanding of the incarnation in terms 
of progressive revelation, follow her Strauss translation in 1849 and 1851 
respectively. One can surely speculate that she was seeking a way to rec-
oncile current knowledge with ideas of faith. It is widely understood that 
she found this a few years later in Feuerbach’s religion of feeling, and I cer-
tainly agree that his translation of the theological question of incarnation 
into anthropological terms and his focus on human feeling as its source and 
ground— particularly since her work of translating Feuerbach coincided 
with her becoming intimately involved with the decidedly godless Lewes28— 
satisfied for a time her need to reconcile her rational views with her feelings. 
But, as with Strauss, her endorsement of Feuerbach was measured according 
to her determination not to allow her desire for faith to override the truth of 
experience.
I will speak more of George Eliot’s response to Strauss and Feuerbach 
when I discuss her early fiction, but it is worth noting here the shift in her 
theological interest that took place around this time, owing partly at least to 
her happiness with Lewes and the consequent or at least concurrent move 
farther away from the Unitarian Bray/Hennell family, with whom she had 
conducted lively debates about pressing matters of faith. Now, and increas-
ingly as she submerges herself more deeply into her fiction and into her 
relationship with Lewes, she responds to Sara Hennell’s earnest efforts to 
clarify doctrines of faith as a mildly interested observer of her friend’s work 
rather than as a participant in the debates.29 For a time, indeed, George Eliot 
shifts attention beyond Christianity to broader theological concerns as she 
begins translating Spinoza, thus engaging in a more strictly philosophical 
way in questions of theology, ethics, and metaphysics.30
All of these efforts turn out to be significant stepping- stones toward the 
emergence of George Eliot the novelist, and I want to mention three essays 
of the time in the context of her developing understanding of incarnation. 
The first two, “Evangelical Teaching: Dr. Cumming,” published in 1855, and 
“Worldliness and Other- Worldliness: The Poet Young,” published two years 
later, are mainly taken up with the second meaning of incarnation mentioned 
above, the failure of these two clerics to incarnate their faith in love. The 
first is a scathing rebuke of an evangelical preacher, whose “absence of genu-
ine charity” and “perverted moral judgement” incur the wrath of a vitriolic 
pen.31 More fortunate than Dr. Cumming in being a century dead, the poet 
Edward Young comes under her scrutiny as “a remarkable individual of 
the species divine,” whom she charges with “radical insincerity as a poetic 
artist  .  .  . deficient intellectual activity and deficient feeling.”32 Throughout 
this piece, as in this comment, we note George Eliot’s understanding of the 
interrelation of the two senses of incarnation that Norris speaks of, in her 
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conviction that, for a Christian writer, bad poetry— both intellectually vapid 
and emotionally false— follows from an inadequate expression (one could 
say incarnation) of love. Interesting as well is the fact that both Cumming 
and Young serve as foils for her to express a truer idea of Christianity. “The 
best minds that accept Christianity as a divinely inspired system,” she writes, 
“believe that the great end of the Gospel is not merely the saving but the 
educating of men’s souls, the creating within them of holy dispositions, the 
subduing of egotistical pretensions, and the perpetual enhancing of the desire 
that the will of God— a will synonymous with goodness and truth— may be 
done on earth.”33 “The highest state of mind inculcated by the Gospel,” she 
goes on, “is resignation to the disposal of God’s providence . . . it is to dwell 
in Christ by spiritual communion with his nature, not to fix the date when He 
shall appear in the sky.”34 In contrast to Young’s “deficiency in moral, i.e., in 
sympathetic emotion,” she celebrates Cowper’s The Task “in the genuine love 
that it breathes.”35 George Eliot’s wrath is provoked against both Cumming 
and Young for their hypocrisy and the superficial thinking that goes along 
with a lack of genuine charity and sympathy; like a latter- day Chaucer, she 
lays bare their failure to practice what they preach, as the saying goes, or, in 
other words, to demonstrate the word incarnate.
Norris’s idea that incarnation for a writer means “show, do not tell” also 
comes to mind in considering an essay George Eliot published between these 
two. “Silly Novels by Lady Novelists” is even more caustic but also hilari-
ous, not only perhaps because the object of her rebuke is her own sex but 
because she was soon to become a “lady novelist” herself. The lady novelists 
are charged with failings similar to those of the writer clerics above, particu-
larly since their pious aim is to represent Christian ideas. Concerning their 
attempts to describe human beings, George Eliot charges them with a com-
plete lack of experience “in every form of poverty except poverty of brains” 
and the consequent complete “want of verisimilitude.”36 The lady novelist of 
the “oracular species” fails to convey spiritual truths, a failing which is not 
surprising since “the means by which she usually chooses to conduct you to 
true ideas of the invisible is a totally false picture of the visible.”37 Interesting 
here again, then, is her sense that bringing ideas to life in fiction requires a 
full intellectual and emotional engagement with real- life experience, a notion 
that suggests her conviction of the interrelation of incarnation and realism.
Even more amusing is George Eliot’s send- up of these poor ladies’ attempts 
at philosophical reflection in their fiction: “Lady novelists, it appears, can see 
something else besides matter; they are not limited to phenomena, but can 
relieve their eyesight by occasional glimpses of the noumenon, and are, there-
fore, naturally better able than anyone else to confound sceptics, even of that 
remarkable but to us unknown school, which maintains that the soul of man 
is of the same texture as the polypus.”38 Further, as poor as the lady novelist is 
at representing chivalry, “we like the authoress much better on her medieval 
stilts than on her oracular ones— when she talks of the Ich and of ‘subjective’ 
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and ‘objective.’ ”39 The humor here is of course all the more delicious when 
we realize that George Eliot is making great fun at the expense of the “lady 
novelists” who fail at doing just what she wants to do: to dramatize in fiction 
the philosophical and theological ideas that were in the air by incarnating 
these ideas in the persons of clerics and their female parishioners, a desire 
that was soon to bear fruit in the three Scenes of Clerical Life.
I will talk in more detail about one of these Scenes later in this chap-
ter when I focus on the idea of inwardness, but here I want first to follow 
the theme of incarnation. No one could fail to notice the change in tone 
from these essays to the stories, which, while anatomizing in sharp detail the 
failings of various specimens of the divine, never revert to what Rosemary 
Ashton calls the “magnificent malice” of the essays.40 Flawed as these clergy-
men are, riddled as Amos Barton, for example, surely is with the egotism, 
shallowness, and vanity that would place him firmly among the evangelical 
preachers she describes in the opening sentence of the essay on Dr. Cum-
ming, the storyteller moves from satirizing and bemoaning Barton’s faults to 
sympathizing with, perhaps we might say forgiving, his weaknesses and vul-
nerabilities and even appreciating his few and feeble strengths. Whereas the 
essayist might herself have been accused of the “lack of genuine charity” she 
identifies in her targets, the novelist promotes and reflects the kind of fellow 
feeling that becomes one of the markers of her aesthetic, as she encourages 
readers to forgive as they would be forgiven. Indeed, particularly in the first 
story, many find an excess of sympathizing and an overflow of sentiment.
As Elizabeth Jay points out, it is perhaps not surprising that George Eliot 
should be more careful in writing her stories, since, while she could count 
on her essays being read by like- minded radicals, who would expect a cri-
tique of Christianity from the Westminster Review, her stories are meant for 
the general reading public, and she would be careful not to offend.41 While 
this is undoubtedly likely, to me a more important idea emerges here: in 
writing fiction, I believe, George Eliot encountered a different kind of truth. 
Bringing characters to life in words demanded a kind of entry into human 
experience that commanded sympathy.42 And here it is interesting to look 
behind the scenes. Because George Eliot published these first stories anon-
ymously, there was much discussion in the reading world about who the 
author could be. Most readers guessed a cleric, some a cleric who was also a 
man of science, some crediting his wife with the so- called feminine touches. 
Much of the speculation fed on trying to identify the real models for the 
characters. Of interest at this stage in George Eliot’s life is the great drama 
that would ensue, which came to a head after the anonymous publication of 
her first novel, Adam Bede, when characters in the novel and stories were 
identified— some of them accurately— with actual people. The drama intensi-
fied when a certain Mr. Liggins was widely held to be the real George Eliot 
and when Adam Bede, Junior, a sequel to her novel by another pretender, was 
announced.
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Here was a real confusion between reality and imagination, which soon 
led George Eliot to disclose her true identity. Obviously, the stakes were 
high, if a woman— and a freethinking woman at that— came to be revealed 
as the author of these stories of clerical lives and Christian themes.43 But 
more interesting for my purposes here is the struggle one reads of in the let-
ters of this time, when George Eliot seems genuinely surprised to find that 
some of her characters are recognizable as based on actual people. While she 
staunchly and eloquently argues for the authenticity of the artistic imagina-
tion, in several cases she maintains silence, presumably rather than lie. What 
seems to be unfolding here is her own understanding of the nature of imagi-
nation; she learns that she is bringing to life on the page not abstractions but 
real persons. The source for her characters is not, as she had supposed, only 
her imagination, but her imagination drawing from her memory. Of course 
she always had known that she was writing about what she remembered, 
but this controversy was crucial in furthering her sense of the mysteries 
of imagination, and central to this realization was her understanding of 
incarnation.
I referred above to A. S. Byatt’s edition of George Eliot’s essays, in which 
she dedicates a whole section of her introduction to “Incarnation.” It begins:
The long nineteenth- century debate about the precise meaning, or 
lack of meaning, of the Christian concept of the Incarnation, the 
meeting- point of the divine and the human, the infinite and the finite, 
is inextricably connected, consciously and unconsciously, to the 
development of the form of the novel.44
Byatt’s thesis certainly is borne out in George Eliot’s case. Despite turning 
away from the church of her youth, she continued to follow Christian themes 
and characters in all of her fiction, beginning with a whole volume dedicated 
to “clerical life.” For, while she abandoned religion in the institutional sense, 
she not only promoted what she saw as the essential truths of Christianity 
but proclaimed in a letter, “writing is part of my religion.”45 Indeed, it might 
be said that writing became her religion, and that its most recognizable tenet 
was the living out of the incarnation. Byatt quotes a letter George Eliot wrote 
during a correspondence in 1866 with the Positivist Frederic Harrison, who 
wanted her to use her fiction to represent his philosophy, with which she was 
in some agreement at the time. In this letter George Eliot explicitly speaks 
of her incarnational aesthetic, as she writes of having “gone through again 
and again the severe effort of trying to make certain ideas thoroughly incar-
nate, as if they had revealed themselves to me first in the flesh and not in the 
spirit.”46 Here George Eliot echoes Kathleen Norris’s understanding of the 
writer’s practice: even as the incarnation was the Word made flesh, her job as 
an artist was the Word (or spirit) made word (fiction) in the incarnate “flesh” 
of her characters. This has huge implications for the doctrine of her so- called 
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realism, which she is claiming here was never about imitating real people. 
The origin, rather, is “in the spirit.”47
I want to show now how George Eliot’s realist aesthetic, most explicitly 
articulated in chapter 17 of her first novel, Adam Bede, which was published 
a year after Scenes of Clerical Life, is at the same time a doctrine of incar-
nation, by illustrating the four main ways (cited above) in which George 
Eliot’s understanding of incarnation is manifest. Concerning the first point, 
the immanent presence of God in nature, George Eliot’s fullest response 
to Darwin (mentioned above) comes in the “indirect” form of her fiction. 
Throughout her early works in particular many have noted a Wordswor-
thian celebration of nature and of ordinary human nature, an approach that 
reflects as well what Erich Auerbach calls the sermo humilis that character-
izes the language of the Bible, in whose heroes “humiliation and elevation” 
meet.48 One example from “Janet’s Repentance,” the third “Scene,” represents 
many. Commenting on how the restoration of Janet’s spirit lends wonder to 
“the flowerless monotony” of an ordinary walk, the narrator says: “A very 
commonplace scene indeed. But what scene was ever commonplace in the 
descending sunlight, when colour has awakened from its noonday sleep, and 
long shadows awe us like a disclosed presence?”49 Extending this view, Adam 
Bede, her novel of the same year as Darwin’s Origin of Species, positively rev-
els in the power of nature and its Ecclesiastes- like imperviousness to human 
woes. But for George Eliot’s narrator the facts of evolution and natural selec-
tion are the text for a lesson: as “children” of nature’s “large family,” we 
must learn “to be content with little nurture and caressing, and help each 
other the more.”50 In other words, the inexorable inhuman power of nature 
calls human beings to be all the more human. Adam Bede reflects the under-
standing that pervades George Eliot’s early fiction that the natural tragedies 
of human experience are the site of a kind of natural redemption that carries 
hints of an underlying supernatural “mystery.”
The second way in which George Eliot demonstrates the mutually rein-
forcing doctrines of realism and incarnation in Adam Bede is to promote an 
anti- doctrinal form of Christianity that is lived out in the form of love and 
sympathy (what we would call empathy or compassion) for the weak among 
us. The two main clerics here are the Anglican Reverend Irwine and the 
Methodist Dinah Morris, who show their true Christian character by putting 
doctrine aside in favor of love. Despite Dinah’s rather otherworldly, asexual 
character (eventually modified when she falls in love), George Eliot convinces 
readers to see past Dinah’s prim exterior to the genuine faith and love that 
pervade her spirit. Like Adam, we might not accept her words except that 
we see her acting on them: “I don’t know what I should ha’ thought of her 
and her letter if I’d never seen her,”51 he says, thus testifying to a faith in 
her words because of the genuineness of her actions, the incarnation of her 
words. Extending this one step further, we could say that George Eliot wants 
us to believe, not what Dinah believes, but in the Dinah who believes it.
22 Chapter 1
With Reverend Irwine, George Eliot produces another in her lifelong series 
of flawed but in this case highly admirable Anglican clerics. As is her wont, 
she interrupts the flow of her narrative about a third of the way through with 
the famous chapter 17, entitled, à la Fielding, “In Which the Story Pauses a 
Little.” By this time, we have already been introduced to Mr. Irwine by her 
characteristic method (of which more later) of taking us into his home, where 
he lives with his mother and unmarried, dependent sisters, one of them ill in 
the irritating way of nineteenth- century ladies, and we have seen him treat his 
family members and a semiliterate pompous parishioner with deep respect 
and consummate courtesy. The narrator even makes sure that we notice that 
he takes off his shoes upon entering the sickroom. But we have also seen 
him, with huge consequences, miss the opportunity to hear the confession 
of a young gentleman who visits him, thereby failing to avert the tragedy 
that is the story’s center. This clerical failure is the catalyst for the narrator’s 
interjection, as he52 feels the need to persuade his readers of the worthiness 
of his cleric. Here follows the famous manifesto of realism in which George 
Eliot, echoing Wordsworth’s “Preface,” declares her dedication to “the faith-
ful representing of commonplace things.”53 While much has been made of 
the realist’s commitment to represent “vulgar details,” it is clear that George 
Eliot sees “Art” as called to be representative of ordinary life in the context 
of a love of beauty, not just for its own abstract sense (which she seems to 
mock as “the divine beauty of form”), but in the form of its “secret of deep 
human sympathy.”
Therefore let Art always remind us of [“these common, coarse peo-
ple”]; therefore let us always have men ready to give the loving pains 
of a life to the faithful representing of commonplace things— men 
who see beauty in these commonplace things, and delight in showing 
how kindly the light of heaven falls on them.54
This dual commitment pervades her whole career: as she proclaims here, 
“paint us an angel, if you can, with a floating violet robe, and a face paled 
by celestial light; paint us yet oftener a Madonna,” but do not “banish from 
the region of Art those old women scraping carrots.”55 Indeed this is, I think, 
more than an aesthetic code to her; it is a religious doctrine.56
Years later, in the letter to Harrison quoted above, George Eliot states 
this in her own terms: “I think aesthetic teaching is the highest of all teach-
ing because it deals with life in its highest complexity. But if it ceases to be 
purely aesthetic— if it lapses anywhere from the picture to the diagram— it 
becomes the most offensive of all teaching.”57 What is most interesting to me 
is the way that her discussion of art in chapter 17 of Adam Bede, which we 
might see as a violation of her own doctrine, in that she feels compelled to 
speak in abstract, diagrammatic terms of her belief instead of letting her “pic-
ture” express itself through story and character, in a larger sense does exactly 
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represent her belief, in that her defense of Mr. Irwine is also a defense of her 
art, and vice versa. She moves seamlessly from the outline of her aesthetic to 
Adam’s defense of Mr. Irwine and his non- doctrinal brand of religion that 
spills over from the pulpit into the mundane activities of his life. In other 
words, Mr. Irwine is like George Eliot herself, whose art loves her characters 
despite what they believe or even how they behave. When she talks about her 
art, she is also talking about religion; when she tells her reader, echoing the 
Book of Common Prayer, that here is a man “with whom I desire you to be 
in perfect charity,”58 she is also echoing Mr. Irwine himself, who would not 
only speak the words of Common Prayer but would speak the words and 
perform the acts of charity to everyone. She would have her readers do unto 
him as they would be done by, as she is doing by him and by every one of her 
characters, in charity. It is supremely logical, then, that George Eliot moves 
in one chapter from a defense of her aesthetic to a defense of her cleric. The 
relation between the two is essential; her job as an artist is to represent her 
cleric as he really is and to treat him with the same loving care that he treats 
his parishioners. Understanding that “the true and the good are one,” as she 
says in her essay on Mackay, is “the essential element of religion.”59
Language is important to this aesthetic— as central as it is to Wordsworth— 
and while George Eliot might be seen to violate her own code when she 
soars off into a eulogy of art, her true love for the common folk comes out 
when she speaks their language, always a moment of genuine sympathy 
and pleasure for the reader. When the narrator says, for example, that Mrs. 
Poyser “thanked God she never had any of your varnished rubbish in her 
house,” George Eliot has thoroughly entered into the canny, honest pride of 
the farmer’s wife.60 Likewise her immersion in biblical culture is clear when 
she has her characters speak the language of Methodists. She too, then, is 
practicing what she preaches in using “loving pains” to bring her characters 
to life, thereby exemplifying the third way in which her incarnational aes-
thetic takes realistic shape. And here we touch on the key element in George 
Eliot’s understanding of the incarnation, which underlies her whole aes-
thetic and provides the major theme of Adam Bede: the necessity for and the 
meaning of suffering, or, as she calls it in that novel the “mystery of human 
sorrow.”61
Feuerbach’s description of the God who is made in the image of man turns 
on the human desire for a God who loves us to the point of excruciating 
suffering and painful death. He writes eloquently of the idolatry of feeling 
that produces the idea of an incarnated god. “But the proposition: God is a 
feeling Being,” Marian Evans translates him as writing, “is only the religious 
paraphrase of the proposition: feeling is absolute, divine in its nature.”62 In 
another famous section (chapter 25), Feuerbach celebrates the value of bread 
and water as purely physical substances, thereby naturalizing the elements 
of Christian sacraments. Both of these ideas have been widely used to sup-
port readings of a Feuerbachian Adam Bede. And generally critics see in the 
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novel either a naturalizing of the sacred or a sacramentalizing of the natural. 
Both of these perspectives are valid, I think, because they are rather mutually 
illuminating than oppositional. As I noted before, George Eliot represents her 
two key religious characters as genuine embodiments of their beliefs, mean-
ing that they practice what they believe in (although Rev. Irwine’s beliefs are 
stated as expressions of his church affiliation, rather than in more personal 
terms). And she affirms the faith of these characters as being founded in 
what has been seen as a Feuerbachian kind of religious feeling. Dinah’s faith, 
for example, is expressed in terms of the kind of Methodist “inner light” 
which she experiences as a deep feeling of God’s presence and guidance. And 
Adam, likewise, expresses his own non- Methodist faith and affirms that of 
Rev. Irwine in terms of “deep, speritial things in religion” that are matters of 
“feelings,” not “doctrines and notions.”63 Throughout, George Eliot affirms 
feeling as an expression of human participation in “an unfathomable ocean 
of love and beauty” that makes human love “hardly distinguishable from 
religious feeling.”64 Adam, for example, in trying to win Dinah away from 
religious feeling to feeling for him, says, “feeling’s a sort of knowledge”65 and 
Dinah’s ultimate affirmation of the incarnation, one might say, is expressed 
in her ability to love God and Adam.
But the fullest expression of this capacity for feeling is through sympathy 
with weaker fellow beings and the suffering this entails. The whole novel is 
based on a demonstration of what must be seen as the essence of the Christian 
doctrine of incarnation, the transformative power of suffering,66 as George 
Eliot implicitly argues against the hated doctrine of compensation on the one 
hand and the notion of meaningless pain on the other.67 The most explicit 
reference to the Christian interpretation of suffering in the novel comes in a 
curious incident when the narrator notes how he has come across, in foreign 
lands (never in his own Loamshire) “an image of great agony: the agony of 
the cross.” He speculates that a traveler who did not know the meaning of 
“this image of agony” would “find it strangely out of place in the midst of 
this joyous nature,” not knowing that it pointed to the sufferings of some 
“foolish lost lamb,” such as the wayfaring Hetty. He goes on, “No wonder 
man’s religion has much sorrow in it: no wonder he needs a suffering God.”68 
This moment echoes the much- repeated report (cited above) that while Evans 
was translating Strauss “it made her ill dissecting the beautiful story of the 
crucifixion, and only the sight of her Christ- image and picture made her 
endure it.”69 George Eliot continued to have a strong attraction to the story 
of a suffering savior. And, while it is easily possible to read Adam Bede as 
a revisioning of the incarnation in Feuerbachian terms, the image of Hetty 
as a straying lamb is one of many allusions to Christ’s parables that points 
to Eliot’s non- Feuerbachian response. For George Eliot could not think of 
God as what Feuerbach calls “a commonplace book, a nucleus of aggrega-
tion” from which humans derive “an aim” for moral action.70 And, perhaps 
in spite of herself, her own stories reflect an aesthetic that is grounded in an 
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incarnational approach that is modeled after the parables and stories of the 
incarnated God.
As I mentioned before, it is crucial to recognize George Eliot’s indirection 
as essential to her approach. Like Kierkegaard, I would argue, she uses stories, 
not to tell the reader what to believe, but to inspire in the individual reader a 
belief in her or his own “capability of an altered vision.” Like Kierkegaard’s 
parables, as described by the theologian Thomas Oden, her stories “intend to 
communicate an enriched capacity for self- examination leading to increased 
moral sensitivity and intensified spirituality.”71 As the theologian and story-
teller John Shea puts it, “A Christian culture must always generate secondary 
forms. The imagination must play with the story of Jesus and resymbolize 
it under the influences of the present experiences of the Spirit.”72 Like Jesus, 
in fact, Christian storytellers must release their stories and allow for this 
kind of “play” of interpretation. It is important, then, to affirm for George 
Eliot’s stories the possibility of differing interpretations, because just such 
hermeneutic openness is essential to her aesthetic, even as it was essential to 
Christ’s storytelling. One reader may in fact see her stories as affirming Feuer-
bach’s religion of humanity, and another reader may not. The only thing one 
can say with certainty is that she leaves the theological meaning a matter of 
interpretation, demanding only that readers recognize the personal message 
of love and charity. And perhaps in this regard, oddly enough, she is imitating 
the message of the Gospel: as Adam says, it isn’t notions and doctrines, but 
actions and feelings that count.
Inwardness
George Eliot’s understanding of incarnation is knit together with her under-
standing of inwardness. Firstly, in a way that I have already been suggesting, 
incarnation— in religion and in art— is a matter of revealing what will remain 
hidden to those who do not have eyes to see (and various forms of the trope 
of vision and blindness, as has often been noted, are rife in her work). While 
George Eliot is clear that her call as an artist is to represent the “commonplace 
things,” it is at the same time “to see beauty” in them: women peeling carrots 
need to be represented alongside angels and madonnas. In this respect she is 
explicit about the fact that the manifest superiority of her major characters— 
Adam, Dinah, and Rev. Irwine— is based on the extraordinary perceptual 
ability that they share with their creator: the ability to see beauty and worth 
in apparent unworthiness. Throughout her career George Eliot represents 
social groups in need of a special person. What qualifies these characters as 
special is their capacity for inwardness. Inwardness is the corollary to incar-
nation, in that while incarnation makes the idea visible (though as noted 
above, infinitely debatable), inwardness is a matter of a hidden, invisible, 
“unfathomable” space of engagement.73
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Most readers associate George Eliot with the idea of inwardness in the form 
of her masterful psychological approach to character, and Michael Davis’s 
recent book situates her skill in the context of nineteenth- century psychology, 
showing her conversance with a complex and erudite mass of contemporary 
works on psychology, most importantly those of her husband. Davis includes 
a chapter on religion and science, focusing on Daniel Deronda, but the extent 
of the interplay in George Eliot’s work between religious consciousness and 
psychological consciousness has not, to my knowledge, been explored. Davis 
finds abundant evidence in George Eliot’s works for two points that are fun-
damental to what I want to argue here: he reiterates how important to George 
Eliot is the fact of individuality, including the individuality of each conscious-
ness; and the fact of unknowability: that each mind is to a great extent an 
unknown, not only to others, but, I would argue, to itself.74 In light of the 
wave of philosophical debate on this issue— notably, as I have mentioned, 
Strauss’s argument for a universal human and Comte’s idea of a kind of social 
salvation— George Eliot’s adherence to the belief in an ultimately mysterious 
individuality is important. In fact, I want to argue, her belief in individuality, 
and the inwardness that is its marker, is profoundly religious.75
Charles Taylor speaks of the idea of inwardness when he traces the devel-
opment of the modern sense of the self, showing that it is Augustine who 
first invokes “the language of inwardness,” thus creating what Taylor calls 
“a stance of radical reflexivity.”76 Augustine takes this step from ontology 
to epistemology to show that “God is to be found in the intimacy of self- 
presence,”77 but Descartes later concludes that what we find in this space is 
not God, but our selves. I turn again here to Kierkegaard, the great prophet 
of inwardness and individuality. Although George Eliot never knew his 
work, so far as I have been able to discover, Kierkegaard’s response to the 
great Hegelian wave, including Feuerbach, is useful to establish the ground 
of my argument because it is based on an aversion to Hegel’s dismantling 
of the importance of individuality, an aversion which George Eliot clearly 
shared. Feuerbach turns the space of inwardness— human subjectivity— into 
a reflector of and projector onto the outer world. “I unconditionally repudi-
ate absolute, immaterial, self- sufficing speculation— that speculation which 
draws its material from within,” he asserts; “I hold that alone to be an object 
which has an existence beyond one’s own brain.”78 Feuerbach wants to turn 
the gaze of religion “from the internal to the external,” from “the sign to 
the thing signified.”79 The supposed object of religious feeling, he claims, is 
also its subject: “thy own being.”80 There is only our perception, he would 
say, which claims to find outside what is really just inside of us; we would 
understand this if we truly appreciated what is really outside of ourselves, 
natural elements such as bread and wine, for example.81 (No wonder the 
“silly ladies” were confused.)
In opposition to such ideas, Kierkegaard’s consuming passion was to restore 
authenticity to contemporary Christianity by rescuing the essential ingredient 
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that he saw as being destroyed in Hegel’s philosophy— the individual— and 
to do so by redefining the individual as the religious subject. Kierkegaard 
identifies the meaning of existing as a human being with existing religiously; 
that is, with a sense of what he calls inwardness.82 For Kierkegaard, “subjec-
tivity,” for individuals located in time, “is the truth” and “the truth exists for 
them in inwardness.”83 Also relevant to my argument here is Kierke gaard’s 
understanding of the meaning of suffering: it is only when suffering “turns 
the person inward,” he says, with Keatsian resonance, that a person can 
“become an individual.”84
George Eliot’s attention to inwardness, in terms very similar to Kierke-
gaard’s, constitutes a virtual epistemology, if not a theology, of interiority. 
Indeed, it seems to me that her understanding of inwardness takes her away 
from Feuerbach and toward Kierkegaard. In writing to a friend to explain 
how she could have written in Adam Bede of Evangelical Christianity 
from the inside, as it were, George Eliot writes that, despite her rejection of 
“dogmatic Christianity,” her experience from the ages of 15 to 22 among 
Evangelicals left her with “the profoundest interest in the inward life of sin-
cere Christians.”85 And though she acknowledges here that “that inward self” 
of her own has changed since those years, it is clear that, as Gordon Haight 
writes in his “Introduction” to her Letters, “Without her intimate knowledge 
of the Evangelical mind George Eliot would have lacked part of the experi-
ence on which her wide sympathy was founded.”86 It is in fact her insistence 
on interiority that is the basis of her characterization and her epistemology.
There are two main elements to George Eliot’s epistemology of interi-
ority. The first is the repeated, multifaceted invitation to readers to “come 
inside”— the church, the farmhouse, the bedchamber, the mind of her char-
acters. In a way, George Eliot is the great historian of human conscience and 
consciousness because of her profound sense of inner space, and of the dif-
ference between the outside and the inside, of surface and depth, which she 
represents as markers of egotism. One of many memorable moments that 
construct this sense of different spatial orientations is the “Bed- chambers” 
chapter in Adam Bede,87 when Hetty’s solipsistic and shallow gaze in the 
mirror is contrasted with Dinah’s visionary gaze out the window and up to 
the sky.88 (Taylor might call this reflection vs. reflexivity.) Related to this and 
also represented well in Hetty and Dinah is the kind of “feeling knowledge” 
that George Eliot celebrates: a knowing that is not only sympathetic or empa-
thetic but personal and individual and costly. It is a knowing that is a kind of 
suffering because it requires that one enter in to the experience of the other.89 
As I’ve said, sympathetic imagination is the mark of George Eliot’s religious 
and aesthetic code. As many have noted, she was fortunate to have George 
Henry Lewes as her first and her ideal reader; it was largely because her first 
reader was an intelligent man who loved her that she was able to love her 
characters into existence. And indeed, her letters record how making him cry 
was the sign that she had engaged his sympathetic imagination. If she could 
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make this intellectual, critical, unchurched man cry about the sorrows of 
“an Evangelical curate and a woman with ‘spiritual’ weaknesses,” as Lewes 
described the main characters of “Janet’s Repentance,”90 then, she believed, 
she had done something worth doing.91
George Eliot’s understanding of interior being, like Kierkegaard’s, is most 
often constructed in terms of an intimate relationship, not of romantic love, 
which she leaves to our imaginations, but of confession.92 It is at this site of 
intimacy that her desire to “make others feel” what she feels93 is most evident, 
just as Dinah’s desire to make others believe what she believes is most power-
ful and effective not when she is preaching in public space but when she is 
fighting for the soul of Hetty in the richly symbolic prison cell. The confes-
sion scene in “Janet’s Repentance” is the climax of a story that is based on a 
real- life situation from the time when George Eliot’s “inward self” was devel-
oping in the Evangelical community. In one of her many stories of rescue, the 
abused, wayward Janet is saved by the intervention of the Evangelical minis-
ter, Mr. Tryan, another of George Eliot’s admired clerics. This is the third of 
the clerical Scenes, and from the first page of the first one, when the reader is 
bid to “pass through the baize doors,” she now arrives at the inner sanctum 
of intersubjectivity. George Eliot frames the narrative with pleas to the reader 
to recognize that “the only true knowledge of our fellow- man is that which 
enables us to feel with him”; that, whatever the followers of the “philosophic 
Deity” of abstraction might tell us, one lost sheep shows the “transcendent 
value of human pain”; that “analysis” must be “lit up by  .  .  . love”; that 
“feelings of trust and resignation” must fill up the blanks of “the margin of 
ignorance which surrounds all our knowledge.”94 Mr. Tryan proves a worthy 
confessor when, accepting that necessary ignorance, he “enter[s] into the only 
half- expressed secrets of her spiritual weakness” and responds to Janet’s need 
for confession with a confession of his own.95 George Eliot makes clear that 
for Janet and Mr. Tryan this confession takes place in the inward space that 
Augustine and Kierkegaard posit, even seeming to invoke the latter when she 
writes that “confiding in human sympathy . . . prepared [Janet’s] soul for that 
stronger leap by which faith grasps the idea of divine sympathy.”96 In explic-
itly differentiating on the last page of the story between Janet’s sense of the 
“Divine love that had rescued her” and the “human love” that had mediated 
the rescue, George Eliot constructs the inward self as what Kierkegaard calls 
“a relation” to both the human and the divine other.97
What is remarkable, however, is George Eliot’s intention to show that even 
the shallowest characters, notably Hetty, have a depth, an inside, which is far 
from evident on the surface; or that they have a possible depth, which can 
be learned or perhaps constructed, with the help of a loving community, by 
their response to suffering. Along with that of Hetty, George Eliot’s explora-
tion of Silas Marner’s consciousness is a brilliant example, as I will discuss 
in chapter 5.98 Hetty’s failure is represented as a kind of childish but at the 
same time vicious egotism that manifests itself as a failure of empathy and a 
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complete self- absorption, as if she is stuck in a Lacanian pre- linguistic mir-
ror state. In fact she is nothing but a reflection. And the huge struggle in the 
prison cell, which Dinah sees as a spiritual battle to save Hetty’s soul before 
she is executed, is at the same time an intense struggle to make Hetty see that 
there is something besides herself in the world, that there is an outside, and, 
conversely, an inside, to herself. Hetty’s failure throughout the novel is not 
only a moral and emotional failure but fundamentally a failure of imagina-
tion, which to George Eliot is at the same time a failure of memory and of 
belief, which together constitute for her the basis of human fellowship and 
community and of individual identity.
George Eliot delves more deeply into the fraught relation between imagi-
nation, memory, and identity in her next works. Although many see George 
Eliot’s early period as including Silas Marner, mainly because of its obvious 
affinity in setting and tone, I believe that in a psychological and religious 
sense this novel is written on the other side of a great divide, nicely symbol-
ized by the bridge that the narrator leans on in chapter 1 of The Mill on the 
Floss, the novel that follows a year after Adam Bede. For Silas Marner, while 
it deals with the time of her early experience in the Midlands, is written from 
the perspective of the writer who has used earlier fictions to take her beyond 
that formative time.
Along with Wordsworth and Dickens, George Eliot helped create a more 
vivid evocation of childhood than readers had before seen. The importance 
of childhood to the shaping of consciousness and identity is most strongly 
represented in The Mill on the Floss, where its memory and imaginative 
reconstruction are represented, as in Wordsworth, as a religious shrine.99 
For George Eliot, our response to “the joy of childhood” is deeply akin to 
our response to religious experience, and her sense of the interrelation of 
memory, imagination, and faith is nicely captured in the midst of a descrip-
tion of Adam’s faith in Hetty: though “much” of “the joy of childhood” has 
“vanish[ed] utterly from our memory” and “is gone forever from our imagi-
nation,” she writes, “we can only believe in” it.100 It is interesting that in The 
Mill on the Floss, which, rooted as it is in a working out of the trauma of 
familial and social rejection, is certainly the most autobiographical of her 
novels, George Eliot asks the reader to “believe in” Maggie’s childhood joy 
while showing how much of the purported joy was a product of Maggie’s 
imagination, mixing memory and desire, breeding lilacs out of the dead land.
The Mill on the Floss clearly puts a whole other spin on the idea of inward-
ness, first of all simply in taking George Eliot to a deeper inward place than 
any of her other works. Before looking further at the implications of this, I 
want to bring in to the discussion a short story, published between Adam 
Bede and The Mill, which served as a kind of doorkeeper to this other level of 
interiority. For my purposes the story bears the perfect title “The Lifted Veil,” 
for it is densely figured with inwardness. The story is unique in George Eliot’s 
opus in that it is a dark Gothic tale about a very unpleasant, self- centered, 
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melancholy young man with unusual powers of insight. It comes at a cru-
cial juncture following the revelation of George Eliot’s real identity after she 
became fed up with being impersonated; and, given the associations of the 
veil with marriage and discretion, it seems to reflect anxieties of self- exposure, 
not only as an author but as a common- law wife who is daring, after all, 
to preach to her readers.101 Two of George Eliot’s most famous statements 
are relevant here. One (mentioned earlier) is her comment in a letter of this 
time with regard to Darwin’s Origin of Species: “But to me the Development 
theory and all other explanations of processes by which things come to be, 
produce a feeble impression compared with the mystery that lies under the 
processes.”102 The other is the famous squirrel sentence from Middlemarch, 
commenting on the hidden tragedy that comprises ordinary experience: “If 
we had a keen vision and feeling of all ordinary human life, it would be like 
hearing the grass grow and the squirrel’s heart beat, and we should die of that 
roar which lies on the other side of silence.”103 In “The Lifted Veil” it is as if 
Eliot lifts the veil and sees the unmediated pain underneath the surface. To me 
it is as if she is contemplating the horror of a kind of Nietzschean perception 
without sympathy, inwardness without religious consciousness.
In the end the story represents a kind of alter ego that George Eliot keeps 
at bay by her choice to believe in sympathy. But the movement toward the 
full development of her own authorial self is not complete until she purges 
her own childhood sorrows, killing off the heroine of her next novel (with 
so much crying in the process that Lewes feared for her health)104 so that 
she herself might live. In this process she imagines a death of memory itself 
so that she can write outside of its shadow. For whereas earlier stories had 
drawn on memories that she had reshaped imaginatively, in The Mill on the 
Floss memory itself and the past from which it comes are the antagonists. 
This novel is the great culmination of George Eliot’s early work and the 
enabler of what comes after, as she explicitly explores the implications of the 
“progress of the intellect” and of society, mainly by thematizing the educa-
tion of a girl and boy and the growth of their consciousness in an oppressive 
provincial backwater. George Eliot explicitly structures the novel in biblical 
terms of a Paradise Lost, and the narrator explicitly identifies Maggie and 
Tom as “martyr[s]” of “historical advance.”105
One could say that Maggie is Mary Anne Evans reincarnated: the pre-
cocious, affectionate child deeply in need of the love of her father and 
particularly her brother. Like Mary Anne, Maggie revels in the world of 
imagination and seeks safety and transcendence as a young woman in a strict 
religious otherworldliness that is actually a self- repression. Instead of mak-
ing the break from her family that Mary Anne was able to do, Maggie binds 
herself to her past, living under the sway of a fierce god named Tom, who 
knows no forgiveness and no pity. Here, it seems to me, George Eliot allows 
her imagination to spell out some of the implications of her creed. In particu-
lar, the notion that feeling is a kind of knowing is a fatal one for Maggie, who 
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invests her own identity in her brother’s unforgiving care, believing that he 
must love her because he knows her so well. The narrator of Adam Bede had 
told us we must believe in those childhood joys; here, Maggie does believe, 
and it is this belief that kills her. When Tom says, after her elopement, “I 
can’t believe in you anymore,”106 we know, as does Maggie, that he has never 
believed in her. Her faith is completely one- sided, completely a construction 
of her imagination.
As she had Adam Bede, George Eliot interrupts the story of the Tullivers 
mid- way, this time to tell readers that tragedy is possible among these “vulgar” 
provincial types. She uses two European rivers, the Rhine and the Rhone, to 
set up the same kind of contrast she had created in the earlier novel between 
the woman peeling carrots and the angel, again affirming two different kinds 
of beauty. When tragedy does come, in the form of a river overflowing its 
banks, it is as if her art is rebelling against “the divine beauty of form” that 
allows her to keep from going mad with hearing the squirrel’s heartbeat, as if 
the tears of sympathy are mocking their proponent. What, after all, she might 
be saying, is the value of art, of culture, of sympathy, when nature is always 
and everywhere the conqueror? Maggie’s dramatic drowning with her nem-
esis brother Tom has been the subject of endless interpretations, almost all of 
them correct. Maggie does triumphantly kill Tom; she does allow social dis-
repute to destroy her; George Eliot does fantasize a death that is both revenge 
and defeat; it is a sacrifice, a martyrdom, a shame. That it is all of these things 
and more testifies to the glorious triumph of George Eliot’s narrative imagi-
nation. Frank Kermode has written that the loss of “the sense of an ending” 
and of an authenticated beginning is responsible for a rich literary heritage. 
There is a direct correlation, he writes, between “the subtlety and variety in 
our fictions and remoteness and doubtfulness about ends and origins.”107 It 
is not just Maggie who dies at the end of George Eliot’s novel, then, but the 
whole culture, the whole past that gave birth to her. For it is because of the 
death of that young self, because she has the courage to test the limits of faith 
and imagination, that we have novels of such “subtlety and variety” as these.
A Concluding Unscientific Postscript
The Word became flesh, says the author of the Gospel of John, and dwelt 
among us. The Word Incarnate spoke in parables and metaphors, inspiring 
faith by activating imagination and awakening an attitude of inwardness. 
This same interrelation of incarnation, inwardness, and imagination, I have 
been arguing, constitutes the basis of the aesthetic of George Eliot’s early fic-
tion. Maggie’s death is the most important moment in George Eliot’s career, 
for it is only by killing her young self that she creates her authorial self. This 
is crucial not only for George Eliot’s career but in the larger scope of liter-
ary history, because it figures, not what Barthes famously called the death 
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of the author that followed on the death of God, but instead what Foucault 
in response called “the coming into being of the notion of ‘author’ [that] 
constitutes the privileged moment of individualization.”108 The italics are 
Foucault’s, but they could be mine, both because George Eliot’s conviction 
that the individual is the site of belief and value is crucial to her incarnational 
aesthetic and because Maggie’s death heralds the birth in her creator of a new 
understanding of incarnation and its relation to narrative.
It is interesting that shortly after the publication of The Mill on the Floss 
George Eliot began what would become regular visits to Italy and traveled 
once to Spain, where she viewed sites and artworks of religious significance 
from the pre- Reformation world. This geographical and religious movement 
is the sign of an imaginative shift beyond the Evangelical religious terrain 
of her early inspiration; it is part of her quest “to know,” as she says in a 
letter of this time, “if possible, the lasting meaning that lies in all religious 
doctrine from the beginning till now.”109 This continuing quest is the subject 
of the following chapters, but if readers experience in George Eliot’s later, 
post- Evangelical fiction— as they surely do— what Richard Kearney calls the 
“redemptive power” of narrative imagination,110 it is because she has herself 
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Toward a Post- Evangelical Aesthetic
I was reading the sorrows of the aged Hecuba with great 
enjoyment. I wish an immortal drama could be got out of 
my sorrows, that people might be the better for them two 
thousand years hence. But fog, east wind, and headache are 
not great dramatic motives.
— George Eliot, Letters, Haight edition, 4:139 (March 25, 1864)
Maggie’s death inaugurates the second phase of George Eliot’s career. The 
passage is marked in several interrelated ways: historical, geographical, aes-
thetic, psychological, and religious. While many critics note the change in 
tone and subject matter from early to middle works, the editors of George 
Eliot’s journals, Margaret Harris and Judith Johnston, acknowledge the 
importance of the geographical element, judging the Italian journey of 1860 
as the crucial turning point that marks “the shift from the working out of 
childhood memories to more studied work on the past in relation to the 
present, both reading the past in relation to the present, and writing it.”1 I 
would agree with this assessment but argue that what has been consistently 
overlooked is the way in which George Eliot’s shift in religious perspective 
undergirds and helps to explain the meaning of the change in her approach.
As I argued in the last chapter, George Eliot wrestles with Maggie in a 
Hegelian life- and- death struggle that results in the death of the character 
and the birth of the author, such that one could say that the character is the 
mother of the author. The next phase— to pursue the Freudian model for a 
moment— is the adolescent testing of this new authorial life. What George 
Eliot does next will determine the meaning and value of Maggie’s death and 
the very existence of the entity we have come to know as “George Eliot.” 
We could see Maggie’s sacrifice as the culmination of George Eliot’s novel-
istic initiation, and in these terms one can understand the peculiar intensity 
that charges the writing of the next decade, with the shadow of futility and 
failure hovering over them. One could also say that Maggie dies a martyr 
34 Chapter 2
to idealism in that her hopes and dreams can never be realized in the actual 
world of her experience. In this sense her struggle and defeat mark the next 
stage in George Eliot’s lifelong effort to realize the ideal, to find a credible 
way to bring the ideal into her fiction and to model for readers the relation 
between the ideal and the actual in the world. While this could be said of any 
of George Eliot’s works perhaps, this period is marked by a more deliberate 
exploration of the dark side of idealism.
This is the period of her two least- read novels, Romola and Felix Holt, 
The Radical, as well as her almost never- read long dramatic poem, The Span-
ish Gypsy. While scholars always find interest in these texts, they are typically 
judged as at best “transitional” works2 and at worst and by most as works 
of relative failure. George Eliot’s journals and letters of the time confirm this 
period to be her deepest slough of despond; never a stranger to discourage-
ment, she struggles during this time with serious depression and even despair 
over the worth of her work. In other words, she not only explores the disap-
pointments of idealism in her fiction but she experiences them herself. What 
most distinguishes George Eliot’s work at this time, however, is the way she 
turns despair and disillusionment to account by making failure her theme. In 
this chapter I will explore some of the ways in which George Eliot’s experi-
ence with failure informed the development of the incarnational aesthetic 
that shapes and grounds her religious imagination.
Geographical and Historical
This period begins a phase in which, having moved beyond the religious ter-
rain of her youth, George Eliot is seeking a new kind of holy ground for her 
imagination; this quest took geographical and historical shape. Beginning 
with the death of her father, she had always traveled extensively, but in this 
period she travels farther and more frequently and ventures more deliberately 
to push geographical boundaries. We might see her using her body to mimic 
her internal adventures, with her travels reflecting her religious and personal 
journeying. As a young woman she had visited Switzerland and Germany, as 
if, following her intense engagement with Strauss and Feuerbach, she meant 
physically to go over the terrain of Protestantism that would soon be the 
ground of her fiction. The new stage begins in 1860 when, following the 
completion of The Mill on the Floss, she and Lewes embark upon their first 
Italian journey. This is the first of several visits to Italy, followed by a truly 
adventurous and highly significant journey to Spain, the nations which, along 
with France, are most associated with Roman Catholicism. Spatial journeying 
is matched then with temporal journeying when Romola takes her imagina-
tion to pre- Reformation Renaissance Italy, and The Spanish Gypsy takes her 
to medieval Spain, and thereby to religious worlds that predate both the 
Victorian crisis of faith and her own.
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During her travels, she is gathering material and models for her post- 
Evangelical aesthetic, for these journeys mark a break out of the provincial 
environment that had suffocated Maggie. The Mill on the Floss has already 
suggested the need for such religious questing. Two of the most important ref-
erences to religion in Maggie’s life are her intense engagement with Thomas 
à Kempis and the futility of Dr. Kenn’s attempt to help her in the face of the 
unloving Christian community. But I want to draw attention to a moment in 
Maggie’s childhood when George Eliot points to a major flaw in the church. 
This occurs early in the novel when Mr. Stelling, Tom’s tutor, famously 
crushes the precocious Maggie’s spirit by granting her only the “superficial 
cleverness” of girls.3 In talking about the education Tom is receiving, the nar-
rator makes a long disquisition on the human dependence on metaphors, a 
dependence which prevents Tom’s tutor from understanding the nature of 
his pupil’s mind and teaching him accordingly. This critique of Mr. Stelling is 
part of a larger critique of an education system that uses language to close, 
instead of open, children’s minds. But crucially this is also part of George 
Eliot’s critique of religion, for Mr. Stelling is also a cleric, trying to eke out 
a living to supply his wife with fashionable clothes and furnishings. In this 
context the narrator writes of Mr. Stelling:
He thought religion was a very excellent thing, and Aristotle a great 
authority, and deaneries and prebends useful institutions, and Great 
Britain the providential bulwark of Protestantism, and faith in the 
unseen a great support to afflicted minds: he believed in all these 
things, as a Swiss hotel- keeper believes in the beauty of the scenery 
around him, and in the pleasures it gives to artistic visitors.4
In the scathing image of England as a “providential bulwark of Protestant-
ism,” George Eliot points here to the narrow, provincial, self- satisfied attitude 
of a church that defines God and the universe in its own limited terms. Here 
too she alludes to the cleric’s condescending attitude toward artists, who see 
more in the world around them than the hotel- keeper can imagine. And here 
too she points to the fundamental ingredient both of imagination and of reli-
gion: a faith in the unseen, which is guided by the senses and the reason but 
refuses to be limited by them.
One of the predominant tropes throughout George Eliot’s fiction is the 
narrow vs. wide view, and here she gives it explicitly geographical shape in 
representing the smallness of English Protestantism. This is important in 
signaling the literal sense that grounds the imaginative journeying she is pro-
moting; for it is significant that George Eliot had recently made a return 
visit to Switzerland, the destination of her first expedition away from En-
gland, and I don’t think it is pushing the point too much to say that her 
analogy about the Swiss hotel- keeper gains imaginative power from its 
being based on actual experience. This analogy points vividly to a major 
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idea that underlies her fiction: imagination is the vital ingredient of faith 
that is lacking in the religious institutions of her time, and religion must 
be vitally constituted of imagination. George Eliot’s own experience mani-
fested this need when she sought inspiration beyond the English Protestant 
“bulwark” in European countries of predominantly Roman Catholic cultural 
background.
George Eliot’s letters of the 1860s contain several significant references 
that mark out the religious terrain she is traversing at this time. In response 
to two friends’ interest in Roman Catholicism, she writes in December 1860 
that while she adheres to the view that the “highest ‘calling and election’ is 
to do without opium,” she does not begrudge anyone else the “comfort” to 
be found in the “forms and ceremonies” of churchgoing. She goes so far as to 
say, “sympathetically, I enjoy them myself. But I have faith in the working- out 
of higher possibilities than the Catholic or any other church has presented.”5 
Earlier that month she had looked forward “with delight” to a performance 
of Messiah;6 and two Decembers later, after another Messiah, she sees in 
Handel’s “conception of the suffering Messiah” what must “surely” represent 
“the acme of poetry.”7 One of her strongest statements comes in a letter of a 
month earlier when she refutes any propensity on her part “to rob a man of 
his religious belief.” She asserts:
I have too profound a conviction of the efficacy that lies in sincere 
faith, and the spiritual blight that comes with No- faith, to have any 
negative propagandism in me. In fact, I have very little sympathy with 
Free- thinkers as a class, and have lost all interest in mere antagonism 
to religious doctrines. I care only to know, if possible, the lasting 
meaning that lies in all religious doctrine from the beginning till now.8
It is this quest for the meaning in religion that takes her, if not to “the begin-
ning,” at least far beyond her own space and time to Renaissance Italy and 
medieval Spain. Toward the end of the decade, in August 1868, having fin-
ished The Spanish Gypsy, she writes of her “yearning affection towards the 
great religions of the world which have reflected the struggles and needs of 
mankind, with a very different degree of completeness from the shifting com-
promise called ‘philosophical theism.’ ”9
Aesthetic and Generic
As Harris and Johnston note, this period begins “a phase of experiment in 
GE’s career,”10 as this spatiotemporal movement provides the ground for a 
re- visioning in generic and aesthetic terms. This experimentation takes three 
related forms: a burgeoning interest in and use of other arts, particularly 
music and painting; the writing and publishing of her own poetical works, 
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with The Spanish Gypsy being the most ambitious of these; and significant 
discursive wrestling with the question of novelistic form.
To consider the first of these, the attention to other arts, it is evident 
that while she had always demonstrated a penchant for ekphrasis by writ-
ing about other art forms, Romola and The Spanish Gypsy are particularly 
marked by an experimentation with the thematic power of visual art and 
architecture. Further, The Gypsy features a self- reflexive exploration of the 
power of poetry and music, not only in its generic form but also in the songs 
and dances within it. In short, rather than being just a phase of experiment, 
this period points to an unending spirit of experimentation, and this quest for 
new generic forms of artistic expression is integrally related to the quest for 
“higher possibilities” in religion, partly because much of her understanding 
of “the great religions of the world” comes at this time through art.
George Eliot’s European journals are full of references to music and art. 
She and Lewes become personally acquainted with Liszt, dine with Mendels-
sohn, critique Wagner’s operas, and hear Clara Schumann play. They tramp 
through the churches and galleries of Dresden, Florence, Venice, Rome, and 
Madrid, among others, absorbing and assessing and comparing works of 
art. While she makes the most direct use of her exposure to classical and 
religious visual art in Middlemarch, it is also the source of her inspiration 
for The Spanish Gypsy and informs the themes of Romola, as I will discuss. 
But George Eliot’s passion for music is evident from her earliest work— in 
Caterina’s singing in “Mr. Gilfil’s Love Story” and in Maggie’s piano- playing 
and her susceptibility to beautiful singing in The Mill on the Floss— to her 
last, in the female singers in Daniel Deronda.
The second form of generic experimentation to highlight is George Eliot’s 
own poetry. George Eliot clearly showcases her interest in music in her fic-
tion and uses it to explore themes such as passion and self- expression, but it 
is interesting that she writes several poems at this time that focus on musi-
cians, thereby allowing herself to explore themes related to art and creativity 
outside of the constraints of novelistic realism. Her attention to music finds 
intriguing expression toward the end of this period in two substantial long 
dramatic poems, “The Legend of Jubal” and “Armgart” in 1870, and two 
slighter poems, “Arion” and “Stradivarius,” in 1873. In all of these, music is 
represented as a high spiritual calling inevitably linked to misunderstanding 
and failure. Jubal is the creator of music, who is glorified at a distance but 
then mocked, beaten, and left to die, a prophet without honor in his own 
land. Arion is a great musician who dramatically leaps to his death at the 
moment the men who would rob and kill him realize the power and worth 
of his music. Antonio Stradivari dedicates his life to trying to make the per-
fect instrument, caring nothing for his obscurity and the philistine attitude 
of his fellow artist. And Armgart— a brilliant, proud, successful singer— is 
felled by an illness that destroys her voice and results in her becoming a 
dedicated teacher and a better person. These poems are vital to the process of 
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developing George Eliot’s incarnational aesthetic. For poetry offers space for 
more fanciful glimpses than she permits herself in her fiction, allowing her 
to indulge in Romantic, indeed tragic, celebrations of the glorious, painful 
calling of the artist and to speculate on ways to reframe apparent failure as a 
sign of true art and its sacred, perhaps immortal, value.
While any of these poems merits fuller discussion— and I will discuss 
“Armgart” and “Jubal” in chapter 3— I will focus here on another long 
poem from 1865, entitled variously “A Minor Prophet” or “My Vegetarian 
Friend.”11 This poem is not a Romantic piece about music or art but instead 
treats the broader question of idealism and related issues of perfection and 
failure with a more sardonic eye. The poem explores the idea of human prog-
ress that preoccupied Victorian thinking in the wake of Darwinism and other 
challenges to the traditional understanding of a universe in which God is 
overseeing humanity’s advance toward an afterlife. It is framed as a playful 
debate between the titular Prophet and his friend the narrator. The Prophet, 
whose middle name is “Baptist,” adheres to his ancestors’ belief in a “Millen-
nium”12 in which haberdashery uniformity has been achieved, “casual talk” 
is “as good as sermons” (“A Minor Prophet,” line 20), and the vegetarian diet 
has done away with any need for animals, with the result that human beings 
can fill up the whole “terraquaeous globe” (line 75). The Prophet looks for-
ward to a time when
All these rude products will have disappeared
Along with every faulty human type.
By dint of diet vegetarian
All will be harmony of hue and line,
Bodies and minds all perfect, limbs well- tuned,
And talk quite free from aught erroneous.
(“A Minor Prophet,” lines 128– 33)
In response to this doctrine of perfectibility, his friend the narrator defends 
his own penchant for “nature’s blunders, evanescent types / Which sages ban-
ish from Utopia” (“A Minor Prophet,” lines 175– 76). Echoing the narrator 
from chapter 17 of Adam Bede, with his celebration of women peeling car-
rots standing alongside angels and madonnas, the narrator here assures his 
interlocutor that he worships “with the rest” in beauty’s temple, but also that 
“by my hearth I keep a sacred nook” (lines 178– 79) for “the dear imperfect 
things” (155), a practice which he calls his “piety” (182). Noting the “para-
dox” of his feelings (188), he expresses “pity” for “future men who will not 
know / A keen experience with pity blent” because perfection will have no 
need for “the pathos exquisite of lovely minds / Hid in harsh forms— ” (189– 
92). In his perplexity the narrator expresses a paradox that pervades George 
Eliot’s whole career: her love for beauty— along with her longing for a bet-
ter world in which “order, justice, love” (287) prevail— is counterbalanced 
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always by her conviction that it is the desire for good, dependent upon the 
existence of its opposite, that constitutes the best of human nature. While like 
this narrator she holds fast to the “high prophetic vision” that “beholds / The 
paths of beauteous order” (278– 80), she too deplores a perfect future that 
leaves the sorry past behind.
While none of this is new to anyone familiar with George Eliot’s novels, 
the sentiments expressed by the narrator of “A Minor Prophet” help explain 
the peculiar intensity of the energy that pervades her works of the 1860s. As 
suggested above, the narrator of the poem not only embraces George Eliot’s 
religion of feeling but is self- conscious about its paradoxes. For he is aware of 
the pleasure he takes in the pathos prompted by pain and castigates himself 
for his “foolish” and even “wicked” unwillingness to witness the dawn of a 
perfect world (“A Minor Prophet,” line 201). Also implied in his paradoxical 
attitude is the awareness that inspiring the sympathy that constitutes the best 
of human nature means that there must be people for whom we ought to feel 
the “pity” that spells “piety.” In describing the “keen experience with pity 
blent” that reaches out to “ungainly forms” (lines 190, 183), he uses a telling 
analogy that illuminates George Eliot’s understanding of a human- centered 
piety. Rather than “penetrating” these motley folks “like fire divine within 
a common bush / Which glows transfigured by the heavenly guest, / So that 
men put their shoes off,” this pity enables one to be
. . . engaged
Like a sweet child within some thick- walled cell,
Who leaps and fails to hold the window- bars,
But having shown a little dimpled hand
Is visited thenceforth by tender hearts
Whose eyes keep watch about the prison walls.
(“A Minor Prophet,” lines 192– 200)
This analogy vividly illustrates that the sympathy George Eliot promotes 
is not akin to a transfiguration— an encounter between human and divine 
as two alien beings— but is rather a purely human interaction between “a 
sweet child” who has somehow managed to get itself imprisoned and “ten-
der hearts” who cannot free it but can at least “keep watch” over its safety. 
George Eliot is clearly not promoting the burning- bush piety of Moses but 
rather the merciful compassion of Jesus: “I was in prison and you visited me.” 
Further, the image is ambiguous or fluid enough that it is impossible to keep 
the imprisoned child separate from the visitor, suggesting that all humans are 
sweet children imprisoned behind impenetrable walls— “lovely minds / Hid 
in harsh forms.”
Another familiar saying of Jesus— the poor you will always have with 
you— comes to mind when the poem’s narrator goes on to describe “the 
patched and plodding citizen” who exults “almost with a sob” in the coming 
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of “some victorious world- hero” (“A Minor Prophet,” lines 223– 29) but then 
settles back into the “more easy fellowship” of his neighbors, acknowledg-
ing that “could he choose” he would turn time backwards, not forwards, in 
order to repeat the days of his hero- less childhood (lines 240, 256). But then, 
in a passage replete with George Eliot’s characteristic “and yet” and “but,” 
the narrator cries, “Yet no! the earth yields nothing more Divine / Than high 
prophetic vision— ” (277– 78). The poem resolves itself in a conclusion that 
accepts the paradox that the future must be the same but different: “Our fin-
est hope is finest memory” (292).
The narrator further claims that “faith” is strengthened by the emotion 
that rises at the goodness evident in music, art, and “at noble and at gentle 
deeds” (“A Minor Prophet,” lines 277, 303). He has earlier opined: “Bitterly / 
I feel that every change upon this earth / Is bought with sacrifice” (lines 144– 
46). But here, near the end of the poem, he confronts the more perplexing 
problem of a sacrifice that achieves no change:
Even our failures are a prophecy,
Even our yearnings and our bitter tears
After that fair and true we cannot grasp;
As patriots who seem to die in vain
Make liberty more sacred by their pangs.
(“A Minor Prophet,” lines 311– 15)
The poem beautifully illustrates the tension between the desire for perfec-
tion and the value of failure, and, while its focus is the question of human 
progress, the references to the value of art at the end also make explicit what 
is implicit throughout— George Eliot’s doubts concerning her own progress 
and possible failure as a writer. While the poem’s prophet is an ironic per-
sona, George Eliot’s own “high prophetic vision” inspires her whole creative 
effort, and this poem ends by articulating with a striking absence of irony the 
hope that even what appears to be failure may be recognized as a sacrifice 
that has a consecrating effect.
Here I must invoke Maggie in The Mill on the Floss again, whose death 
George Eliot accomplished, as reported by her husband, with more “bitter 
tears” than accompanied any other work.13 Maggie’s death is so very pro-
vocative because it gathers into itself many of the words we have for violent 
death— murder, suicide, sacrifice, and martyrdom— and affirms them all. 
Indeed, Maggie may be interpreted in terms of the paradox explored by the 
Prophet as a woman who is too in love with the past to have a future. Yet 
in these same terms hers is not a death that could be called “vain,” for her 
death is also the birth of George Eliot, novelist. Had George Eliot stopped 
writing fiction at this point her novels would still be honored, but probably 
as pastoral, even nostalgic, accounts of the pre- industrial English Midlands. 
Instead, Maggie’s death is a failure that is also a prophecy of George Eliot’s 
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commitment to writing novels that are “double mirrors, making still / An 
endless vista of fair things before / Repeating things behind” (“A Minor 
Prophet,” lines 295– 97). It is true of course that George Eliot had already 
achieved success before writing Maggie’s fictional life and death, but I would 
argue that without Maggie, she would never have crossed the “bridge” fig-
ured so elegantly in the first chapter of that novel that took her from literary 
success to artistic phenomenon.
In the evolution of George Eliot’s art that I am tracing, “A Minor Prophet” 
is itself a “double mirror” in the sense that it retrospectively illuminates Mag-
gie’s importance as the first in the series of heroes and heroines through whom 
George Eliot explores questions related to the problem of appearing to die in 
vain and the equally heroic but more quotidian problem of appearing to live 
in vain. She highlights her attention to the first of these questions in another 
important text, “Leaves from a Note- Book” (undated), when she quotes her 
own Fedalma, the Spanish Gypsy: “The grandest death! to die in vain— ” 
in the “Note” entitled by the editor “ ‘A Fine Excess.’ Feeling Is Energy.”14 
George Eliot reinforces her self- quote by saying, “I really believe and mean 
this— not as a rule of general action, but as a possible grand instance of deter-
mining energy in human sympathy, which even in particular cases, where it 
has only a magnificent futility, is more adorable, or as we say divine, than 
unpitying force, or than a prudent calculation of results.”15 While the self- 
sacrifice that achieves calculated results may indeed claim “the highest title 
to our veneration, and makes the supreme heroism,” she concedes, “the gen-
erous leap of impulse is needed too to swell the flood of sympathy in us 
beholders.”16 Feeling, in other words— indeed an “excess” of feeling— cannot 
come from calculation and is necessary to provide the “energy” that fuels 
the struggle for goodness in the world. We “beholders” of heroic action are 
moved to good actions by acts of “magnificent futility” more than by results.
Also in this “Note” George Eliot castigates any who would use hopeless-
ness as a reason for inaction, arguing ultimately, as in “A Minor Prophet,” 
that apparently futile heroism energizes observers for good. To despair of 
the value of one’s own actions towards a good end “comes from that sapless 
kind of reasoning which is falsely taken for a sign of supreme mental activity, 
but is really due to languor, or incapability of that mental grasp which makes 
objects strongly present, and to a lack of sympathetic emotion.”17 It is telling 
to read this kind of judgment from the pen of the woman whose self- doubt 
is legendary, whose journals are riddled with questions about the value of 
her work. Yet these judgments, as well as her frequent words of encourage-
ment about the importance of even the smallest good work, hold all the 
more weight when we know that they are motivated by her sense of her own 
failings.18 As I’ve said, this “Note” points to the major concerns that shape 
the themes and characters of the rest of her novels, but it is also important 
to recognize the metafictional element of such ideas. In this respect Maggie 
takes on further importance, as I suggested above, in that she might be seen 
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as a martyr not only to the cause of women and to “historical advance”19 
but to the cause of George Eliot’s writing. The “futility” of Maggie’s death is 
“magnificent” indeed in its “fine excess” of feeling, which not only inspired 
generations of response but propelled George Eliot forward into a whole new 
stage of her career.20
This brings us to the third element in the aesthetic revisioning of this time, 
the question of the form of the novel. As discussed in the last chapter, this 
rethinking of religious and aesthetic possibilities had everything to do with 
rethinking the idea of incarnation. To recall A. S. Byatt’s statement in her 
introduction to her edition of George Eliot’s writings: “The long nineteenth- 
century debate about the precise meaning, or lack of meaning, of the Christian 
concept of the Incarnation  .  .  . is inextricably connected, consciously and 
unconsciously, to the development of the form of the novel.”21 While the 
theological notion of the incarnation of Christ is a question separate from 
the incarnation of ideas in fictional form, George Eliot’s intense attention at 
this time to the question of form, and specifically the problem of incarnating 
her ideas, certainly bears out Byatt’s claim. Interestingly, Rosemary Ashton 
articulates the common criticism of George Eliot’s works of this period in 
these very terms, stating that they “suffered from insufficient incarnation of 
ideas.”22 Indeed, though evidently quite different from each other, the three 
major works of this period have in common this manifestation of George 
Eliot’s aesthetic experimentation with the question of, as she puts it in a letter 
of 1866, “how to make certain ideas thoroughly incarnate.”23 While George 
Eliot has written before about this question— notably in chapter 17 of Adam 
Bede— during this period she is unusually forthcoming about her struggles, 
partly because she is aware of embarking on untried ground.
This awareness of a new stage applies even to her writing of Felix Holt, 
despite its being set in familiar territory and based on a remembered incident. 
When she takes the unusual step of consulting an expert, lawyer Frederic 
Harrison, their correspondence following its publication illuminates the 
nature of George Eliot’s aesthetic preoccupations at this time. Harrison, who 
has glimpsed in Felix Holt possibilities for a Positivist utopian novel, tries 
to persuade George Eliot that her “destiny” is “to produce a poem—  . . . a 
drama,” that gives form to the philosophy of Positivism.24 Somewhat sympa-
thetic to Positivist ideas and already engaged in writing The Spanish Gypsy, 
George Eliot expresses her mistrust of didactic utopias but tells him that she 
has “gone through again and again the severe effort of trying to make cer-
tain ideas thoroughly incarnate, as if they had revealed themselves to me in 
the flesh and not in the spirit.” She makes clear that she is not interested in 
writing utopian fictions, because “they do not pretend to work on the emo-
tions,” which is always her primary goal. Imagine, she goes on, “the sort of 
agonizing labour to an English- fed imagination to make art a sufficiently real 
back- ground, for the desired picture, to get breathing, individual forms, and 
group them in the needful relations, so that the presentation will lay hold on 
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the emotions as human experience.” Relying on historical documents rather 
than primarily on personal memory for the writing of Romola, she tells him, 
cost her “unspeakable pains.”25 Such is the interrelation of the three texts 
that here we see her, while engaged in writing The Spanish Gypsy, using her 
experience with Romola to explain her ideas about aesthetic form to some-
one who has helped her with Felix Holt.
Psychological
The “unspeakable pains” George Eliot mentions are in fact literal— physical 
and psychological— and written of frequently in her journals. While her 
writing is always a painful process, this period, as mentioned above, is one 
of unprecedented suffering, and her journals are riddled with references to 
debilitating “headache and sickness” and “feebleness of head and body,” 
frequently “producing terrible depression.”26 George Eliot’s experience of suf-
fering actually provides the crucial link between the incarnation as religious 
concept and incarnation as an aim of her fiction. For it is in experiencing the 
pain involved in investing her creations with life as “breathing, individual 
forms,” I want to argue, that she experiences the power of incarnation as a 
divine force.
George Eliot goes so far as to use the term “incarnation” to describe her 
writing difficulties at this time, and the new problems she experiences in 
writing The Spanish Gypsy serve to articulate the issues involved. So trouble-
some was the writing of this text that her husband had prevailed upon her to 
“put aside” the work more than two years before “because,” as she confides 
to Harrison, “it was in that stage of Creation or ‘Werden,’ in which the idea 
of the characters predominates over the incarnation.” The drama— later to 
become, as a result of her struggles with form, a dramatic poem— presented 
a more serious challenge even than Romola: without the source of “a grand 
myth or an Italian novel” and instead writing only “under the inspiration 
of an idea,” with her source “in the spirit,” she feels “anything but omnipo-
tent.”27 Six months later, still engrossed in this work, she confides to her 
publisher, John Blackwood, that she is writing “— prepare your fortitude— a 
poem,” reiterating the distinction that “the plot was wrought out entirely as 
an incorporation of my own ideas.”28 In writing The Spanish Gypsy, then, 
George Eliot has the new experience of seeming to create out of nothing, a 
process that takes her to a deeper understanding of the incarnational nature 
of artistic creation.
Crucial to this process is her abiding but ever- deepening engagement with 
the topic of suffering, including her own. From the beginning, as no one 
familiar with her work needs to be reminded, George Eliot is convinced that 
her task as a writer is actually a vocation that charges her with an ethi-
cal responsibility to arouse sympathy in her readers for the sufferings and 
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shortcomings of their fellow mortals. And from the beginning she takes as 
her model the suffering Christ. “No wonder [man] needs a suffering God,” 
the narrator of Adam Bede had said,29 and that whole novel is built on the 
struggle to believe in the transformative power of suffering and to show what 
it means to enter into the sorrows of others. In this context Maggie’s death 
is also enormously significant in that it raises the question of the meaning of 
individual suffering. It is this question that energizes the works of the decade 
that follows, for in writing Maggie’s death George Eliot’s aesthetic undergoes 
a crucial change: from talking about the suffering of others in her fiction and 
talking about her own suffering to herself in her journal and to a few friends 
in letters, The Mill on the Floss has her integrating the two. For in this novel 
she participates in the sufferings of her characters, making them her own in a 
way that might be seen as masochistic or narcissistic— as we see in her intense 
grieving over Maggie’s terrible and necessary death. But in this she is coming 
to a new understanding of the relation between writing and suffering.
This process takes her model of sympathy beyond the level of ethics and 
aesthetics so that, without being her own story, the text is constituted of 
her own suffering. The next stage is the one she works through in the ter-
ribly painful process of writing Romola, for, though the writing of the two 
works that follow it is also a painfully arduous process, she is in them coming 
gradually to a new state of awareness. By the end of this decade of sorrows, 
I believe, she has begun to understand, or more consciously to acknowledge, 
that rather than accomplishing her writing in spite of her suffering, she is suf-
fering for her writing and writing out of her suffering. This is tricky ground 
because, as she herself is aware and as some critics have explored, there could 
be seen to be a morbid or superstitious element, carried over from her evan-
gelical experience perhaps, whereby she is permitted to achieve success only 
by suffering, thereby paying for her happiness as all sinners must do. As Byatt 
notes, George Eliot passionately hated the “doctrine of Compensation,” the 
cheap idea that one’s sorrows will be compensated by future reward or an 
improvement of character.30 She is aware of the danger that in seeming to 
preach about the redeeming power of suffering the writer risks minimizing 
the suffering and giving it a “meaning” that is insulting both to the sufferer 
and to any presumed god. This is such tricky ground in fact that except in 
occasional passing hints George Eliot defers conscious acknowledgment— 
some would say represses her knowledge— that her own suffering has served 
the purpose of shaping not only her writing but her very self, until she has 
finished with fiction. It is only in retrospect and in the form of a poem, “Self 
and Life,” that she embraces this idea, and even then it is through a dialogue 
that separates her self from her life.31 This elegant, little- known poem has 
Life schooling Self on the reason for all of its grief. Self learns that growth 
entails pain: the hard- won insight she achieves that “life is justified by love” 
requires accepting the truth that “half man’s truth must hidden lie / If unlit 
by Sorrow’s eye.”32
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This separation between self and life was an essential survival tactic 
throughout George Eliot’s writing life. The obvious manifestation of this 
split is of course in her self- naming, primarily in her pseudonym but as well 
in the abundance of names she had for herself.33 George Eliot’s self- naming 
was a fructifying force for her writing, but it is also an element of the self- 
construction which Paul Ricoeur claims is vital to the “narrative identity” 
that all humans need to create for themselves.34 Ricoeur argues that selfhood 
is a matter of “narrative interpretation,” a practice which teaches us “the fig-
ural nature of the character by which the self, narratively interpreted, turns 
out to be a figured self— which imagines itself . . . in this or that way.”35 In 
these terms, we see Marian Evans Lewes engaged in constructing her writing 
self by creating fictional narratives and concurrently creating a “narrative 
identity” to write that self, or even by simply imagining herself as that writing 
self. This dual self- construction has been brilliantly analyzed by Harris and 
Johnston in their edition of George Eliot’s journals, in which they show how 
she tried to keep a kind of textual division in her writing life by writing from 
both ends of her diary, often simultaneously, recording in the front mainly 
quotidian activities and concerns, and, in the back, events related to her writ-
ing and her travels. In fact then, this was a double doubleness, in that not 
only did she maintain two writing selves— one to write fiction, the other to 
write the diary— but the latter self was subdivided into two separate voices.
One of the early installments in the back of the “Journal,” “How I came 
to write fiction,” serves to illuminate the importance of the self- division to 
George Eliot’s creativity. In this famous account, George Eliot writes of how, 
having long nurtured “a vague dream” of writing a novel, she was finally 
compelled to try when one morning she was “lying in bed . . . thinking” of 
what she might write, and her thoughts “merged . . . into a dreamy doze,” 
until, she says, “I imagined myself writing a story of which the title was— 
‘The Sad Fortunes of the Reverend Amos Barton.’ ”36 This entry is intriguing 
in many respects: for one thing, dated December 6, 1857, it was written 
just over a year after she finished “Amos Barton” and when she is just two 
months into the writing of her first full novel. In other words, though she 
has only just started, she is already aware that she has begun what she calls 
“a new era in my life”;37 rather than gaining this sense of significance in ret-
rospect, as we might expect, she already knows that this is the beginning of 
something significant enough to write about and essential to the construction 
of what Ricoeur would call her “narrative identity.”
George Eliot’s construction of this event is a prime instance of the narra-
tive habit of mind that is signaled in her propensity to construct her own life 
in retrospect as a succession of narrative moments. As discussed above, her 
journal of the 1860s is a kind of litany of sorrows, and it is crucial to her 
writing life both that she constructs such a text and that she then rereads it, 
for it is in the process of interpretation that the sorrows become an energiz-
ing force. This returns us to “A Minor Prophet” and the “Note” on feeling, 
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with their notion that an observer— in this case her self— is energized to work 
for good by the display of “a fine excess” of “feeling” represented in an act 
of “magnificent futility.” In rereading her journal, George Eliot is frequently 
an observer, in that she encounters a suffering self that she has forgotten. In 
this regard it is interesting to note that despite her unconventional lifestyle, 
George Eliot’s novels became a source of moral guidance and spiritual conso-
lation to readers, some of whom— to add a further generic spin— were known 
to have “copied passages from [Romola] into their New Testaments.”38 This 
only happened because George Eliot modeled that behavior by rereading her 
journals in search of reassurance and consolation.
This practice continued even into the next decade, when she had emerged 
from the depths of the pit of despond (although she was still inhabiting its 
outskirts). In May 1870, for example, when she is beginning Middlemarch, 
George Eliot resumes writing in her diary after a lapse of seven months, 
and finds there references to earlier periods of “headache and depression” 
that reassure her that her present anguish “is not unprecedented.” Later, with 
Middlemarch a huge success, she is similarly struggling over Daniel Deronda 
and is reassured in turn by references in her diary confirming “that I really 
was in worse health and suffered equal depression about Romola— and so 
far as I have recorded, the same thing seems to be true of Middlemarch.”39 
Later, having recorded in her diary some heartening responses to Deronda, 
she writes: “I record these signs, that I may look back on them if they come 
to be confirmed.”40 This reconfiguring of her own words (and those of oth-
ers) into “signs” reflects the crucial reinterpretation that established George 
Eliot’s narrative identity. For, while her journals and letters are riddled with 
references to her own suffering, her understanding of the meaning of this suf-
fering changes. Whereas she begins by seeing her ailments of body and mind 
primarily as inhibiting her writing, she later comes to see them as a sign of 
the value of her work and even as its substance. It is crucial to the power of 
this symbiosis, however, that the source of her energy remain hidden from 
herself: her suffering must retain the tenor of “futility” in order to produce 
the energy of excess. The quotation I use as my epigraph rather humorously 
captures this situation.
Fog, east wind, and headache: there is my week’s history. But this 
morning, when your letter came to me, I had got up well, and was 
reading the sorrows of the aged Hecuba with great enjoyment. I wish 
an immortal drama could be got out of my sorrows, that people 
might be the better for them two thousand years hence. But fog, east 
wind, and headache are not great dramatic motives.41
This first paragraph of a letter George Eliot wrote to Mrs. Peter Alfred Taylor 
in March 1864 exemplifies such a beautiful rhetorical flourish that it is diffi-
cult to believe that its writer is unconscious of the “enjoyment” future readers 
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were to derive from her “dramatic motives.” Nonetheless it is just this sort of 
blindness to self that facilitates her writing life.
George Eliot’s journals and letters, particularly those of the young Mary 
Anne Evans, have always been subject to the charge of self- dramatization. 
Many have commented as well on the self- image she constructs in later 
letters: the suffering artist rescued from herself and a condemning world 
by the supportive spouse.42 While this pattern may indeed smack of self- 
dramatization— as she herself came to suspect— it is vital to her narrative 
identity. And crucial to this pattern is the fact that the woeful accounts of her 
struggles and sufferings are alleviated by occasional glimpses of her sense of 
a special calling. In a letter of 1857 she writes of her hope that “the terrible 
pain I have gone through in the past years . . . has probably been for some 
special work”;43 and in a journal entry summing up that year she records 
her gratitude that “the long sad years of youth were worth living for the 
sake of middle age.”44 Notwithstanding this realization, however, this pain, 
as we have seen, is even more terrible with Romola, partly for the reasons 
mentioned above, and because she continues to be attracted to the Romantic 
aesthetic— that true art is the product of suffering— and to the Christian view 
that suffering is redemptive. In exulting in a letter to a friend over her tri-
umph with Adam Bede and her happiness with Lewes, for example, George 
Eliot feels compelled to include her concurrent sadness over “the much work 
that remains,” as if she is not allowed unalloyed happiness. But in a signifi-
cant aside she acknowledges her “blessed” state in having “all this reason for 
being glad that I have lived, in spite of my sins and sorrows— or rather, by 
reason of my sins and sorrows.”45 This shift from “in spite of” to “by reason 
of” speaks volumes, not least because in refusing to appropriate it fully she 
keeps alive the tension that she almost superstitiously believes is essential to 
her narrative identity.
Ricoeur argues that “we never cease to interpret the narrative identity 
that constitutes us, in light of the narratives proposed to us by our culture.”46 
For Marian Evans, the cultural narrative that deemed her a common- law 
wife living in sin with another woman’s husband had to be urgently resisted 
by a counter- narrative, which she built upon the “figured self” of novel-
ist.47 Subverting the cultural codes, she claims “Marian Evans Lewes” as her 
true name, and the other self- naming, “George Eliot,” actualizes that claim, 
reinscribing it with each novel.48 Harris and Johnston have compared her 
pseudonym to a “second name, exactly like the one a religious assumes upon 
taking orders,”49 an important gesture of self- anointing that proclaims the 
sense of vocation mentioned earlier.
It is tempting to say that George Eliot learned how to endure and at the 
same time to profit from her suffering by making Maggie a martyr for the 
cause of her writing. But The Mill on the Floss is more accurately seen as a 
kind of culminating and turning point: it is in writing this novel that George 
Eliot learns how to bring her life into her work without killing her self. Her 
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earlier works had drawn heavily on memory, yet she was so unconscious 
of this dependence that she was genuinely surprised to find people identify-
ing her characters with actual people. The ensuing battle over her identity 
and that of her characters is dramatic enough to have earned much critical 
attention, with the most interesting element being her telling silence when it 
becomes evident that she has been found out. Her own surprise is the most 
interesting aspect of this, in that it smacks of the astonishment that comes 
from having kept her knowledge even from herself. The anguish involved in 
having to fight for her authorial identity gives her a better understanding of 
the intimacy between her work and her life. And it is this that empowers her 
to write Maggie and to kill her, as she enacts the painfully paradoxical expe-
rience of embracing her past and separating herself from it forever. The Mill 
on the Floss thus represents a point of intersection between her self and her 
life, which she had until now determined to keep separate.
It is difficult to imagine a gesture more expressive of excess of feeling 
than Maggie’s very literal “generous leap of impulse” into the raging Floss. 
Within the text it illustrates the futility that defines the magnificence of such 
gestures in that, had they waited, Maggie and Tom would have been rescued; 
outside of the confines of the text it also raises the question of futility in that 
the novel has sparked endless debate as to its success and meaning. In the 
context of my argument, this is interesting in that it focuses the discussion 
of suffering on George Eliot’s experience of success and failure, whose terms 
are radically changed for her during this period of rethinking her aesthetic. It 
is certainly true, as discussed above, that she continued to agonize over her 
writing process and the value of her work, but I believe there is also a signifi-
cant shift in her own sense of her work, a shift that is impelled by Maggie’s 
death and then worked through in Romola. One of the reasons for this is the 
fact that with Romola she became financially secure. But equally material 
was the fact that in moving into new territory— geographically, historically, 
generically, emotionally, and professionally (in changing publishers for this 
one novel)— she frees herself, and in this way benefits from the heroic gesture 
of a martyr who has “[made] liberty more sacred by [her] pangs.”
George Eliot’s changing attitude to her work is signaled in two unusual 
responses: first, when she consults experts— a lawyer to help with the legal 
morass involved in Felix Holt, and an artist who is illustrating Romola— and, 
second, when she discusses the merits of her work in correspondence. As she 
did with the lawyer Frederic Harrison, as mentioned earlier, she engages in a 
kind of collaboration with the illustrator of Romola, Frederic Leighton, as 
part of the process of working out her ideas about aesthetic and generic form. 
Learning of the “impossibility of producing perfect correspondence between 
my intention and the illustrations,” as she says in a letter in 1862,50 is crucial to 
the way in which she wrestles with the meaning of incarnation for her work.
The second significant change relates to her opening herself to criticism 
in a new way in this period. Midway in the serial publication of Romola she 
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replies to her friend Sara Sophia Hennell’s interest by warning that the book 
is different from previous ones in not being “intended” to be popular (her 
emphasis). Her reference here to freedom is telling: “If one is to have freedom 
to write out one’s own varying unfolding self, and not be a machine always 
grinding out the same material or spinning the same sort of web, one cannot 
always write for the same public.” Since her publisher is in agreement with 
this idea, she says, she is “acquitted of all scruple or anxiety except the grand 
anxiety of doing my work worthily. Alas, I want to do something very much 
better than I ever can do it— if fasting and scourging oneself would make one 
a fit organ, there would be more positive comfort.”51
Two more letters will help to further this point. After Romola has been 
published, George Eliot takes the unusual step of replying to Richard Holt 
Hutton’s detailed and judicious critique, in which he says that this novel “will 
never be George Eliot’s most popular book” but is in his view “the greatest 
she has yet produced.”52 George Eliot responds that she understands his “dis-
satisfaction with Romola herself,” noting that “I have failed to bring out my 
conception with adequate fullness.” She goes on to expand on the aesthetic 
problem, which to her is a religious one:
With regard to that and to my whole book, my predominant feeling 
is— not that I have achieved anything, but— that great, great facts 
have struggled to find a voice through me, and have only been able to 
speak brokenly. That consciousness makes me cherish the more any 
proof that my work has been seen to have some true significance by 
minds prepared not simply by instruction, but by that religious and 
moral sympathy with the historical life of man which is the larger 
half of culture.53
In a similar vein a few weeks later, she affirms Sara Sophia Hennell’s critique 
of Romola as “ideal” (rather than convincingly real) and similarly merges her 
explanation for this perceived flaw with an explanation of her religious aim: 
“I feel it acutely in the reproof my own soul is constantly getting from the 
image it has made. My own books scourge me.”54
George Eliot’s response to the reception of The Spanish Gypsy when it 
was finally published in 1868 reflects a similar insouciance about its popular-
ity. She reports to a friend of being grateful for the public’s “kindly” response 
to the work and describes herself as “serene, because I only expected the 
unfavourable.”55 While it would be easy enough to argue that this apparent 
acquiescence to these judgments constitutes a clever self- defense— and while 
it is certainly true that these positive responses are admixed with her usual 
consciousness of failure— I would argue rather that her responses are genuine. 
Perhaps her aversion to reading criticism of her earlier works had as much to 
do with her conviction that whatever anyone else said, she was only writing 
what she knew, whereas here she is making a whole new world. We would 
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do better to take these comments as an index of her growing sense that she 
is engaged in a transition into another aesthetic realm, which is concurrently 
another religious realm, her interest in which develops out of that previously 
quoted “yearning affection towards the great religions of the world.”56 Cen-
tral to all of this is the recognition that emerges in “A Minor Prophet” and 
her “Note” on feeling, cited above, that what is seen as failure is subject to 
interpretation and may from another perspective be seen as triumph.
Religious
The fact that Richard Holt Hutton was a Roman Catholic perhaps explains 
George Eliot’s ability to articulate her feeling of being used as a kind of 
flawed vehicle through which ideas are being expressed. Here we may see 
a religious sense of herself as being chosen to convey, however imperfectly, 
what she calls in Adam Bede “the divine beauty of form.” This experience 
and confession of failure to incarnate her ideas are essential to the develop-
ment of her mature, post- Evangelical aesthetic. For, although the three main 
texts of this period feature a martyr or para- martyr figure, there is no longer 
a Maggie to die for George Eliot’s art. What I believe happens here is that 
George Eliot’s own aesthetic practice teaches her a deeper understanding of 
the Christian incarnation; in other words, while she is taking “unspeakable 
pains” to incarnate her ideas, she comes to see that the creative process is 
itself an incarnational activity by which something changes in her. While we 
might therefore see her labor pains as a sign of neurosis, we may equally see 
them as a sign of kenosis, the idea of self- emptying that underlies the Chris-
tian understanding of incarnation.
Romola: The Failure of Art, the Art of Failure
Central to the change I have been analyzing is a shift in George Eliot’s under-
standing of the relation between the sacred and the secular. For while from 
the beginning of her fiction writing she had thought of her work as part 
of her religion, it is in this period that she is consciously working out the 
implications of this claim.57 George Eliot continues to explore her favorite 
themes— the conflict between duty and passion, particularly for daughters, 
and the imperative of sympathetic suffering— but in Romola she formulates 
these themes in explicitly religious terms. The primary way in which she 
explores these ideas is through the figure of the martyr and the concomitant 
issues of sacrifice and belief. The letter quoted above contains what I have 
come to think of as George Eliot’s definition of religion: “The contemplation 
of whatever is great is itself religion and lifts us out of our egotism.”58 Romola 
represents her most ambitious attempt to date to animate this idea. In it she 
dramatizes the contest during the Renaissance between secular humanism 
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and institutional Roman Catholicism, embodying the former primarily in 
Romola’s father and the latter mainly in Savonarola. But both these fathers 
are judged as wanting in George Eliot’s religious terms by the extent to which 
their respective beliefs— in classical learning and in the Christian system— 
are tainted by their own egotism. And the novel’s most fascinating character, 
Tito, is characterized as consumed by ego, a believer in nothing.
Like Maggie, Romola is subject to the will of several powerful men, all of 
them obsessed with their own desires and intent upon shaping hers to their 
own. Her father and brother, though ideological opposites, are similar in 
each being consumed by passion for a vision— for Dino, a vision of Christ’s 
crucifixion, for Bardo, a vision of the classical wisdom of the past— that sets 
them apart from the world. Their allegiance to death blinds Romola to the 
falsity of the charming Tito’s liveliness, and George Eliot uses his character 
to explore the possibility of a conscience- free egotism. One could imagine 
Tito’s mocking response to Maggie’s sacrifice, since he knows the meaning of 
sacrifice only insofar as he can sacrifice the needs and even the lives of oth-
ers to his own desires. The narrator wonders, “could any philosophy prove 
to him that he was bound to care for another’s suffering more than for his 
own?”59 In the terms of George Eliot’s religious philosophy, Tito’s “contempt 
for the tales of priests”60 is continuous with his contempt for social laws and 
duties. And she characterizes his lack of a “terror of the unseen” as a sign 
not of refreshing rationality but of his scorn for the “guardianship” such fear 
provides for “a moral law restraining desire.”61 In George Eliot’s terms, Tito’s 
lack of sympathetic feeling is a lack of morality. In a different way, Dino the 
monk also rejects the relation between human feeling and divine meaning. 
“What is this religion of yours,” Romola asks him in exasperation, “that 
places visions before natural duties?”62 Whereas Tito rejects all duty except 
that to his own pleasure, Dino, in his search for “wisdom,” replaces human 
bonds with a religious one, not recognizing that in rejecting “human sympa-
thies,” as the narrator makes sure to tell us, he is rejecting “the very life and 
substance of our wisdom.”63
Married to a man of no faith and yet unable to embrace the absolutism of 
her brother, Romola seeks to understand suffering in terms of the promise of 
transcendent meaning.
What thought could reconcile that worn anguish in her brother’s 
face— that straining after something invisible— with [Tito’s] satisfied 
strength and beauty, and make it intelligible that they belonged to 
the same world? Or was there never any reconciling of them— but 
only a blind worship of clashing deities, first in mad joy and then in 
wailing?64
In a brilliant figure, George Eliot has Tito try to force Romola to accept art as 
the means to “reconcile” beauty and suffering by commissioning the painting 
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of a triptych of the two of them posing as classical lovers and using it to 
cover Dino’s crucifix. Tito’s transparent effort to cover “sadness” with art 
(and artfulness) paradoxically reveals the power of art, in that the painting, 
instead of keeping sadness “hidden,” becomes a mirror that reveals the truth 
of his deception and betrayal.65 This is a fascinating image because rather 
than entertain the Romantic idea of art becoming a kind of religion, George 
Eliot makes her villain a man whose lack of belief extends along a continu-
ous line that includes social duty, religious faith, and art, characterizing his 
egotism as a comprehensive failure of “imagination.”66
As a young wife to a faithless husband, Romola is susceptible to the 
absolute faith claims of Savonarola, and what stirs her to the point of physi-
cal “sensation” and “thrill” when she hears him speak is his invocation of 
“martyrdom.” Though a “transient emotion,” she experiences the feeling 
as like “being possessed,”67 and it is this idea of self- sacrifice, so foreign to 
her husband, that ultimately draws her to Savonarola, even though this call 
has the unwanted application of compelling her to return to her duty as 
a faithful wife. The narrator characterizes Romola’s “tenderness and keen 
fellow- feeling for the near and loved” as her “religion”68; in Romola’s recoil 
from Tito’s anti- religiousness and Dino’s anti- humanity George Eliot strives 
to represent her heroine as seeking to sanctify her religion of feeling. In this 
respect it is interesting that Savonarola identifies her calling as reconciling the 
claims of humanity and divinity in what Ashton calls “a kind of respiritual-
ised secular humanism.”69
George Eliot carefully delineates the process by which Romola chooses to 
leave her husband, having her don a religious habit to represent the holiness 
of her deliberation. Yet she makes clear too that her choice is a human one: 
“In those times, as now, there were human beings who never saw angels or 
heard perfectly clear messages. Such truth as came to them was brought con-
fusedly in the voices and deeds of men not at all like the seraphs of unfailing 
wing and piercing vision.”70 Still, though George Eliot explicitly refuses to 
represent Romola’s experience as supernatural, she also seems to want to cast 
a more than natural aura around the occasion. She describes the beauty of 
the dawn in which Romola “for the first time in her life” makes a free choice 
as casting a light that she feels “as a divine presence.” This inspires “a certain 
awe,” which Romola feels, not as something new, but as “a more conscious 
element in [her] feeling”71 and a truer illuminator of her own path. Here 
George Eliot strives to create an image of the relation between the sacred and 
the secular, the human and the divine, as continuous, not oppositional. And 
in her effort to represent a human kind of sanctity George Eliot is careful not 
to mention faith; instead she offers her heroine a choice between “the path of 
reliance and action which is the path of life” and its opposite, the “loneliness 
and disbelief, which is no path, but the arrest of inaction and death.”72
Decidedly human too is the stern monk Savonarola, who turns Romola 
back on this path through “nothing transcendent in [his] face”73 but instead 
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through his words, words that merely confirm what she already believes. 
Savonarola voices her own belief in the “fellowship with suffering”74 as the 
highest calling and sanctifies her suffering by linking it with the suffering 
represented in “the religion of the cross.”75 He holds out the cross to her as 
a means whereby she can take “a share in the divine life which quenches the 
sense of suffering Self in the ardours of an ever- growing love.”76 In opposi-
tion to Tito’s artful offer of art, then, Savonarola offers the cross, not to hide 
sadness but to reconcile and integrate Romola’s own sadness with the uni-
versal sadness embodied in the sacrifice of Christ. And in the ultimate word 
of integration (and incarnation) he urges her not to go away in search of a 
holy calling but to return home: “Instead of taking a long exciting journey, 
she was to sit down in her usual place.”77
George Eliot reiterates a central idea from The Mill on the Floss twice in 
Romola. After Maggie’s elopement, the narrator had pontificated on the vir-
tue of what we would call situational ethics:
The great problem of the shifting relation between passion and duty 
is clear to no man who is capable of apprehending it: the question 
whether the moment has come in which a man has fallen below the 
possibility of a renunciation that will carry any efficacy, and must 
accept the sway of a passion against which he had struggled as a tres-
pass, is one for which we have no master key to fit all cases.78
In Romola she is taking this great problem to another level by framing it in 
terms of a historical figure who suffered cruel torture and execution at the 
hands of the church: she sums it up as “the question where the duty of obedi-
ence ends, and the duty of resistance begins.”79 But more telling is the second 
iteration of this dilemma as a measure of Romola’s growth of conscious-
ness; for in deliberating on her decision to sever herself from her bigamist 
husband, Romola recognizes that she faces the same problem as her spiritual 
mentor— “the problem where the sacredness of obedience ended and where 
the sacredness of rebellion began.”80 This realization is crucial within the 
text and also in George Eliot’s career. For Romola herself this awareness is a 
sign of maturity, as she realizes that despite her disillusionment with Savon-
arola, his “inspiring consciousness” that “had exalted even the minor details 
of obligation into religion” had been nonetheless genuine,81 and that, further, 
she is herself capable of undergoing the same kind of spiritual struggle as her 
mentor.
For George Eliot’s own work this statement is equally important in that 
she not only makes a point of rejecting the claim that Savonarola is a mar-
tyr, she also aims to humanize the meaning of his suffering and death by 
explicitly emphasizing the point that he did not see himself as a martyr. R. H. 
Hutton notes that she rejects the last words with which historians credit 
Savonarola— his declaration that he cannot be cast out of “the Church 
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triumphant.”82 Instead, George Eliot wants to convince readers of the more 
complex point that seeing himself as a martyr in this way would actually 
detract from Savonarola’s greater merit— the merit of doubting one’s own 
worthiness and dying not in triumph but in “resignation.”83 Thus in refusing 
to accept Savonarola’s official status as martyr, she attempts to enroll him in 
a more select group— heroes who have died in what seems “magnificent futil-
ity.” Her aim is to make of him a human, flawed hero, rather than the purified 
saint of official church history. She then ends the novel— in what Hutton 
deplores as a “somewhat feeble and womanish chapter”84— by returning to 
Romola, thereby affirming as the last word in holiness the saintly blessedness 
of a woman who dedicates her life to the other wife and the children of her 
bigamist husband and enshrines the memory of the dubious martyr who has 
taught her the sanctity of duty.
This strategy has an ironic effect in that the novel, as mentioned above, is 
widely faulted, even by George Eliot herself, for the unbelievable goodness 
of its heroine, who is dubbed by Sara Sophia Hennell, for example, a saint 
rather than a woman. George Eliot seems to be unable to resist the compul-
sion to create an ideal woman, while at the same time insisting— to the point 
of emphatic italics— on the worthiness of a flawed hero, whose very worthi-
ness lies in his sense of failure and unworthiness. The narrator claims that 
harder to bear than martyrdom is “the lowest depth of resignation . . . to be 
found when we have covered our heads in silence and felt, ‘I am not worthy 
to be a martyr: the Truth shall prosper, but not by me.’ ”85 Later George Eliot 
is more emphatic and even allows her narration to turn polemical: “There 
is no jot of worthy evidence that from the time of his imprisonment to the 
supreme moment, Savonarola spoke of himself as a martyr.” This glorious 
idea had been succeeded by the inglorious one of “resignation,” the narra-
tor asserts. “But therefore he may the more fitly be called a martyr by his 
fellow- men to all time.”86 Seemingly then, in trying to show the sanctity of 
ordinary life, George Eliot ends up merely transferring the halo from within 
the institutional church to another religious domain of her own construction 
where Saint Romola presides, thereby confirming the separation of secular 
and sacred instead of demonstrating their reconciliation in the human.
The Spanish Gypsy: Annunciation as Renunciation
George Eliot continues to tackle this problem of voicing “great, great facts” 
in human form in subsequent works. It proves so daunting in The Spanish 
Gypsy that she abandons the text, then comes at the problem from the oppo-
site direction in Felix Holt, and afterwards returns to rework and complete 
the poetic piece. But it is vital in all of this that George Eliot is sufficiently 
self- critical that she can articulate her difficulties with Romola in terms of 
a failure to incarnate her ideas. As she says in her letter to Hennell quoted 
above, she is trying to do something better than she has done before, and 
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such an effort entails failing. Shifting her expectations to this level of uncer-
tainty by venturing into unknown territory means inviting failure; and yet, as 
with Savonarola, there is something glorious in being able to say “the Truth 
shall prosper, but not by me.” It is just at this time that she sees in Italy what 
she will later identify as the inspiration for The Spanish Gypsy: a painting 
on the subject of the Annunciation, “said to be by Titian.” As she later writes 
in her “Notes on The Spanish Gypsy and Tragedy,” she saw in the idea of 
a young woman preparing for “ordinary womanhood” and learning “sud-
denly” that she is instead “chosen to fulfil a great destiny” the potential for a 
“great dramatic motive.”87
It is not difficult to see why the woman who senses a destiny to incarnate 
ideas in a new way would be inspired by the story of the girl who is destined 
to be the vehicle of Christ’s incarnation. Yet it is curious to see what she 
did with this inspiration: the young Jewish woman living under Roman rule 
becomes the model for a young Gypsy woman living as a Christian in a Chris-
tian realm in which Jews have been forced to convert, Moors are the enemy, 
and Gypsies are the most reviled of all. It is clear that the racial mix fascinates 
George Eliot and, as many commentators note, race is the lowest common 
denominator that determines Fedalma’s choice and her lover Silva’s “slow 
misery.”88 Commentators from the beginning have critiqued the implausibil-
ity of the heroine’s choice and its implications, even calling it unethical for 
her to choose to follow a father and a racial group with whom she has no 
history and turn her back on the people with whom she has lived most of 
her life.89 Readers all see in the heroine’s dilemma a replaying of the dilemma 
of Maggie and of Romola, and the reiterated idea quoted above— “the great 
problem of the shifting relation between passion and duty”— suggests that 
George Eliot was quite aware of the vexatious nature of the question she was 
exploring.
In her “Notes on The Spanish Gypsy and Tragedy” George Eliot makes 
clear that what she aims to do in The Gypsy is to cast the heroine’s dilemma 
in classically tragic terms. She speaks in these “Notes” of finding in each 
individual lot “the same story” involving “some grand collision . . . between 
the individual and the general.”90 While her whole career consists of illu-
minating the grand tragedies of ordinary human “renunciations,”91 these 
works of the 1860s see her working out more consciously the meaning of 
the tragedy of renunciation by focusing more particularly on the figure of the 
martyr— here moving from the officially proclaimed Savonarola to the ordi-
nary martyrdom of a young woman who “must walk an unslain sacrifice.”92 
Her aim could not perhaps be made clearer than by her transformation of the 
story of the Annunciation into another tale of renunciation. In The Spanish 
Gypsy she translates the inspiration she receives from Titian’s picture of the 
angel Gabriel appearing to Mary into a secular myth wherein the daughter 
Fedalma renounces her love for, as George Eliot puts it, “what we call duty.”93 
Her aim, as these “Notes” suggest, is to translate what have traditionally 
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been seen as divinely inspired acts into acts taking place within socially and 
naturally imposed structures wherein individuals make choices— choices that 
are constrained or even dictated by “the dire necessities of our lot, partly as 
to our natural constitution, partly as sharers of life with our fellow- beings”— 
that shape character and destiny.94
George Eliot’s next move in this 1860s trajectory is to produce in Felix 
Holt a secular saint, the opposite of Savonarola in his lack of religious adher-
ence but the famous martyr’s equal, within his own provincial sphere, in 
charisma and influence. Felix Holt earns her the same charge as had Romola, 
in being too ideal for credulity, but George Eliot’s ascription to him of the 
Miltonic (or perhaps more aptly Blakean) “human face divine”95 points to 
her desire to exceed the limits of realism to outline a new kind of hero, the 
kind she points to in her “Note” on feeling, who inspires others by his very 
failure.
The Martyrdom of Ordinary Life
As noted above, no one is more aware than George Eliot herself of her fail-
ure at this time to “incarnate” her ideas. Neither is anyone more capable of 
articulating her own difficulties or of articulating her way out of those dif-
ficulties in and through her own works. In her “Notes on The Spanish Gypsy 
and Tragedy” she reminds readers that “rational reflection” will not allow 
anyone to make their peace with “inherited misfortunes.” “Happily,” she goes 
on, “we are not left to that.
Love, pity, constituting sympathy, and generous joy with regard 
to the lot of our fellowmen comes in— has been growing since the 
beginning— enormously enhanced by wider visions of results— by 
an imagination actively interested in the lot of mankind generally; 
and these feelings become piety— i.e., loving, willing submission, and 
heroic Promethean effort towards high possibilities, which may result 
from our individual life.96
This statement could serve as a fine summation of George Eliot’s aesthetic, 
and I want to pay particular attention to the understanding of imagination 
she expresses here. This imagination “enormously enhance[s]” feelings of 
love by finding grounds for hope for the future, by extending these feelings 
beyond ourselves to humankind in general, and by at the same time giv-
ing us models of “heroic” action that demonstrate the value of “individual 
life.” By this process, the imagination turns feelings into piety. It is this kind 
of religious imagination that George Eliot does demonstrate in her greatest 
works, and she makes her way to the most masterful of them, Middlemarch, 
by working out her incarnational aesthetic during this period.
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An important element of the experiments she was conducting at this time 
consisted in an exploration of the nature of religion in different contexts. First 
she has Romola conduct her own experiment in institutional religion, from 
which she emerges with a sense that her personal, noninstitutional kind of 
religion is holy. Then George Eliot considers religion in the cultural context of 
medieval Granada, in which Silva’s uncle and Fedalma’s father construct race 
as religion, promoting a faith in one’s own people. In this context she lingers 
over the possibility of no religion, both in the Gypsies and in her Christian 
hero. When he abandons his own culture, Silva has the uncomfortable sense 
of being naked without a creed: unlike the Gypsies, “He could not grasp / 
Night’s black blank mystery / And wear it for a spiritual garb / Creed- proof.”97 
In contrast, Zarca claims that “the Zincali exult in having no god,”98 that 
theirs “is a faith / Taught by no priest, but by their beating hearts: / Faith to 
each other”; the Gypsies “call our Holy Place / The hearth that binds us in one 
family.”99 Still, Zarca’s claim seems romantic and egotistical in that he goes so 
far as to credit himself with bearing “the power divine that chooses them and 
saves.”100 In the end both Zarca and Silva seem doomed, however, with Silva 
ending his days as a pilgrim doing eternal penance and seeking forgiveness 
from the pope, and the Gypsies aiming in vain to construct a nation based 
on Zarca’s inspiration and memory. After working in this medieval melting 
pot of religious and cultural difference, George Eliot experiments further in 
Felix Holt with the idea of a religion- less hero as she moves back home to the 
England of her youth and to a secular hero, who makes a religion out of his 
devotion to the oppressed workers of his community.
In the terms of my discussion, we might think of this period of the 1860s 
as the beginning of George Eliot’s own return to the fraught landscape of 
her youth, equipped with a sense of the wider range of imaginative and 
religious possibilities that she has gleaned from her excursions into foreign 
spheres. She emerges from this experience of the art in which saints, angels, 
and madonnas abound with a sense, not of a god who is dead, but of what 
Richard Kearney calls “a God who may be.” Kearney’s understanding of the 
poetic imagination helps to explain this development; he speaks of its three-
fold ethical powers— the utopian, the testimonial, and the empathic101— in 
a way that resonates with George Eliot’s practice. Among the aspects of 
imagination that Kearney identifies and George Eliot explores are “a pri-
ority of moral testament over moral theory,”102 “the imaginative power of 
sympathy” as “a sine qua non of all ethics,”103 and the “redemptive power” 
of imagination.104 To recall George Eliot’s “Notes” on tragedy, she speaks 
there of how her own love and joy in her fellow humans have been “growing 
since the beginning— enormously enhanced by wider visions of results— by 
an imagination actively interested in the lot of mankind generally.” And she 
has deepened her understanding of the “piety” that is grounded in “loving, 
willing submission” and “heroic . . . effort towards high possibilities, which 
may result from individual life.”
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One can only imagine what Tito’s son could be thinking of Romola’s 
response to his statement that he would like to grow up to be “great” and 
“happy,” and have “a good deal of pleasure.” His “Mamma Romola” replies:
We can only have the highest happiness, such as goes along with 
being a great man, by having wide thoughts, and much feeling for 
the rest of the world, as well as ourselves; and this sort of happiness 
often brings so much pain with it, that we can only tell it from pain 
by its being what we would choose before everything else, because 
our souls see it is good.105
George Eliot defines here, in this goal of a happiness that is only morally 
distinguishable from pain, a kind of martyrdom of ordinary life. While the 
statement may easily be seen as sanctimonious and morbid, it is also inspir-
ing because it is spoken in the voice of a woman who has learned in much 
sorrow the lesson she is passing on: “If you mean to act nobly and seek to 
know the best things God has put within reach of men, you must learn to fix 
your mind on that end, and not on what will happen to you because of it.”106 
It seems to me that George Eliot experiences, in trying to incarnate her ideas 
in this period, the pains and failures that lend credibility to the sufferings of 
the ordinary martyr.
Again it is one of her poems, “O May I Join the Choir Invisible,” written 
a year before The Spanish Gypsy was finally published, that most poignantly 
expresses the consolation she derives from this experience.107 The editors of 
the Standard Edition of George Eliot’s Essays and Poems, published in New 
York (n.d.), strategically situate this poem at the end of their text, while at the 
same time noting that it was originally published a year before The Spanish 
Gypsy, which is situated as the first poem in this American edition. Perhaps 
the editors seek a kind of closure in the poet’s prayer to join the invisible 
choir of “immortal dead who live again” in others who live better than she 
herself has been able to do. She calls such a membership “heaven,” in its 
legacy of “that sweet purity / For which we struggled, failed, and agonized 
/ With widening retrospect that bred despair.” While the poet does not call 
herself a martyr, she does find consolation in the hope that “martyred men” 
give for a future life after the end of “human Time.” And she expresses a 
wish or prayer to be, like them, the inspirational “cup of strength” for others 
who follow her.108 My aim in this chapter has been to show George Eliot’s 
triumph in failure and to demonstrate the necessarily religious tenor of this 
paradox. In these works of the 1860s she learns what she could not have 
learned through obvious successes, and the works that follow will show how 
fruitful this experience would be.
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Religion in a Secular World
Middlemarch and the Mysticism of the Everyday
. . . for the soul can grow,
As embryos, that live and move but blindly,
Burst from the dark, emerge regenerate
And lead a life of vision and of choice.
— George Eliot, Felix Holt, “Epigraph,” chap. 41
By any measure, Middlemarch is an extraordinary book. It brings to the 
reader the world of mid- nineteenth- century Britain, while conjuring a sense 
of the most intimate experience of individual lives. The novel is all the more 
remarkable for creating this profound sense of intimacy while maintaining 
strict discretion: readers are not invited into the bedrooms of its characters, 
but into their hearts and minds, as well as, I would argue, their souls. For 
while Middlemarch is less overtly concerned with religion than is Romola or 
Adam Bede, it is a radically more religious novel than either because with it 
George Eliot aims to redefine the notion and practice of religion for a society 
in which, as she says in the novel’s “Prelude,” there is “no coherent social 
faith and order.”1 She does this in large part by reminding readers, in a rather 
Kierkegaardian fashion, that they have souls.
There are three main vehicles for religious ideas in the novel: Dorothea 
herself, whose changing understanding of religion the reader is invited to 
monitor; the actual clerics: Casaubon, Cadwallader, and Farebrother, along 
with the latter’s rival, Tyke, and Casaubon’s curate, Mr. Tucker; and the 
hypocritically religious Bulstrode. In all three of these strands of the novel’s 
narrative web religion is less a designated theme than a means of develop-
ing an exploration of the idea of personal integrity. But just here is where 
we find George Eliot’s important statement about religion: rather than its 
being a force that stands outside of and apart from ordinary human life, 
religion must be seen as integral. Religious concerns must be seen as inte-
grated with personal and social concerns and bound up with the pursuit of 
integrity.
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The Vocation of the Artist:  
“The Legend of Jubal” and “Armgart”
George Eliot’s key imaginative way of expressing the complexity of these ideas 
is through the metaphor of the web that pervades the novel, and her aware-
ness that this complexity is reflexive— that she herself is caught in this web— is 
evident in two poems that herald its writing, “The Legend of Jubal” and 
“Armgart.” These poems offer insight into George Eliot’s self- understanding 
as an artist, and in doing so they provide a means of self- expression that 
both allows her to disentangle some of the knots of her own life’s web and 
prevents these personal strands from becoming enmeshed in the novel’s nar-
rative web. Indeed, this process of what I would call self- integration depends 
on a triangular relation among the novel- in- process, the poems, and her own 
lived experience. Middlemarch has such profound integrity in a formal and 
in a thematic sense because while it is a realistic account of mid- century 
life and emerges out of George Eliot’s own experience— or, more accurately 
that of Marian Evans Lewes— this realism is made authentic and more than 
merely personal by the mediation of the idealizing, Romantic perspective of 
the poems. The poems represent the mysterious transmuting power of art 
in that, by allowing George Eliot a more nakedly personal exploration of 
the nature of art and the role of the artist, they afford— in the sense made 
famous by that other Eliot— an impersonality that frees her to write this 
novel.
The wrestling with form that occupied George Eliot’s imagination through 
the 1860s continues into the following decade with an intense period of 
poetic activity, starting in 1869 with two rather whimsical pieces, “Agatha” 
and “How Lisa Loved the King,” followed in that same year by the highly 
personal series of sonnets on her childhood, which came to be called “Brother 
and Sister.” By this time she is already meditating characters for a new novel 
she is calling Middlemarch, which she first mentions in her journal on the 
first day of 1869 and begins in August. Between October 1869 and January 
1870 she writes “The Legend of Jubal,” and then “Armgart” in August and 
September 1870. At the beginning of December that year she mentions work-
ing on a story she is calling “Miss Brooke”; two days later she has changed 
her plans, having decided to combine “Middlemarch” (which had focused on 
Lydgate) and the story of Dorothea into one novel.2 When we contemplate 
this process, particularly in light of the poetic activity that punctuated it, we 
might see George Eliot’s artistry as seeking to give shape to the “coherent 
social faith and order” that she notes as lacking for her heroine. Intriguing 
as well is the fact that the theme of integration that emerges as central in the 
story of the Middlemarchers is given form in Middlemarch itself. For, origi-
nating as it does from two separate ideas, the novel is nonetheless, as Joan 
Bennett remarks, “a single organism” that “gives a remarkable impression of 
unity” founded upon “singleness of vision.”3
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With apparent singleness of purpose then, George Eliot dedicates herself 
to this work until its completion at the end of 1872. But while one might 
sense the novel relentlessly taking shape during this period, the debilitating 
illness and self- doubt discussed in the last chapter continue to plague her. She 
is physically more seriously ill for longer than ever before, and she expresses 
in her journal her fear of never again being able to write a novel as good as 
Felix Holt. In this state of psychological dis- ease the poems serve a number of 
useful purposes. For one thing, they may be seen to be “priming the creative 
pump,” as she is able to produce shorter works that stimulate her imagina-
tion and gird up her confidence. And “Jubal” and “Armgart,” in taking the 
artist figure as their main character, explore the nature of art in a more direct, 
more daring, and more Romantic way than she allows herself to do in her 
novels. In these two poems George Eliot allows herself to voice her fears, her 
feelings, and her fantasies about being an artist.
Both these poems deal with the art of music. Born on the feast day of 
Saint Cecilia, the patron saint of music, George Eliot had a keen interest in 
music and was a skilled pianist and a regular concert- and operagoer. Maggie 
Tulliver’s passion for music reflects her own, but she avoided constructing 
a novel around the artist figure, coming nearest to this focus with singers, 
Caterina, from her second story in Scenes of Clerical Life, “Mr. Gilfil’s Love 
Story”; and Mirah and Alcharisi, as well as the artist and teacher Klesmer 
from her last novel, Daniel Deronda. She pays some attention to painters as 
well, in Will’s friend Naumann in Middlemarch, and Daniel’s friend Hans in 
Daniel Deronda. It is thus significant that only in poems does she give artists, 
Jubal and Armgart, center stage.
George Eliot builds her long poem “The Legend of Jubal” from the single 
reference in Genesis to one of the sons of the exiled Cain, who was “the father 
of all such as handle harp and organ” (Genesis 4.21), following a medieval 
tradition and references by Chaucer and Dryden.4 George Eliot’s poem is fas-
cinating firstly in the way that she spins a myth of cultural origin out of the 
legend of Jubal.5 The poem begins with Cain, banished by Jehovah for mur-
dering his brother, seeking a land ruled by “wild joyous gods, who winked at 
faults and folly / And could be pitiful and melancholy.” The narrator goes on 
to note that Cain never doubted the existence of such gods since “he looked 
within, and saw them mirrored there.”6 Cain’s people live in a kind of Para-
dise, where “time was but leisure” and love reigns, because no one but Cain 
knows of Death.7 When an accidental death occurs, everything changes. With 
this Fall, “Death was now lord of Life,” Content became marred by Haste, 
“Work grew eager, and Device was born”; but, as if in compensation, every-
thing in the world takes on a “new dearness” from its vulnerability to death. 
Then, with the new sense of “dread” of loss comes “Memory,”8 which gives 
Jubal, who had already begun “the pastoral life” by extending the “ties that 
bind the family” to include animals,9 the idea to “fashion acts that are to be / 
When we shall lie in darkness silently.”10
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Thus, “in that home of Cain the Arts began.”11 The poem traces Jubal’s 
inspiration to construct the first musical instrument and then create the first 
song as he begins to find music around him, first in his half- brother Tub-
al’s pounding of metal, then in the birds, then in human voices and animal 
sounds, “Till thought self- luminous flamed from memory, / And in creative 
vision wandered free.” George Eliot strains to represent the source and pro-
cess of inspiration as metaphysical:
It was his thought he saw: the presence fair
Of unachieved achievement, the high task,
The struggling unborn spirit that doth ask
With irresistible cry for blood and breath,
Till feeding its great life we sink in death.12
The narrator thus foretells Jubal’s fate as, after his music becomes so popular 
that all he hears is his own songs, he leaves his homeland in search of fresh 
melodies. When he returns after many years, his own people fail to recognize 
him; instead they scorn and mock the old man while enthusiastically singing 
the praises of the now- mythic Jubal. In a final apotheosis, death does not 
after all have the last word: instead, Jubal is taken up into heaven by a “face” 
who identifies herself as “thy loved Past, / The soul that makes thee one from 
first to last.”13
Indeed, a prophet has no honor in his own country, but George Eliot 
makes the parallel to Christ explicit when “the face” asks whether anyone 
could ask more “from any god / Whether with gleaming feet on earth he trod 
/ Or thundered through the skies” than to bear the pain involved in bind-
ing himself to the solitary task of providing music to accompany the “sweet 
unrest” of humanity. The face goes on to explain:
Thy fate
Was human music’s self incorporate
Thy senses’ keenness and thy passionate strife
Were flesh of her flesh and her womb of life.14
Jubal, then, gave birth to and died for human music— he incarnated it— and 
must “atone” with his final suffering at the hands of these same humans for 
the offense of having “too much” to give.15
Clearly, this poem tells of a legend and a myth, but it is also an alle-
gory about the role of the artist. Most fascinating is the fact that with this 
poem George Eliot reintroduces the martyr figure, here as an artist. Thus 
in the figure of Jubal she incarnates the notion of art as religion, lay-
ing explicit claim to the high calling of the artist that she has articulated 
otherwise only in letters and personal writings. Familiar here from her ear-
lier fiction, however, is George Eliot’s preoccupation with the high price 
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of any sense of special calling and the worthiness that must be proven by 
suffering.
“Armgart” pursues similar themes in a very different way. This is a dra-
matic poem in five short scenes, taking the titular character from glorious 
triumph as a successful classical singer, whose performances show her to be 
not simply a singer and performer but an artist, to an illness that damages her 
throat so that she is driven to leave the stage and languishes in despair before 
deciding to become a teacher. On one hand, this is a tale of hubris being hum-
bled as Armgart moves from her proud scorn of being anything but the best 
and of jeopardizing her greatness by becoming a wife to a recognition of the 
aspirations and talents of those around her— whom she has heretofore seen 
only as the supporting characters in the drama of her life— and an acceptance 
of her own ordinariness. In a way, George Eliot is subtly confronting here the 
contradiction inherent in the notion that it takes a special person to recognize 
and explain the value of the ordinary. As a writer who takes as her life’s work 
the celebration of the significance of ordinary life, she must practice a kind of 
doublethink whereby she forgets that her own work requires a special gift. It 
is for this reason, in part, that she speaks of her writing as both a high calling 
and as merely the work that she, like anyone else, does in the best way she 
can and with just as much labor, heartache, and pain.16
Like Jubal, Armgart must suffer a kind of death, but first George Eliot 
indulges a fantastic vision of a powerful, supremely gifted female artist whose 
narcissistic egoism and perfectionist, all- or- nothing expectations for herself 
are sustained by her companions and teacher and buoyed up by the applause 
of an adoring public. But she is a more complex figure than this would at first 
suggest. A true descendant of Maggie Tulliver, she is aware of a “rage” within 
that would wreak havoc on the world if she did not have her singing voice 
to “channel” it.17 Moreover, though her lover admires her talent, he sees it 
as reflecting an “ambition” in conflict with her womanhood,18 and Armgart 
is right to judge that as his wife she would not be free to pursue her career. 
Likewise she knows that the audience would turn on her and condemn her 
for impropriety if they were not swept away by her singing. Further, though 
she exudes such confidence, she is at the same time embroiled in a conflict 
between the demands of pure artistry and the appeal of performing virtuosic 
trills that imitate the birds but alarm her teacher (and are perhaps the reason 
for her eventual throat damage).
All these struggles over ambition, propriety, love vs. career, and art vs. 
popularity seem but surface ripples, however, compared to the depths of 
Armgart’s artistic passion. For, while she may give the impression of vanity, 
George Eliot wants us to believe that Armgart, like Jubal, is a god of music. 
Her performance of Gluck’s Orpheus, her teacher says, makes pleasure indis-
tinguishable from pain; it does away with the music’s writer and the singer’s 
teacher: “Orpheus was Armgart, Armgart, Orpheus.”19 Returning to the stage 
after her performance, she is like a shy bride, says Leo, and Armgart concurs: 
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“I was a bride / As nuns are at their espousals.”20 Armgart agrees that her 
ambition includes adulation— even what might be seen as the blasphemous 
“gifts, / Gold, incense, myrrh”21— but affirms something other than “mean 
vanity” in her enjoyment. Not a prima donna, she says,
No, but a happy spiritual star
Such as old Dante saw, wrought in a rose
Of light in Paradise, whose only self
Was consciousness of glory wide- diffused,
Music, life, power— I moving in the midst
With a sublime necessity of good.22
George Eliot affirms Armgart’s sense that she was born an artist with a spiri-
tual calling. Like Elizabeth Barrett Browning’s Aurora Leigh, Armgart rejects 
her suitor’s proposal because she knows that she cannot be both a wife and 
an artist; she sees in her art a “supreme vocation” that affirms womanhood 
but precludes the “wife’s renunciation.”23
But the similarity stops there. Barrett Browning permits her heroine to 
reform and then to marry a chastened Romney, but George Eliot has her 
heroine reject the marital renunciation only to choose a more difficult one. 
Here, it is another woman who teaches the heroine her true calling. Armgart’s 
teacher is her devoted cousin, Walpurga, whose limp makes physical and 
seemingly reasonable her role of helpmate to the gifted artist. When Armgart, 
having lost her sublime voice, acts out her new chosen role of tragic heroine, 
Walpurga shows her the puerility of the melodrama and the shamefulness of 
her egoism. And when Armgart despises her new role as voice teacher, giving 
it the sarcastic title “The Woman’s Lot: a Tale of Everyday,”24 Walpurga turns 
on her, berating Armgart for her narcissistic arrogance— always the speaker, 
never the listener; always the star, never the friend. She is fierce about the 
depths of “ruthless Nature’s charry average” to which Armgart scorns to sink 
and where Walpurga has always had to live.25 Walpurga calls her to recognize 
her own moral lameness, to call this change not a defeat but a “new birth— 
birth from that monstrous Self.”26 And in the end Armgart acknowledges her 
blindness toward others and graciously accepts her new “humble work” as 
teacher.27
In this poem George Eliot allows herself to air some of her deepest fears 
and anxieties, which, rather than being dispelled by her undeniable success, 
simply adapt themselves to this new stage and mutate to reveal the dark side 
of fame and success. As she begins Middlemarch, she wonders if her popular-
ity actually means that she has succumbed to the temptation to a kind of a 
virtuosic trilling that has destroyed her true voice. She wonders how she can 
reconcile her respect for the “everyday” with her contempt for mediocrity, 
and how she can avoid mediocrity in her writing without obsessing about 
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perfection. In Armgart’s explosion of grief over her lost talent, George Eliot 
expresses her own fear that she might be asked to exchange the pain of suf-
fering as a gifted artist in the pursuit of her “one high function”— which 
comes with the consolation of knowing that she has been set apart— for the 
more ordinary pain of an unremarkable calling, which comes with the more 
acute pain of living without that sense of special purpose. And yet, again, 
how can her need for such a sense be other than hypocritical in one whose 
calling is to celebrate the everyday?
The answer to these doubts takes what George Eliot would call a religious 
form. For while Armgart will no longer perform as an artist, she is deter-
mined not to contribute to the fund of “mediocrity” by “doing great tasks 
ill”; instead she chooses to “take humble work and do it well.”28 In other 
words, George Eliot reaffirms Armgart’s sense of integrity in her changed 
role, the same sense that had sustained her sense of purpose as an artist. As 
she has told Walpurga, her “joy” as an artist was not in being separate from 
the world.
All my good
Was that I touched the world and made a part
In the world’s dower of beauty, strength, and bliss;
It was the glimpse of consciousness divine
Which pours out day and sees the day is good.29
This implied comparison of her own creative work to that of the God of 
Genesis might be seen as arrogant but must also be seen as the source of the 
sense of meaning and purpose that undergirds George Eliot’s own sense of 
calling.
These two poems prepare George Eliot psychologically for the work of 
Middlemarch by allowing her to celebrate and affirm the purpose and joy of 
art and her sense of herself as an artist, while at the same time expressing all 
of the doubts and fears attached to that sense of herself as an artist and the 
equally strong doubts and fears that she might not, after all, be a true artist. 
Importantly, this includes the bold affirmation of the role of the artist as a 
holy calling, a religious activity, which is for George Eliot an utterly neces-
sary conviction. The profundity of the psychological exploration that she 
achieves in Middlemarch is rooted in the depths of her own psychological 
struggles and self- analysis, and these poems provide her with an outlet for 
that self- attention, which the novel can use to tell a story that both is and is 
not her own. Important as well is her understanding that mediocrity does not 
consist in doing something ordinary, or in her case writing of the ordinary, 
but in doing badly whatever one is doing. Conversely, doing the ordinary well 
and with the intention of contributing one’s own “good” to the general good 
offers what Armgart calls a “glimpse of consciousness divine.”
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Social Order and Professional Integrity
One way of looking at Armgart’s dilemma is to say that she is challenged to 
reframe her sense of integrity in terms of integration— to sacrifice her sense 
of a special calling for the sake of performing a duty to and in the everyday, 
by integrating her own good into the web of social good. The theme that we 
found in earlier works is here again in new form: renunciation. It is this call 
to reframe one’s own desires and interests for the good of the whole that is 
the burden of the key players in Middlemarch. “Armgart” helps us to see 
that for George Eliot this theme is profoundly religious, reflecting both her 
personal project of integration as professional writer, artist, and woman and 
her exploration of the place of religion in her world.
In Middlemarch her challenge is to explore the place of religion in public 
and private life in a world that lacks a “coherent social faith and order.” But it 
is interesting, that, unlike Trollope in his Barchester Chronicles, George Eliot 
does not focus on the politics of the religious structures of the day (although 
we certainly learn something about this), but continues instead to write of 
clerics as human beings and as citizens of the human community and of their 
work as part of the whole work of that community. For, while she acknowl-
edges that clerics are still traditionally considered to have a special role, she 
is concerned to show their influence in the everyday. For example, early in 
the novel she shows us that Mrs. Cadwallader, though she is more renowned 
for her intrusiveness and stinginess than for her piety, is primarily a good 
neighbor, whose foibles and eccentricities give more pleasure than grief to her 
husband’s parishioners and tenants.
This notion of tenants introduces a key issue that comes into focus for 
George Eliot at this period. For in this middle period of her career, which 
culminates in her writing of Middlemarch, with its focus on the agitation sur-
rounding the passing of the First Reform Bill in 1832, she turns her attention 
to the issue that has just resulted— in 1867— in the passing of the Second 
Reform Bill: the issue of class. In terms of my argument, this means that this 
novel’s exploration of the question of integrity revolves around the treatment 
of the lower classes by their social superiors and the problem of mistak-
ing rank for merit; and the movement toward reform, in these terms, is a 
movement away from hierarchy and segregation toward a more integrated 
structuring of society. Central to George Eliot’s interrogation of these themes 
is the question of whether a religious response could have a bearing on these 
contemporary debates and what forms it might take.
George Eliot’s move to looking at the construction of contemporary 
society shapes the narrative arc that extends from Felix Holt through Mid-
dlemarch and becomes a meditation on the notion of order and its role in 
forging the link between public and private life. Turning her attention for 
the first time to contemporary sociopolitical matters, she explores in these 
two novels the pressing questions of personal integrity and the vulnerability 
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of the individual in the context of public unrest. For while she is always the 
author of personal lives, she makes explicit here the principle that informs 
her approach when the narrator of Felix Holt notes that “there is no private 
life which has not been determined by a wider public life,”30 a statement 
broadened and deepened by the narrator of Middlemarch to become: “there 
is no creature whose inward being is so strong that it is not greatly deter-
mined by what lies outside of it.”31
George Eliot addresses the question of social order in Felix Holt directly 
by embroiling her peace- loving hero in a situation of violent disorder, which 
results in a killing for which he is inadvertently responsible. But, interestingly, 
she examines the question of the relation between private life and public 
order primarily as an issue of gender, as she entangles her naive heroine, 
Esther, in a legal morass that almost results in a marriage of Gothic dimen-
sions. Here we see how George Eliot demonstrates the social reality that 
women are social beings only through marriage, an idea whose implications 
she will confront more directly still in her last two novels. And it is fascinat-
ing that, in her own state of unwedded, technically adulterous bliss, George 
Eliot passionately believes in marriage, to the point that she goes so far as to 
articulate Esther’s awakening to the possible felicities of marrying Felix with 
explicitly religious language. Although Esther is believed to be the beloved 
daughter of a devoutly religious minister, she is indifferent toward religion. 
And while Felix is a deliberately nonreligious man, George Eliot gives his 
selfless passion for justice a holy fervor, describing his countenance as he 
addresses the workingmen, for example, as “worthy to be called ‘the human 
face divine.’ ”32 Further, George Eliot describes Esther’s turn from the Byro-
nic “Childe Harold” to Felix as a conversion that entails “the first religious 
experience of her life— the first self- questioning, the first voluntary subjec-
tion, the first longing to acquire the strength of greater motives and obey the 
more strenuous rule.” While the man’s primary interest is in the sociopolitical 
order, then, the woman’s is in obedience to the good man’s “law” and adop-
tion of the “rule” of his order.33
George Eliot’s explicit designation of the man’s influence for good and 
the woman’s submission to a good man as religious is reinforced in “Address 
to Working Men, by Felix Holt,” which was hoped by her publisher, John 
Blackwood, to have a moderating influence on workers agitating for reform 
in 1867. This piece merges the rhetoric used by Felix in the novel to promote 
orderly change through education with the rhetoric used by the novel’s nar-
rator to promote what is called the order of wedlock: in his address Felix 
advocates patience, “obedience,” and adherence to the “rules of fellowship” 
as a kind of “religion” that will produce a harmonious and indeed sacred 
social order.34
Written as it is in the period surrounding the Second Reform Bill and 
dealing as it does with the period leading up to the First Reform Bill, it 
is not surprising that this question of order is a major preoccupation of 
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Middlemarch. But George Eliot shares with Percy Shelley’s Defence of Poetry 
the view that there is a deep human longing for order that goes beyond poli-
tics. As the epigraph for chapter 9, Book I, of Middlemarch has it, “human 
souls” have always been the theater for “the struggle” for “order and the 
perfect rule.” Of the many meanings of “order” in the Oxford English Dic-
tionary, number 17 outlines the idea that is a starting point for both these 
novels, with Middlemarch teetering on the brink between traditional society 
and the imminent reforms that will irrevocably change the inflection of the 
definition: “The state in which the laws or rules regulating the relationship 
of individuals to the community, and the public conduct of members within 
a community, are maintained and observed and authority is obeyed; the rule 
of law or constituted authority; social cohesion; absence of riot, anarchy, or 
violent crime.”
Having set Felix Holt in the period immediately following the passage of 
the 1832 Bill, when order has given way to riot and violence, George Eliot 
moves backwards in Middlemarch to the time leading up to the bill’s passing 
and to a world in which the “social cohesion” included in definition number 
17 is giving way. Here her concern is to probe more deeply the meaning— and 
the meanings— of order. The society of Middlemarch offers a cross- section of 
the burgeoning, diverse middle class of the mid- century English Midlands. As 
such it is a world preoccupied with the Oxford English Dictionary’s seventh 
meaning of “order,” which is defined by “social class” and “specific rank.” 
While it can be said that the most admirable people in the novel avoid this 
obsession and accept their own rank, several of the best of them are com-
promised by their inability to recognize the extent to which their superior 
social rank constitutes a privilege and, in being taken for granted, becomes a 
hindrance to self- understanding and growth. Others less fortunate (because 
of less fortune) see nothing but their own lower status and are desperate to 
leave it behind for what the narrator calls “that middle- class heaven, rank.”35
This comment slyly alludes to the supreme power of rank, which is so 
seductive that it becomes a satisfactory replacement for religion, generating 
an almost metaphysical aura that readily blurs the concept of “order” into 
meanings 14— “the condition in which everything has its correct or appro-
priate place, and performs its proper functions; the force for harmony and 
regularity in the universe”— and 15: “the fixed arrangement found in the 
existing state of things; a natural, moral, spiritual, or social system in which 
things proceed according to definite, established, or constituted laws.” This 
facility to project onto order, as manifest in rank, a “natural,” “moral,” or 
even “spiritual” good that is seen to be reflected in and sanctioned by the 
cosmic order underlies the preoccupation in this middle- class world with the 
great guarantor of heavenly bliss— and the source of so much calamity in the 
novel— marriage. It is this facility to blur meanings that turns marriage into 
an ultimate good that is necessary not only for social but also for cosmic 
order and turns this constructed order and the ranking system that upholds 
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it into religion. And it is the religious power of such language that insidi-
ously defines the “correct or appropriate place” and the “proper functions” 
of women in terms of their domestic relations with men.
I think it is clear that order was supremely seductive for George Eliot her-
self, and this is why she writes of its abuses, excesses, and mystifications with 
such compassion and subtlety. What the narrator says of her heroine, Doro-
thea, could be said of George Eliot herself: “Permanent rebellion, the disorder 
of a life without some loving reverent resolve, was not possible to her.”36
In this her most ambitious novel to date, George Eliot takes on the whole 
social order of mid- century Britain, sustained as it still is by the money and 
power of the landed gentry and flirting or threatened with reform on almost 
every side. The issue of medical reform is a main thematic focus, and George 
Eliot represents Lydgate’s work as bound up with his quest for one kind 
of order and his corresponding ignorance of another. His passionate long-
ing is “to demonstrate the more intimate relations of living structure, and 
help define men’s thought more accurately after the true order.”37 Ironically, 
however, Lydgate’s study of “certain primary webs or tissues”38 has blinded 
him to his own enmeshment in a social and sexual web spun out of female 
wiles and middle- class and professional envy. Like a fish that can’t recog-
nize its own dependence on the water it swims in, Lydgate is oblivious to 
his entrenchment in a particular place in the social order that controls his 
actions and even his feelings. His egoism blinds him, to the point that he ends 
up trapped in a marital structure that is devoid of true “intimate relations” 
and leaves the doctor virtually taking orders from an anatomically perfect 
but perfectly shallow, vain, materialistic wife. There is a certain poetic justice 
in Lydgate’s hen- pecked, soul- destroying fate in that his foolish sense of his 
own power has included a deep scorn for women as persons. Nonetheless, 
readers are left to mourn him as an almost classical hero, because George 
Eliot makes clear that he was indeed of a different order and surely deserved 
a less cruel fate.
Social Order and Holy Orders
Despite Lydgate’s romanticism and misogyny, George Eliot encourages read-
ers to admire his pursuit of “the true order” and to sympathize with his 
quixotic self- image as a knight of the order of physicians. For George Eliot, 
this sense of professional integrity, shared as well by Caleb Garth in rela-
tion to “business,” does amount to membership in a kind of sacred order.39 
Indeed, the men in the novel whose profession is “holy orders” in the tradi-
tional sense are held to the same standard. In this respect we can say that 
George Eliot treats clerics in the novel as part of the social order and asks 
the reader to assess them in terms of their integrity with respect to their call-
ing, which notably does not include a distinguishable sense of a spiritual life. 
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In other words, George Eliot represents the novel’s clerics as members of a 
particular profession, like medicine and business, rather than as set apart for 
religious life.
While George Eliot did not dedicate her career to an extended series of 
“Scenes of Clerical Life,” she did include such scenes in almost all of her fic-
tion, and Middlemarch represents a culmination of these representations. It 
will be useful at this point to sketch some of the major shifts that occurred in 
the role and function of the church of her day and its clergy.
The church historian R. A. Solway tells us that Anglican clergymen were 
“an integral part of the traditionally landed social and political establish-
ment that governed the country throughout the eighteenth and much of 
the nineteenth century.”40 This mutual establishment of Church and State 
was completely entrenched in class, of course, as Trollope has illustrated so 
memorably, with ecclesiastical appointments having more to do with “whom 
one knew and whom one was related to” than standards of “merit and vir-
tue.”41 Party and family alliance extended to university education as well. 
Nonetheless, while patronage told much of the story, the climate of reform 
helped encourage a higher standard in university education in general and in 
theological training in particular, such that there was some overall improve-
ment over this period in the intellectual quality, and sometimes the sense of 
spiritual vocation, of clergy.42
The period leading up to and immediately following the passage of the 
First Reform Bill saw crucial changes in the role and function of the clergy. 
As W. M. Jacob puts it,
Until about 1835 the parish was the critical unit of government in 
people’s lives. . . . The parish was the backbone of the State. The key 
figure in a parish, exercising both a civil and ecclesiastical function, 
was the parish priest, the rector, vicar, or perpetual curate. Clergy and 
local elites were closely involved together in the civil and ecclesiasti-
cal government of a parish where there was little distinction between 
what was later distinguished as religious and secular.43
After the 1830s, Jacob goes on, the increasing separation of church and state 
brought about by reform meant that the role of clergy gradually became 
“spiritualized.”44 He points out that later centuries interpret the clerics’ close 
integration in their society as secularizing and their withdrawal as spiritu-
alizing, with the ironic effect being the loss of the bonds of understanding 
they once had. Another factor in these changes was urbanization and the 
concentration of working people in towns, a situation that contributed to 
the increasing politicization of the working class and sealed their disaffection 
from the established church.
George Eliot’s fiction serves as a record of the changing function and role 
of the church, as embodied in each of the clergymen she depicts. From the 
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first Scenes to Middlemarch she portrays a range of clerics, all of whom work 
in parishes as they were in the pre- 1835 period described by the historians 
above, when the vicar “still enjoyed a great deal of prestige and influence.”45 
In her earliest works of fiction— the three Scenes and Adam Bede— George 
Eliot represents clerics from the time of her youth, and from stories she heard 
as a youth. Mr. Gilfil, from her second story, set in the 1780s, might be seen 
to exemplify what J. R. H. Moorman calls the “typical” parish priest of this 
period: “He lived the comfortable life of a small country squire, took the 
necessary services on Sundays, visited where there was sickness, and spent 
his evenings playing cards or dining with his neighbours.”46 In the traditional 
fashion, Mr. Gilfil’s clerical life is centered around his role as chaplain to 
the gentry, for whom he conducts family prayers. What is distinctive about 
George Eliot’s depiction of Mr. Gilfil, of course, is her desire to show the 
heartache that has shaped his life and belies his apparent ease.
From the 1830s of Mary Anne Evans’s youth, we have the hapless Amos 
Barton, who might fit Moorman’s profile of one of “a large number of simple 
men who carried out their modest duties with reasonable efficiency,” and the 
self- sacrificing Mr. Tryan from “Janet’s Repentance,” one of the “few really 
devoted parish priests,”47 in this case one who, in this crucial time of social 
change, is extending his work to the poor in the towns. In Adam Bede, we see 
this picture developed, in the context of a glimpse at the comparative work of 
the established church and one of its dissenting brethren in the first decade of 
the century, as Dinah works among the urban poor while Mr. Irwine devotes 
himself to the rural parish and lives closely (albeit in relative poverty) with 
the landed gentry. Mr. Irwine is typical of the pre- 1835 period in serving a 
multifaceted social role entailing officiating at or giving assistance to parish-
ioners in legal, financial, and medical matters, as described by W. M. Jacob.48 
Mr. Irwine and Amos Barton also instantiate nicely another aspect of the 
shift occurring around this time: the classics- steeped Irwine represents the 
cleric more typical of the earlier age, who, according to Jacob, was often “in 
the forefront of intellectual life,”49 while Amos is more typical of the curate 
whose origins in the lower class means in part that he serves his parishio-
ners without notable intellectual gifts or theological training. Mr. Irwine also 
shares with Dr. Kenn, from The Mill on the Floss, the qualities of compassion 
and wisdom that make the local clergyman the person to whom Adam (in 
the first decade of the 1800s) and Maggie (a decade or so later) turn in their 
trouble.
The relationship between established churchman and Dissenter that we 
find in Adam Bede is given another turn in Felix Holt, set at the very moment 
of Reform in 1832. Like Dinah, the devout Mr. Lyon is well versed in the 
Bible and is dedicated to the poor and working folk, but he is at the same time 
a man of his political time, working for changes that will benefit the work-
ing class. His ecclesiastical adversary, the Reverend Augustus Debarry, as a 
member of the ruling family (as “always”),50 is what the narrator calls a “fine 
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specimen of the old- fashioned aristocratic clergyman.”51 The ironic voice of 
the narrator makes clear that such a specimen does not demonstrate theo-
logical knowledge or much pastoral care, but this doesn’t matter in any case 
since the farmers’ presence at church, where there is room for Debarry tombs 
but not for parishioners, is at best “exceptional.”52 Debarry thus embodies 
the incumbents that, according to Solway, were still most prevalent in the 
1840s: “ambitious, pleasure- seeking, mediocre party- men who owed their 
advancement to family and friends.”53 Despite the fact that Mr. Lyon’s ear-
nest spirituality and absent- mindedness make him a laughingstock to many, 
George Eliot leaves the reader in no doubt about her own respect for such 
men as he and about the fact that it is the Reverend Debarry who has more 
to answer for with respect to the decline of religious observance.54
In Middlemarch it is as if George Eliot brings these various clerical figures 
together to take up familiar roles on this larger stage. But while most of them 
played central roles in their previous appearances, here they are all, except for 
the miserable Rev. Casaubon, just part of the social web— significant players, 
one or two quite important, and all of them worthy of interest, but none a 
major focus of narrative attention. Certainly George Eliot’s main object from 
the start has been to show clergy as men like other men, but here she sharp-
ens her attention to the fact that each of them is no more important than 
any other person. This might be George Eliot’s strongest statement about the 
parish clergy of 1832: the idea that, whether they know it or not, they are 
becoming less and less important, less and less influential. Still, she represents 
them with the deepest respect and evenhanded tolerance.
One might think that she has a soft spot for poor clergymen, and perhaps 
she does, but in fact, as Solway notes, the church of this period was served 
by “thousands of curates eking out a bare subsistence serving several par-
ishes for pluralistic non- residents, many of whom were themselves holding 
additional cures to obtain an adequate income.”55 As George Eliot’s ironic 
narrator puts it in introducing Amos Barton, curate at Shepperton Church, 
and his rather large family: “Those were days when a man could hold three 
small livings, starve a curate a- piece on two of them, and live badly himself 
on the third.”56 In Middlemarch all the clerics except the miserable Casaubon 
are poor. George Eliot’s favorite among them, Farebrother, is like Reverend 
Irwine in being prevented from marrying because all of his meager income 
goes to support his mother and unmarried sister and aunt. Farebrother is also 
similar to his ecclesiastical forebear from Adam Bede in being an intellectual, 
but times have changed in that, while Irwine’s intellectual passion was clas-
sical literature and language, Farebrother’s is science. Similar as well is their 
pastoral ability; Irwine’s, as we saw in chapter 1, is of a practical, wise kind 
without much regard for doctrinal purity or theological rigor. Farebrother 
demonstrates a similar pastoral skill and care for his flock and is like Irwine 
too in not being drawn into doctrinal debates and in delivering sermons that, 
according to Lydgate and others, are worth listening to.
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But in the later novel George Eliot is interested in constructing a more 
complicated clerical figure. For Farebrother takes the neighborly card- playing 
mentioned above to another level in being driven by his poor financial state 
to gambling. Also unlike with Irwine, we get a glimpse of his internal state 
when he struggles with and finally resists the temptation to compete for the 
affection of the woman he can finally afford to marry, and when he admits, at 
least in private, that he is pursuing the wrong calling and would rather have 
been a man of science than a man of the cloth.
Another churchman in Middlemarch whose calling we might wonder 
about is the Reverend Cadwallader, rector of Freshitt and Tipton, who none-
theless shares with Irwine and Farebrother the ability to preach well. He too 
is a poor man but has been luckier than the other two in being able to marry 
the woman he loved, a “high- born” woman57 who romantically defied her 
family by marrying a destitute clergyman, and who not only loves him and 
keeps his household with a stringent attention to their modest pocketbook but 
tolerates his lackadaisical ways and even enjoys his sermons. Cadwallader’s 
professional abilities remain otherwise obscure to the reader since, though he 
is a good- natured man, he avoids getting involved in the lives of his parishio-
ners and giving unsought opinions on any subject other than fishing, his true 
passion. Though we hear the irony, the narrator seems to resemble Cadwal-
lader himself in her response, not seeming to see any reason to pass judgment 
on a harmless man “who take[s] life easily,”58 the most severe adjective that 
is used against him being his wife’s epithet, “charitable.”59
George Eliot uses Farebrother to bring to light another feature of cleri-
cal life, when he competes with clerical colleagues for vacant ecclesiastical 
positions. Where once a clergyman depended on family and friends for 
advancement, the new social structures mean that they now depend more on 
business and professional people of the middle classes. In this respect cler-
gymen are in a position very similar to members of other professions, with 
medical men being George Eliot’s particular focus in Middlemarch. While 
there is no reason other than his good will, common sense, and high intel-
lectual standards— rather than any religious sense that we are made aware 
of— to credit Lydgate’s opinion on these matters, George Eliot’s narrator takes 
his admiration of Farebrother’s sermons and character as enough to ground 
Dorothea’s willingness to consider him for the living at Lowick. Lydgate calls 
Farebrother’s the best preaching he has heard, full of “plain, easy eloquence” 
in the style of Hugh Latimer.60 Neither he nor Dorothea can see any use in 
the “apostolic” style of his rival, Tyke, or the latter’s propensity to preach on 
obscure doctrinal matters.61
This brings us to the cleric whose vacant living Farebrother will fill, Mr. 
Casaubon. Although we are never made privy to the subjects or quality of 
his sermons, his scholarly bent suggests that they would involve a lot of ety-
mology and historical documentation, rather than attempting to provide the 
“wider blessing” Dorothea is hoping for in the sermons of his successor.62 
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As mentioned, Casaubon is the only clergyman in Middlemarch who is not 
poor, and his wealth allows him to employ a curate to do the parish work, 
as is standard practice, leaving him free from clerical duties other than Sun-
day sermons. By the time the reader visits Lowick, in chapter 9 of Book I, 
everyone except Dorothea already knows that Casaubon has no room in 
his tiny consciousness for the people of his parish. Instead, Mr. Tucker, like 
Amos in being blessed with many children and noted by the ironic narrator 
as “one of the ‘inferior clergy,’ ” is “able to answer all [Dorothea’s] questions 
about the villagers and the other parishioners.”63 And we are not surprised 
at Casaubon’s ignorance in these parochial matters, since we have already 
learned from Mr. Brooke that Casaubon is “a little too buried in books” to 
get involved with working for the reform of laws whereby sheep- stealers are 
hanged.64
Only someone as insistently blind as Dorothea could fail to see that Casa-
ubon is not concerned with goodness, in other than a strictly moralistic sense, 
nor with anything to do with the well- being of others, except as a Christian 
duty, nor with any matters that might be called spiritual, except in the most 
church- bound sense. As such Casaubon serves as almost a caricature through 
which George Eliot can exemplify the deplorable state of the Christian cleri-
cal system. In going through the motions of religious service, Casaubon can 
be seen to represent a type of clergyman that Solway claims is typical, whose 
generosity was “often a matter of role obligation essentially split off from 
any genuine emotional involvement with the suffering poor.”65 And in Casau-
bon’s case, of course, he is split off from involvement with the suffering of 
anyone except himself.
Nonclerical Religious Life
Dorothea’s unique blindness concerning this “dried bookworm towards 
fifty”66 is fascinating and indeed almost unbelievable, a fact that leads atten-
tive readers to the conclusion that George Eliot has particular cause for 
making her heroine unlike anyone else. Her sister, the knowing Celia, knows 
that Dorothea “always sees what nobody else sees” and misses what everyone 
else sees.67 In this respect Dorothea is a true seer in the tradition of Tiresias, 
of the nineteen- year- old, female, nineteenth- century variety. She shares with 
Lydgate the social blindness that is the corollary of a deep insight into a high, 
true order— in his case an order of science, in hers of religion— that others 
fail to see. And while Casaubon is almost a caricature and Dorothea is almost 
an ideal, together they make a thoroughly believable unhappy marriage. One 
of the reasons Dorothea mis- sees him is her intense idealism, which includes 
a desire for goodness and truth that is so palpable that it takes on substance 
for her in the form of the first person in her small world who appears, like 
herself, not to belong in the social order of Middlemarch described above. 
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Casaubon is devoted to something different than are the usual male suspects 
of her acquaintance, and her desire easily reconstructs his obsession with his 
studies as a passion for an ideal of truth and goodness that is beyond the 
ordinary world of her experience.
As mentioned, George Eliot herself knew the seductions of the pursuit of 
order, including one that would explain the universe.68 In Middlemarch we 
find her replaying Maggie’s relationship with Thomas à Kempis, whose voice, 
speaking across time as if alive in his Imitation of Christ, promises “a secret of 
life that would enable her to renounce all other secrets,” the “key” to happi-
ness.69 Her successor in this quest, Dorothea is attracted to a living man who 
is in pursuit of the “Key to all Mythologies,” but the narrator makes clear 
that his quest is so blighted by his “morbid consciousness” and “melancholy 
absence of passion” as to be a pursuit of death.70 According to the principles 
of George Eliot’s own religious code, Casaubon is the worst of sinners in 
being, not just obsessed with his work and blind to his own failings— as most 
of us are— but in being ruled by loveless ego to the point of seeking absolute 
power over his wife, not only in his lifetime but after his death. Sir James is 
correct to call their marriage “horrible”: Casaubon is indeed, as the jealous 
suitor says, “a mummy”71 but also proves a veritable Gothic villain, whose 
desire is to control his wife even after she has become his widow.
Perhaps Dorothea is duped partly because Casaubon’s duplicity is so deep- 
seated that he himself mistakes it for integrity. And in this we find George 
Eliot’s subtle commentary on the worst flaws of the clerical system, in that 
while she herself in creating a realistic picture must represent clergy as just 
another profession, there is still a sense in which this profession is meant to 
be different. This is why Casaubon’s failure, like that of the church he serves, 
has such dire consequences. Because he is a priest (something readers might 
be forgiven for forgetting) his obsessiveness becomes all the darker— more 
Gothic and more deplorable— for his way of turning his profession of holy 
orders into a cover for what Walpurga called “monstrous Self.”
Casaubon’s profession must be seen as crucial to the naive Dorothea’s 
attraction to him. George Eliot makes clear that her intensely religious nature 
puts her at odds with the predominantly secular world in which she lives. But 
it is important that Dorothea does conform in the matter of the key expec-
tation for a young woman: to be in need of a husband. Somewhat oddly to 
many readers, the novel is prefaced by a “Prelude” in which George Eliot 
explains why a nineteenth- century woman may not imitate the sixteenth- 
century Saint Theresa, who “found her epos in the reform of a religious 
order” rather than marry. Perhaps George Eliot feels the need to explain 
why she makes marriage the central event of her heroine’s life. She ranks her 
heroine among many unfulfilled Theresas, whose “ardour alternated between 
a vague ideal and the common yearning of womanhood”72 and then casts 
Dorothea’s fate as ultimately determined by the latter. Given that, George 
Eliot constructs Dorothea as a woman who, since she must marry, will seek a 
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religious man. And in Casaubon she believes she has found “a living Bossuet, 
whose work would reconcile complete knowledge with devoted piety . . . a 
modern Augustine who united the glories of doctor and saint.”73
Dorothea’s desire for a holy husband follows from her devout nature: her 
beauty has the appeal of “the Blessed Virgin,” and her style of dress “gave 
her the impressiveness of a fine quotation from the Bible.”74 In marriage she 
is “yearning” for a context in which to practice “her own rule of conduct.” 
Filled with a sense of her own uselessness, she longs for “the submergence 
of self in communion with Divine perfection”75 and mistakes Casaubon’s 
seriousness for the wisdom that will facilitate it. If it were not so tragic, her 
quixotic determination to see the dried- up old scholar, not as a knight in 
shining armor but as “a modern Augustine” mixed with Pascal, would be 
laughable. From the silly vanity of the more ordinary Esther we have moved 
to the almost pathological self- loathing of the beautiful young girl who looks 
to this grotesque “union” to “deliver her from her own girlish subjection to 
her own ignorance, and give her the freedom of voluntary submission to a 
guide who would take her along the grandest path.”76
For although Dorothea is full of illusions about her future husband, she 
has no illusions about her dependency as a woman. Though she is different 
from most women— and the virtual opposite of Esther— in combining an 
“intensity of religious disposition” with a “passionate desire to know and 
to think” and an equally passionate concern for “doing good,”77 at the age 
of nineteen she has already learned the limits of gender. Her large, ardent 
nature feels “hemmed in” by “a labyrinth of petty courses, a walled- in maze 
of small paths” that require her to follow “rules which were never acted 
upon.” She wishes to exchange a rule of life that she sees as petty and mean-
ingless for one that is “grand” and purposeful: the rule of married life.78 Her 
“faith” fatally transforms Casaubon’s “frigid rhetoric” of courtship into an 
invitation to the purposeful, shared life of her imaginings,79 such that she 
sees in his work the “Key” to her finally discovering “a binding theory which 
could bring her own life and doctrine into strict connexion with that amaz-
ing past, and give the remotest sources of knowledge some bearing on her 
actions.”80
More than a husband, the narrator says, Dorothea wants “a sort of 
father”81 and teacher, a wise older man to conduct her, via Latin and Greek 
and perhaps even a smattering of Hebrew, to those revered “provinces of 
masculine knowledge” that “seemed to her a standing- ground from which all 
truth could be seen more truly.”82 She believes that knowledge must be the 
means to wisdom, goodness, and the power of action, and, having perhaps 
learned from Maggie to moderate her desire, accepts that she will attain such 
knowledge through her husband. In this way she hopes to “arrive at the core 
of things, and judge soundly on the social duties of the Christian.”83 Although 
the narrator notes that Dorothea would be content to be a humble “lamp- 
holder” for her husband’s explorations,84 she also observes that the young 
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woman “had not reached that point of renunciation at which she would have 
been satisfied with having a wise husband: she wished, poor child, to be wise 
herself.”85
At the same time though, it is not merely intellectual improvement Doro-
thea longs for.
She did not want to deck herself with knowledge— to wear it loose 
from the nerves and blood that fed her action; and if she had writ-
ten a book she must have done it as Saint Theresa did, under the 
command of an authority that constrained her conscience. But some-
thing she yearned for by which her life might be filled with action at 
once rational and ardent; and since the time was gone by for guiding 
visions and spiritual directors, since prayer heightened yearning but 
not instruction, what lamp was there but knowledge? Surely learned 
men kept the only oil; and who more learned than Mr. Casaubon?86
While she does hope to get to “the core of things,” then, Dorothea more 
urgently seeks to engage her whole being, to become part of a greater order. 
As the novel’s “Prelude” informs us, this heroine is no Saint Theresa, but she 
is nonetheless on a spiritual quest, yearning with her whole being for “some-
thing” that will connect knowledge and action, mind and body, reason and 
passion. Dorothea believes that marriage to a good and learned man is her 
ticket to that “something”— the necessary conduit to link the woman to the 
world and give sanction and legitimacy to her action. Sadly, of course, she 
is even less able to act once she is married. Bound by “the gentlewoman’s 
oppressive liberty,” she finds herself after her marriage “in a moral imprison-
ment” in which “her religious faith was a solitary cry” and her hope for a 
purposeful life is sustained only by an “inward vision.”87
In Dorothea’s plight George Eliot replays the comedy of a blind, romantic 
girl falling for a man devoted to his cause to the point of farce and then trag-
edy. We are thrust from Jane Austen to William Blake here however, as the 
innocent, “childlike” Dorothea88— God’s gift— is forced by her marriage to 
chant the dirge of experience. The reason for this has everything to do with 
order, in that, like Lydgate, Dorothea overlooks the everyday power of social 
and conventional order and is at the same time duped by a belief that in mar-
riage she is submitting to the rule of a holy order that will sanctify and bless 
her submission by turning it into good action. And indeed this is just what 
does happen for Esther, so that with the triangulation of these three texts— 
Middlemarch, Felix Holt, and Felix’s “Address to the Working Man”— we 
catch a glimpse of the complexity of George Eliot’s response to the question 
of order. For what Felix is exhorting the workingmen to adopt is modeled by 
the “voluntary submission” of Esther and Dorothea, and the religious reso-
nance of his language suggests that adopting such “rules of fellowship”89 will 
produce a harmonious, and indeed sacred, social order.
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But for the heroine of Middlemarch the situation is more complicated. At 
crucial moments in the novel, George Eliot compares Dorothea to Saint The-
resa, whose “passionate, ideal nature demanded an epic life,” but she does so, 
as mentioned above, in order to make clear that such a life is forbidden to her 
nineteenth- century heroine. This is because of the contemporary requirement 
of marriage for a woman and Dorothea’s misguided choice of husband, along 
with the fact that in her society religion has been replaced by secular values 
to the point where there is “no coherent social faith and vision” to help her.90
It is interesting, however, that both Felix Holt and Middlemarch in the end 
represent the same vision of marital joy: two young people deep in love and 
conversation. For Dorothea, who had “looked up gratefully” to the Reverend 
Mr. Casaubon believing he could “understand the higher inward life” and 
join with her in “some spiritual communion,”91 finds a true lover and soul 
mate in Will Ladislaw, a young man with whom she can talk and even laugh. 
When Casaubon is disposed of, Dorothea’s friends continue to believe that 
another “husband is the best thing to keep her in order,”92 and her second 
marriage might on the outside look as if it is satisfying this convention, for 
Ladislaw does become “an ardent public man” and she, a mother and duti-
ful wife whose life seems to “have been absorbed into the life of another.”93 
But George Eliot carefully designs Ladislaw as a husband who, being what 
Middlemarchers call a “gypsy” who belongs to “no class,”94 will not perpetu-
ate the existing social or marital order. Instead, George Eliot makes clear that 
their private life, “hidden” from the eye of the world and from the reader, is 
a relationship of the highest order that two human beings can achieve.95 She 
thus seems to confirm the pronouncement of Philip Wakem’s father: “We 
don’t ask what a woman does— we ask whom she belongs to.”96 But she puts 
forward the idea, first in a rather bald way in Felix Holt and then in a fuller 
way in Middlemarch, that wedlock may actually be the holy order of a con-
temporary religion. In a “Finale” that answers the “Prelude,” George Eliot 
suggests that her heroine’s apparent insignificance as the wife of Will Ladi-
slaw and the mother of his children is representative of all— even ourselves 
and the author herself— whose vital influence for good is both “unhistoric” 
and endlessly fruitful.97
Dorothea and the Mysticism of Everyday Life
George Eliot’s invocation of Saint Theresa reminds us that though she scorned 
the various forms of spiritualism that were gaining prominence in the later 
years of her life, this period also marked the beginnings of her renewed 
interest in ancient traditions of mysticism. In Middlemarch, we see George 
Eliot tentatively but certainly engaging with religious mysticism in a way 
that anticipates the great modernist thinkers on mysticism, Evelyn Underhill 
and William James. In Dorothea, George Eliot creates a neo- Theresa, whose 
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“hidden life” as the unheralded influence for “growing good” provides a 
model for the reader.98 Dorothea follows George Eliot’s Renaissance heroine, 
Romola, in finding a new way for faith after her disillusionment with cleri-
cal, institutional Christianity; and the religious practice she develops could be 
understood in terms of Karl Rahner’s description of a mysticism of everyday 
faith.
Dorothea’s spiritual odyssey and its significance for George Eliot’s reli-
gious imagination may also be understood in the context of some recent ideas 
of the philosopher Richard Kearney, including his consideration of how vari-
ous mystical traditions have responded to disillusionment with the familiar 
idea of God.99 In his 2010 book Anatheism Kearney asks: what happens “for 
those who— after ridding themselves of ‘God’— still seek God?”100 Crucial 
to Kearney’s purpose here is to challenge the post- Enlightenment claim that 
societies and individuals “grow up” and grow out of faith, replacing reli-
gious belief with rationality; in response, Kearney is arguing that we grow 
indeed— not necessarily away from God, however, but from one kind of God 
to another.
Kearney’s subtitle is Returning to God after God, and he eloquently 
encapsulates his idea of a return to theism with the prefix “ana,” which in its 
compound meaning— “up, back, again”— conjures the notion of a constant 
movement towards, away from, back to, and around the divine in a kind of 
cosmic and intimate dance. Kearney explores many forms of this return in 
our post- religious, post- secular age, and it is key that it is a return of what 
was once known, a retrieval of what has been— a recognition, rather than a 
discovery of something new. Religion, in one of its meanings, is about links 
and bonds, and Kearney’s conception here is of a link to something out-
side oneself— not simply a subjective sense— that is already known and thus 
recognized. Important too, and resonant with the Christian terms of the res-
urrection story, is the necessity for a departure that will afford a recognition 
and a revelation of meaning that couldn’t be known by continued presence. 
It is necessary, in other words, that there be a withdrawal, a detachment, in 
order for there to be the new perspective that allows for true belief by awak-
ening passive reception to active engagement. And sometimes, says Kearney, 
we need to hear stories of the death of God and experience the absence of 
God— just as Jesus did on the cross— in order to find out about and enact 
God’s living presence.
All of Kearney’s ideas pertain to cultural as well as personal development, 
and, indeed, the micro and macro levels of religious experience mutually inhere 
in and facilitate each other. At both levels the return he is heralding is marked 
by two essential shifts in religious understanding that resonate with George 
Eliot’s thinking to the extent that we can see her as anticipating Kearney’s 
anatheistic approach. These are the shift in understanding from the sovereign 
God to the suffering God, and the concurrent shift from “my God” and “our 
God” to the God of all. The first of these is taking shape, as I will outline here, 
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from the beginning of George Eliot’s fiction; from this follows her exploration 
of the second of these shifts in her final novel, Daniel Deronda. This process 
demonstrates a crucial idea that George Eliot shares with Kearney— that reli-
gious understanding evolves and indeed must evolve if any faith is to claim to 
be alive, an idea that I will develop more fully in chapter 5.
Kearney argues that all religions hold a view of both a sovereign and a 
suffering version of God and that they have emphasized the former at the 
expense of the latter. Christianity holds to a “God of power and might” (as 
the Anglican tradition celebrates in its liturgy) because we need to believe 
in a God who is powerful; and while we also believe in a suffering God— 
manifest primarily in the person of Christ— we underplay this vulnerable 
aspect because of the dominant culture of fear. In simple terms, one could say 
that a culture must “grow up”— leaving behind the god who demands blood 
sacrifice and provides inspiration and strength and warrant for war and other 
forms of cultural dominance— and instead model the god who suffers and 
dies for others. Along with this, a culture must surrender the notion of a god 
whose interests are identified with one’s own and embrace instead a god who 
is there for everyone, even one’s enemies.
In George Eliot’s early work we can see an exploration of the divine in 
terms of a dialectic of sovereignty and suffering. Particularly in several of 
her early essays we see a positively vitriolic response to the narrow, smug 
claim to a god who rewards me and my religious fellows while punishing all 
others unmercifully. Typically for George Eliot, the vitriol is poured out as 
much because of the intellectual as the moral and spiritual stupidity of this 
mind- set, which sees salvation as the end, rather than the beginning, of a 
movement toward holiness and the unfolding of God’s will.101 George Eliot’s 
early works of fiction all re- create her experience as a young Christian in a 
far more positive light than do these essays, and the sympathy she evidently 
feels and encourages from her reader is taken by most critics as what one 
calls “a piety about the past”;102 that is, a kind of pious memorializing of 
religious piety. Most readers recognize in Adam Bede, for example, a refram-
ing of biblical images and parables that works to either sacralize the ordinary 
or naturalize the sacred (or both). And the narrator also takes great pains 
to make early Methodism comprehensible to the sophisticated, urban, even 
unchurched contemporary reader. While for many readers Dinah never loses 
her ultra- pious and thus unrealistic and unsympathetic quality, Adam’s and 
the narrator’s love for her almost succeeds in bringing her down to earth. 
And while Dinah’s preaching may grate on us, her prayerful, visionary sen-
sibility is more readily acceptable for the ease with which it can be reframed 
in nonreligious terms as a superior kind of intuition. As if knowing how 
unpalatable all of this is to a modern day reader, the narrator intervenes with 
a double- edged injunction, asking readers both to understand that things 
were different back then and to recognize that their own perspective is not as 
rationally unimpeachable as they might like to think.
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As has often been discussed, the germ of Adam Bede is the story told to 
Mary Anne Evans as a girl by her Methodist aunt, and the novel that results 
is redolent with re- created memories of her girlhood. For the purposes of my 
argument here, it is interesting to think of this childhood origin as a kind of 
metonymy for the idea of a progressive cultural consciousness; George Eliot 
is here telling a story of her own religious origins as well as those of her cul-
ture. In a way she is saying, “Don’t you see how valuable and important and 
rare this traditional religious view was?” And, conversely, “Now I’m grown 
up, I’m rational and sophisticated, just like you.” Of course it is not an either/
or for George Eliot, and the point is more to say, “I experienced and believed 
in this religious consciousness, and now along with my rationality and intelli-
gence I have a deep sense of something more.” In other words, I think we can 
say that at this point in George Eliot’s career and life, she endorsed the post- 
Enlightenment rationalist view and realized that she had grown out of faith. 
Importantly, however, her fictional work belied the simplicity of this shift and 
revealed instead that there was still something more to be said. We find clues 
throughout her first novel, but the real truth- teller comes in another narra-
torial interlude when she is speaking of Hetty’s lost- sheep wanderings and 
refers to the image of the crucified Christ, which she says is never to be found 
along the lanes of her enlightened English Protestant countryside but only in 
Europe. It is as if the narrator is pulled up short in her own wanderings here 
as she exclaims, “No wonder man’s religion has much suffering in it: no won-
der he needs a suffering God.”103 It seems to me that it is her knowledge of the 
truth of suffering that makes the post- Enlightenment claim that persons and 
cultures grow out of faith implausible for George Eliot.
Another key signpost on this journey is the struggle that the heroine of 
The Mill on the Floss undergoes. Here we see George Eliot, as discussed in 
previous chapters, leaving her childhood past behind; as we know, instead of 
growing up Maggie drowns, but her death is the crucial sacrifice that allows 
her creator not only to live and to write but also to move beyond childhood 
territory and avoid the compulsion to return. In Maggie we see a childish 
need to be loved by and to please the sovereign father, and her best efforts to 
overcome this need to submit are thwarted again and again by the insidious 
guilt- producing introjections that prevent her acting in her own best interests 
and according to her own feelings. Here too we witness an intuitive under-
standing that suffering is the true touchstone, but Maggie is trapped in a kind 
of double stereotype— of gender and of extreme religion— that makes her see 
herself as the one who must suffer.
George Eliot’s other heroines, notably Romola and Fedalma, work out 
her trademark tragedy of renunciation in less tragic though still deeply costly 
ways, but it is in Dorothea that we see George Eliot arriving at what I will 
call a mystical solution. Like Maggie, Dorothea is seduced by the idea of sov-
ereign authority, which she thinks she finds in Casaubon, who is obviously 
more of a father figure and teacher than a lover or companion. Like Maggie 
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too, Dorothea is convinced of her need to be taught; she has a pressing need 
to find a way to be of use in the world, and it is her enforced acquiescence 
to the cultural view that women find usefulness through their husbands that 
leads to her severe humbling and then her maturity. Like Maggie too, she 
is almost betrayed into voluntarily walking into “a virtual tomb”104 by the 
insidious allure of guilt and pity. The danger of this belief in sovereign power 
and the complicity of social forces to ensure its reign even into the future are 
given ghoulish weight when Casaubon tries to control his wife from beyond 
the grave, through his will.
But Dorothea is not Maggie; neither is she Dinah. Like Dinah, however, 
Dorothea is unusually pious, but it is the suffering caused by her marriage 
that reveals an otherwise unsuspected depth of inwardness, which she experi-
ences in her disillusionment as “spiritual emptiness and discontent.”105 When 
we first find the newly married Dorothea in tears, the narrator claims that 
we cannot be expected to regard the young bride’s marital misery as “tragic” 
despite its sublime Roman background. But she nonetheless convinces us 
that it is tragic— could we bear to recognize it— because of “the very fact of 
frequency.” It is indeed Dorothea’s tragic destiny to learn just how painful 
unseen tragedy can be: in short, it is Dorothea’s destiny to grow up, to leave 
behind the belief in a husband who will be a benevolent, powerful guide. 
But, the narrator hastens to tell us, it is not in Dorothea’s nature to rebel: 
“Permanent rebellion, the disorder of a life without some loving reverent 
resolve, was not possible to her.”106 And so at this point and in this way she is 
like Maggie, but George Eliot does not leave her here, for she is now ready to 
develop the next stage in this progression of religious experience.
Eighteen months or so into Dorothea’s miserable marriage, after her hus-
band has repeatedly rebuffed any overtures of intimacy, we witness another 
deep inward crisis. Now however, Dorothea experiences “a rebellious anger” 
which forbids tears in favor of words (to herself) of self- defense. The sound 
of her own words shocks her into acknowledging the destruction of “her 
young hope” and the abandonment of “her best soul in prison, [where she 
could pay it] only hidden visits.” It is fascinating here to see Dorothea taking 
another huge step toward maturity when she recognizes in herself the desire 
for vindication by a sovereign god: “Her anger said, as anger is apt to say, 
that God was with her— that all heaven, though it were crowded with spirits 
watching them, must be on her side.”107 The wording here suggests the child-
ishness of this perspective, however human for us all and however permanent 
it might remain for many of us. This is a dark night of the soul for Dorothea, 
and “the struggle changed continually” through that night, until her anger 
is transmuted to pity, subdued by the “shadowy monitor” that her husband 
still embodies. “It cost her a litany of pictured sorrows and of silent cries that 
she might be the mercy for [his] sorrows— but the resolved submission did 
come . . .”108— to the disappointment of most readers perhaps, but true to the 
nature of this heroine.
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But her creator isn’t finished with her yet. Whether by means of a deus 
ex machina or poetic justice or a sovereign but merciful author, Dorothea is 
rescued from this miserable fate because there are better things in store for 
her. For the next step in her process of maturing is through the independence 
afforded by a wealthy widowhood that allows her to experience and model a 
different kind of power. Every reader is familiar with the eulogy to the insig-
nificant with which the novel ends, but I want to focus on one of Dorothea’s 
life- changing yet “unhistoric acts.” After her husband’s death, one responsi-
bility she has is to bequeath the clerical living at Lowick. In a beautiful touch, 
George Eliot allows Lydgate, the physician who is himself inwardly ailing, 
to diagnose Dorothea’s deepest need: “She wants perfect freedom,” he says, 
“more than any other prescription.”109 Lydgate is right, because Dorothea 
has moved beyond the need for sovereign power, and she must start experi-
encing in grown- up fashion the conundrum that Lydgate too is confronting. 
Dorothea’s innocent question concerning Farebrother, “Why has he not done 
more?” casts a glaring light on Lydgate’s own failings, but he replies simply, 
“It’s uncommonly difficult to make the right thing work: there are so many 
strings pulling at once.”110
When it comes to her decision about the living, Dorothea experiences the 
same difficulty but in nicely (for my purposes) ecclesiastical terms: “She was 
wishing it were possible to restore the times of primitive zeal,” the narra-
tor notes, “and yet . . .”111 This “and yet” tells it all, because Dorothea has 
learned by now that she is living in a new era when she must take respon-
sibility for trying “to make the right thing work” as best she can. She also 
knows that Mr. Tyke’s so- called “apostolic” affiliation112 represents a dead 
kind of traditionalism that is more focused on claiming a link to the past 
than developing a connection with his parishioners. Instead of doctrinal pro-
nouncements, Dorothea states a preference for Farebrother’s way of teaching 
Christianity, which “makes it a wider blessing than any other . . .— I mean 
that which takes in the most good of all kinds, and brings in the most people 
as sharers in it.”113 Even her difficulty in expressing this desire signals a shift 
to a more complex and mature attitude that witnesses her discovery of an 
indescribable depth in ordinary religious practice.114
In this small scene between Dorothea and Lydgate we see a number of 
important things: the friendship between two people, a man and a woman, 
who recognize in each other a will to do good in a way that brings them 
together and has far- reaching effects. In part, each has been brought to this 
understanding and mutual respect by marital disappointment; each has 
learned something that helps create a bond between them and allows them 
to intervene to improve a worthy clergyman’s life and the lives of the peo-
ple who will be his parishioners. For Lydgate, the painful education in the 
power of a woman has meant a new understanding of this woman’s grace. 
For Dorothea, the religious idealism of her youth remains, but she is now pre-
pared to put aside those ideals in favor of a visible and practical good. Still, 
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she is granted the power to “rescue” Farebrother,115 and later is able to help 
Lydgate in a way that enforces the sense of a new religious order, sustained 
by a desire for the good that is not bound by doctrinal definition.
Although George Eliot allows her heroine only a temporary period as 
husbandless disposer of her own life, here we see her giving Dorothea an 
opportunity to act under her own power. In this, George Eliot is expanding 
an idea she introduced in The Mill on the Floss, when Maggie recognized in 
Dr. Kenn’s face a sympathetic response. The narrator pauses then to reflect on 
the importance of such a connection:
The middle- aged, who have lived through their strongest emotions, 
but are yet in the time when memory is still half- passionate and not 
merely contemplative, should surely be a sort of natural priesthood, 
whom life has disciplined and consecrated to be the refuge and rescue 
of early stumblers and victims of self- despair. Most of us, at some 
moment in our young lives, would have welcomed a priest of that 
natural order in any sort of canonicals or uncanonicals, but had to 
scramble upwards into all the difficulties of nineteen entirely without 
aid, as Maggie did.116
Here George Eliot gestures toward a new religious order— “natural” yet 
“disciplined” and “consecrated”— consisting of one human being helping 
another. And it is important that Dorothea is a member of this order, her 
gender and her relative youth notwithstanding.
Dorothea’s growth away from a sovereign, private god enshrined in a 
doctrinal code toward a Christianity that is focused on addressing the suf-
fering of all through love accords with Kearney’s ideas on “anatheism.” It 
also, I think, further defines George Eliot’s rejection of a theologically based 
understanding of faith in favor of something akin to what Evelyn Underhill 
called “practical mysticism.” Relevant here too is Karl Rahner’s understand-
ing of “the mystical way in everyday life.” Rahner’s idea of “the experience 
of God” as “the experience of grace in everyday life”117 could describe Doro-
thea’s influence— herself “the gift of God” to those with whom she lives. And 
Rahner’s identification of this everyday mysticism as a “wintry spirituality,” 
which is “ ‘closely allied with the torments of atheists’ and modern rational-
ism”118 accords with Kearney’s ideas concerning a middle ground between 
theism and atheism.
There are three main elements of mysticism, at least as Underhill and 
Rahner propose it, which could be seen to resonate with George Eliot’s 
religious position. First, there is the combination of idealism and pragma-
tism. George Eliot rejected various forms of spiritualism because they did 
not represent what she called “a practical religion”; conversely, as Rosemary 
Ashton says, “George Eliot was not at all [impatient] with the beliefs of 
those who strove after some genuine but ideal object.”119 Second, as Kearney 
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demonstrates, there is the common ground shared by various mystical tradi-
tions that speak of a widening scope not only within but beyond their own 
tradition. We see George Eliot’s further exploration of this common ground 
in her next novel. Third, and perhaps most deeply appealing to George Eliot, 
would be the commingling in mysticism of knowledge and feeling; that is, 
a way of knowing that is not discursive but almost indistinguishable from 
feeling. As Adam Bede has said to Dinah, “feeling’s a sort o’ knowledge,”120 
and George Eliot continues to demonstrate her own agreement with him 
throughout her career until she is explicitly proposing the idea of “emotional 
intellect” in her final novel.121
As the narrator of Middlemarch says of its heroine, she was incapable of 
“permanent rebellion”; and I would propose the same for her creator. Indeed, 
among the beautifully subtle hints of the constantly evolving religious feel-
ing in this novel is George Eliot’s gifting to Dorothea— an earnest, naive, 
idealistic young woman— not only the name “gift of God” but the gifting of 
a clerical living; that is, the ordaining, in practical terms, of the clergyman to 
serve her community. According to Kearney, “Theresa of Avila argued that 
true mystical experience testifies to the sacramental movement from mystical 
meditation back to the ordinary universe.”122 Dorothea’s radical yet relatively 
“hidden” and “unhistoric” gift to Farebrother, I would argue, is an expres-




“The Religion of the Future”
Daniel Deronda and the Mystical Imagination
Could there be a slenderer, more insignificant thread in 
human history than this consciousness of a girl, busy with her 
small inferences of the way in which she could make her life 
pleasant?— in a time  .  .  . when the soul of man was waking 
to pulses which had for centuries been beating in him unfelt, 
until their full sum made a new life of terror or of joy.
— George Eliot, Daniel Deronda, 2:11 124
Daniel Deronda enacts a tremendous shift in the scope of George Eliot’s reli-
gious imagination, but it also represents a culmination of all of the themes 
and concerns that have shaped and informed the religious imagining of 
her previous novels. What George Eliot means by religion in this novel is 
something new, and its meaning is inflected throughout with a radical under-
standing of imagination. Religion and imagination converge in this novel in 
George Eliot’s continuing exploration of mysticism.
All readers recognize Daniel Deronda as distinctive in George Eliot’s 
canon for being deeply rooted in contemporary English life and culture. In a 
sense, she has written her way to the present, tracing a clear route from her 
own childhood past in the novels and tales up to and including Silas Marner, 
then widening the circle to include the distant historical European past in 
Romola and The Spanish Gypsy, then approaching a more recent and less 
personalized past in Felix Holt and Middlemarch. All four of the latter end 
with a sense that the protagonists and their cultures are poised to enter the 
future, on the brink of a new beginning. Daniel Deronda plunges into the 
present but problematizes the notion of contemporaneity by invoking at the 
same time a radical sense of atemporality. The much- discussed epigraph to 
the first chapter of the novel reflects fittingly on the constructedness of all 
beginnings, in science as much as in poetry, and claims to presuppose every-
thing. This novel takes up the issue of time itself— as a philosophical and 
religious question— and though it is all about the present it is also charged 
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with the past and aimed explicitly toward the future. Further, the novel’s 
orientation is to no merely temporal past or future but to an eternal, ongoing 
dimension that is perhaps indeed best described as presupposing everything.1
George Eliot insists in this novel on forcing a collision— a favorite word of 
hers— between two worlds that could hardly be more different: the ordinary 
London world of Jews, including that of a Zionist seeking the promised land, 
on the one hand, and, on the other, the blatantly secular world of a jaded 
English middle class. Deronda himself is the link between the two worlds and 
largely bears the burden— for most readers with mixed success— of making 
the otherworldly realm credible, both to his own contemporaries within the 
text and to George Eliot’s readers. She employs the age- old device of student 
and teacher in order to instruct the reader while Mordecai is instructing Dan-
iel, who in turn is instructing Gwendolyn.
Religion in Daniel Deronda has little to do with Christianity. Through the 
desperate plight of her heroine, Gwendolyn, George Eliot discloses, as if on 
second thought, the inadequacy of the Christian Church. Gwendolyn attends 
the church of which her uncle is the pragmatic and well- meaning though spir-
itually obtuse rector as she does any other social function. Further, through 
Deronda’s silence on the subject of Christianity, as he searches for a way to 
identify and pursue a vocation, George Eliot suggests the church’s downright 
irrelevance. Deronda’s fascination with Judaism is of course explained by 
his eventual discovery of his own heritage, but it is significant that he never 
identifies the heritage in which he has grown up as “Christian” but rather 
as “English,” a point that serves to denigrate religious affiliation in favor of 
racial and national allegiances. For all its deliberate bracketing of the Chris-
tian Church as irrelevant, however, this novel that has least of all George 
Eliot’s fiction to do with Christianity is the one that is most explicit of them 
all about the need for faith. Its most obvious engagement with religious ques-
tions is of course Daniel’s fascination with Judaism, but equally important is 
George Eliot’s thorough engagement with the religious climate of the time.
Daniel Deronda and the Contemporary Religious Climate
We can identify in very simple terms two sets of related issues that pervade 
English religious discourse during the decade in which Daniel Deronda is 
produced. The first is the cluster of theological questions that have been in 
the air from the beginning of George Eliot’s career— questions about the exis-
tence of God, the nature of Jesus, and the status of the Bible. The second is 
the cluster of questions about human nature and destiny that follow from 
a move away from certainty on the first set of questions— questions about 
the existence of the human soul, the nature of human individuality, and life 
after death. And following from these latter questions for most thoughtful 
Victorians is the existential question of the meaning of life in the absence 
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of certainty concerning a God and an afterlife as traditionally understood. 
One can say that while the first set of questions is still very much alive in 
contemporary religious circles, “religious circles” have become quite a bit 
smaller by this time. George Eliot is deliberately turning her attention in 
Daniel Deronda to the second set of questions, which she believes to be the 
pressing ones for the present and future.
In a letter of this time, George Eliot is explicit in stating that this shift in 
perspective does not mark a change in her point of view. In answer to a cor-
respondent who laments the evidence of a loss of faith in her later works, she 
claims that
there has been no change in the point of view from which I regard our 
life since I wrote my first fiction— the “Scenes of Clerical Life.” Any 
apparent change of spirit must be due to something of which I am 
unconscious. The principles which are at the root of my effort to paint 
Dinah Morris are equally at the root of my effort to paint Mordecai.2
This correspondent’s mistake can be identified as a literary rather than a 
theological or religious one, in that she mistakes George Eliot’s stories as 
embodiments of their author’s belief rather than as what she calls, in another 
much- quoted letter, “a set of experiments in life.”3 Even if we accept her 
statement about the consistency of her views, however, a shift in perspective 
is evident. And to suggest the way in which George Eliot’s own response to 
religious questions has developed, I would like briefly to situate her responses 
in relation to those of two contemporaries: her friend Sara Sophia Hennell, 
sister- in- law of Charles Bray and writer on theological and religious matters, 
and the poet and cultural critic Matthew Arnold.
Hennell and Marian Evans Lewes maintain a correspondence through-
out their lives whose original focus, aside from personal friendship, consists 
of theological discussions. But once George Eliot emerges and begins writ-
ing fiction, Hennell’s friend Marian Evans is no longer interested in tackling 
theological questions. Though they continue to correspond and Marian even 
maintains her pet name Polly or Pollian in writing to Hennell, it is as if the 
latter continues along the same track, writing about “the Development prin-
ciple” in religion while Polly abandons talk of principles and simply develops 
into George Eliot. Hennell continues painstakingly to thrash out a theologi-
cal position in hopes of showing that the new understanding of God and 
religion is but a development of the old. One can see in Present Religion as 
a Faith Owning Fellowship with Thought, published in 1865, for example, 
Hennell’s turn on Feuerbach’s ideas of God. In response to his idea that God 
and religion are in effect a creation of humans, Hennell states that, though she 
no longer sees God in the traditional way “as a Being apart from man,” she 
now sees God, not as a creation of man’s imagination and need, but “as the 
universal spring of human action”4— the source of any human thinking on 
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God and religion. Hennell’s thinking is sophisticated enough to acknowledge 
that “God” is a symbol, as is all human knowledge that language attempts 
to conceptualize.5 Hennell continues to consult her friend, now George Eliot, 
on matters of style and titles, and Marian/Polly responds with what could be 
described as polite, generous interest and tries to be helpful, enlisting Lewes’s 
aid in practical and stylistic matters. But her response to such theological 
questions is now found in her fiction, articulated according to her incarna-
tional aesthetic.
Almost a decade later in 1873 in Literature and Dogma, Matthew Arnold 
is writing in a similar though far more fluid and less anxious way than Hen-
nell of a god whom he defines as “The enduring power, not ourselves, that 
makes for righteousness”6 and championing the Bible as a necessary source 
for faith but only to be understood in terms of literary, rather than dogmatic 
ideas. The following year he begins God and the Bible: A Review of Objec-
tions to “Literature and Dogma” by defending this new theology against 
charges of heresy, comparing his own situation with that of Polycarp, in his 
own time seen as a heretic of the Greek religion and later recognized as a 
Christian martyr. It is interesting that Lewes, who does not show interest in 
religion and is what one could call unchurched, notes in response to Arnold’s 
God and the Bible an enormous shift in the cultural climate: “What a singu-
lar spectacle is presented by the contrast of the general tone of men’s minds 
on this subject of Religion at the present day and that of some twenty years 
ago! And the progress rushes on, it does not simply move.”7 George Eliot’s 
claim that her view has not changed, then, begs to be inserted into this con-
text in which everything has changed.
Also interesting is Lewes’s statement in the same letter that “we”— he and 
his spouse— agree with much of what Arnold says. Lewes comments that he 
“profoundly agree[s]” that “righteousness is salvation” but that “I, myself” 
don’t see what the Bible has to do with it. He then reiterates a rejection of 
the idea of a personal God in favor of a human manifestation of goodness.8 
To me it is interesting here that he at first claims an agreement of “we” and 
then seems to distinguish an individual opinion on the Bible. Though one 
could debate George Eliot’s position on all of this, it is certainly true that she 
does seem to see what the Bible has to do with it: while she has withdrawn 
from theological discussions, she continues to produce biblical echoes and 
quotations throughout her fiction and in her letters; and as late as 1876 she is 
asking to borrow Hennell’s copy of the apocryphal gospels.9 A further shift is 
evident in this period around the time of the writing of Daniel Deronda, for 
she now seems ready at least selectively to rejoin the religious conversation 
although, as I suggested above, her attention is on the human, rather than the 
theological questions.
Several reasons may be suggested for this change, one being her position 
as a respected woman of letters and wise counselor who has gathered around 
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her a coterie of like- minded correspondents, some of whom seek answers 
from her to troubling religious questions. The major issues we see George 
Eliot discussing with correspondents and visitors in this period belong to 
what I referred to above as the second set of questions, having to do with 
human destiny and the meaning of life and the consequent threat of fatalism. 
In her letters she takes up the challenge of fatalism in two main situations: 
firstly, because of the problems that death raises, particularly when the idea 
of personal immortality is no longer taken for granted; and, secondly, in the 
dilemma of an apparently purposeless life.
The letters of this period certainly reveal a greater attention to death, 
partly owing to her and Lewes’s age and their more serious and unrelenting 
physical ailments. But she marks its inevitable approach with equanimity, as 
noteworthy for example in her dedication to Lewes of the 1874 edition of her 
collected poems, which includes this quotation:
‘And the last parting now began to send
Diffusive dread through love and wedded bliss,
Thrilling them into finer tenderness.’
Her sanguine attitude toward death can be accounted for partly by the fact 
that— even though she is still prone to depression verging on despair over the 
writing of her novel and feels threatened by the “too much” that can “almost 
nullify one’s own small individual effort”10— she now has two strong bul-
warks against hopelessness: her conviction of the contribution that she has 
made through her work, and the value of her relationship with Lewes and 
their mutual love.
The question of life after death is pressing for many contemporaries who 
have abandoned traditional religion, and George Eliot’s own stand on this 
issue is not to take a stand. In comforting Mrs. W. H. Smith, a friend who 
does not believe in immortality, on the death of her beloved husband, she 
writes of the “blessed reunion, if it may come,”11 and suggests that in doing 
good to others Mrs. Smith may keep the presence of her husband alive. To 
Mrs. Henry Ponsonby, who in moving from an ardent faith to atheism has 
lost her sense of purpose, George Eliot preaches against what she seems to see 
as the most pernicious foe of this time, “hideous fatalism.” She rails against 
allowing the lack of belief in a supernatural power to excuse any moral lapse, 
arguing
that the fellowship between man and man which has been the 
principle of development, social and moral, is not dependent on con-
ceptions of what is not man: and that the idea of God, so far as it has 
been a spiritual influence, is the ideal of a goodness entirely human 
(i.e., an exaltation of the human).
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She goes on to counsel that our job is to keep doing what we can since “the 
progress of the world— which you say can only come at the right time— 
can certainly never come at all save by the modified action of the individual 
beings who compose the world.”12 This conviction— the belief in progress 
and in the idea that it can come only through the purposeful action of human 
beings— is fundamental to her religious mind- set at this time.
The notion of the significance of individual action is not new for George 
Eliot, but in letters of the time and in Daniel Deronda we see a new urgency 
prompted by her concern over this “hideous fatalism.” In Daniel Deronda 
she focuses on the problem of a pervasive attitude of almost existential 
meaninglessness, embodied primarily in the monstrous Grandcourt and sym-
bolized in gambling and the motif of chance. George Eliot’s concern over a 
widespread sense of purposelessness is evident in a letter of September 1876 
in which Emily Davies reports to her friend Annie Crow on a conversation 
she had with Mrs. and Mr. Lewes on the topic of education and the question 
of teaching morals to children.
[Mrs. Lewes] was anxious that my friend [a prospective teacher] 
should impress upon them the wide, far- reaching consequences of 
every action, as a corrective of the common feeling that it does not 
signify what we do— and on the other hand how society reacts upon 
us, and how much we owe to it. People are always asking, Why 
should I do what is good for society? What is society to me? The 
answer is that if it were not for the accumulated result of social effort, 
we should be in the state of wild beasts.13
According to Miss Davies, Mrs. Lewes also expressed scorn for the atti-
tude of “stupid scepticism” that claims life is not worth living.14 Two months 
later, in the reflective mood of their shared birthdays, she writes to Sara 
Sophia Hennell that she would indeed “scold” young people who claim 
“that life is not worth having” were it not for her remembrance of her own 
“young discontent.”15 But while the current sense of purposelessness may 
remind George Eliot of her own youthful despair, Emily Davies notes that 
Mrs. Lewes asks in the conversation reported above: “was there not a great 
deal among girls of wanting to do some great thing and thinking it not worth 
while to do anything because they cannot do that?”16 To this Miss Davies 
can only reply in the negative, thus distinguishing George Eliot’s own youth-
ful sense of thwarted purpose from the widespread ennui of the present 
generation.
Another theme that returns at this time is George Eliot’s scorn for “con-
solation” as the vapid doctrine that compels people who suffer or simply 
contemplate death to find their hope in a world beyond. Again we may note 
an unchanged principle but a changed attitude based on the pressing issues of 
the day. Refusing to hum the refrain of consolation, she focuses her religious 
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understanding on action and experience in the present, along with an open-
ness based on a willingness to accept her lack of knowledge. In an oft- cited 
letter from this time to Dr. Joseph Frank Payne, a self- confessed freethinker 
who worries about the fate of his loved ones after death, she notes traditional 
religion’s inadequacy in being “chiefly precious as a source of consolation” 
and hopes for something more from “the religion of the future.”17 In this 
letter she clearly wishes to reject a religion based on false hope and refuses 
to offer any clear- cut answer. Instead she gives Payne the true consolation 
of sharing his concerns and offers her fictional works, not as answers to his 
questions but only as “experiments in life.”
It is worth quoting at length from this important letter since it points to 
several more ideas I will pursue here:
Your letter will have associated you with questions which are the most 
frequently in my thoughts— questions which are my chief prompters 
to write anything at all. But my writing is simply a set of experiments 
in life— an endeavour to see what our thought and emotion may be 
capable of— what stores of motive, actual or hinted as possible, give 
promise of a better after which we may strive— what gains from past 
revelations and discipline we must strive to keep hold of as something 
more sure than shifting theory. I become more and more timid— with 
less daring to adopt any formula which does not get itself clothed 
for me in some human figure and individual experience, and perhaps 
that is a sign that if I help others to see at all it must be through that 
medium of art.18
This notion of “experiments” is fascinating in that there is a sense in which 
science, particularly as she witnessed and participated in her husband’s 
physiological and psychological explorations, had caught up with her long- 
standing belief in the essential power of feeling, linked here with thought as 
the source of human endeavor. As she writes in another letter of this time, 
“the most thorough experientialists admit intuition— i.e., direct impression of 
sensibility underlying all proof— as necessary starting- points for thought.”19
Her claim here to the importance of these fictional experiments in showing 
the way to a firmer foundation than “shifting theory” is echoed in another 
letter to Mrs. Ponsonby in which she expresses a mistrust of a physicist “or 
other ‘ist’ ” if he “strands us on results that seem to stultify the most ardent, 
massive experience of mankind, and hem up the best part of our feelings in 
stagnation.”20 Throughout these letters there resounds a confidence in feel-
ing and experience as the basis for knowledge. This echoes the findings of 
Lewes as well, who notes in a letter at this time, “my doctrine, all doctrine is 
primarily emotion.”21 In George Eliot’s early letters we heard her upholding 
feeling, particularly in terms of her sense of a duty to teach readers to feel, 
as the basis for her writing; here we see her standing on the same ground of 
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feeling and intuition, living out Adam Bede’s confidence that “feeling’s a sort 
o’ knowledge”22 as she gestures toward “the religion of the future.”
The letter to Payne shows George Eliot responding to questions of ulti-
mate meaning through a combination of knowledge— based on feeling and 
intuition— and hope in what humans “might be capable of.” This emphasis 
on capability, possibility, the “promise of a better” points to the striving after 
an ideal which, while applicable to all of her works, is framed in new ways in 
Daniel Deronda. And the final sentence of the quotation above, in which she 
articulates her need to clothe ideas in human figures, identifies the key to that 
novel and to the whole of George Eliot’s approach— the incarnational aes-
thetic that underlies her religious imagination. While we may accept George 
Eliot’s claim that her “point of view” on religious matters has not changed 
since her first work of fiction, she would not say that she was simply repeat-
ing herself in each work; in fact she made frequent claims for the distinct 
purpose of each and said that she could not repeat herself. For, though her 
position may not have changed, her ways of expressing it and even of under-
standing it are constantly evolving. As we saw in chapter 1, she knows that 
the “treatment” of an idea is inseparable from the idea itself and that the idea 
is impossible to distinguish from its treatment. So, while her “principles” and 
“point of view” may be consistent, the changes in her mode of representa-
tion suggest that her correspondent was correct to detect a “change of spirit.” 
This change is manifest in Daniel Deronda in a powerful new expression 
of her incarnational aesthetic, articulated by means of a veritable concert 
of arts.
By setting Daniel’s idealistic quest in the context of a comprehensive 
exploration of the power of art, George Eliot aims to address the contem-
porary religious problem of a demoralizing disdain for feeling that leads to 
a lack of hope. She creates two characters, Daniel and Gwendolyn, who, in 
very different ways and for different reasons, are seeking purpose and mean-
ing. Gwendolyn moves according to a familiar George Eliot pattern from a 
state of narcissistic egoism in which her only purpose is to please herself to 
an awareness of others and of her humble place in a larger world.23 Daniel, in 
contrast, thinks and feels for others— partly because of a sensibility that has 
been finely tuned by the mystery and sometime dread surrounding his uncer-
tain origins— and is driven by an almost uncanny sense of wanting something 
more, shaped by a conviction that achieving his own identity and purpose 
will involve taking responsibility for others. This novel is both unique and 
related to previous novels, and here one may note a link to Middlemarch. 
As unlike Dorothea and as like Rosamond as she is, Gwendolyn nonethe-
less eventually learns an attitude of self- denying attentiveness to others that 
includes a new appreciation of the value of life in all its “unhistoric” ordinari-
ness. Daniel, on the other hand, experiences and facilitates an interpretation 
of life that evolves from Will Ladislaw’s somewhat undeveloped Shelleyan 
perspective to encompass a vast and deep form of neo- Romanticism.
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In their own ways, both individually and together, Gwendolyn and Daniel 
learn the meaning of faith, and through them George Eliot demonstrates the 
mystical notion that faith allows one to see poetry in the everyday. The novel 
explores the possibilities for mysticism in contemporary life in three major 
ways, and while I must discuss them separately, their necessary interrelation is 
crucial to George Eliot’s conception. The simplest of the three is most evident 
in Daniel’s schooling of Gwendolyn in a practice that will be formulated in the 
next century in terms of the mysticism of everyday life. For reasons which are 
never explicit, Daniel, at the age of twenty- five, is an expert in this practice: 
his blatantly secular middle- class lifestyle has been the proving ground of a 
disciplined practice that allows him to discern a deep value and significance in 
everyday things. This attitude emerges as, and merges with, a preparedness for 
the second, more ethereal and more obviously religious form of mysticism that 
he will be schooled in by Mordecai. Yet Daniel and Mordecai are both steeped 
in the third form of mysticism, which is the mysticism of imagination— an 
attitude that is interfused with the other two in its power to elevate the com-
monest sights and experiences to heights of romantic and religious grandeur.
Gwendolyn Harleth and the Mysticism of the Everyday
As I suggested in the last chapter, we can understand Dorothea as modeling 
a practice that will come to be known as the mysticism of everyday life. In 
Daniel Deronda George Eliot develops this motif, this time by having her 
very un- Theresa- like heroine be deliberately instructed by her hero in this 
practice. She conducts this instruction mainly through a complex series of 
encounters; increasingly they are private, but they are intense even in a crowd 
or in the midst of a mundane social gathering. The meetings between Daniel 
and Gwendolyn are part of what by this time has become a great George 
Eliot tradition of one- to- one encounters, each serving as a metonymy for 
the powerful influence one person can have on another. From Mr. Tryan and 
Janet, to Dinah and Hetty, to Dorothea and Rosamond, these encounters 
exceed mere intimacy to achieve the status of a kind of entity unto themselves 
in which time and space are transcended in the experience of eternal imme-
diacy and presence.
Each meeting between Daniel and Gwendolyn is more intense and serious 
than the last, and George Eliot carefully develops the significance of these 
encounters so that we come to understand their relationship as religious. 
Gwendolyn invests Daniel with power from the first, when she interprets 
his aloofness from gambling and his intervention over the necklace as disap-
proval— as indeed it is— and casts him in the “unique” role of a “superior,” 
the only man she has ever known who is immune to her charms; by his “stan-
dard” she measures her “littleness.”24 George Eliot chooses not to be subtle 
about the religious tenor of Deronda’s influence: after Gwendolyn betrays 
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Lydia Glasher, Deronda observes an intriguing change in her, which the nar-
rator describes in deliberately religious language: “a conscious error had 
wakened something like a new soul”;25 later we learn that “he was becoming 
part of her conscience.”26 Without need for words, Daniel sees “confession” 
in her look27 as she continues to invest him with the power of a confessor. As 
if writing a spiritual biography, George Eliot notes Gwendolyn’s conscious-
ness, in the misery of her fear and humiliation, “of an uneasy, transforming 
process.”28 By the end of this chapter the narrator is describing the process as 
“conversion,” with Daniel cast by the young woman in the role of “priest.”29 
The narrator is explicit about the suitability of the term “conversion” for 
“that change of mental poise” that occurs only when “some personality 
touches [another’s] with a peculiar influence,” until which point “neither 
heaven nor hell has any revelation.”30 The narrator notes that Gwendolyn 
sees Daniel as a priest “without the aid of sacred ceremony or costume”; but 
when Gwendolyn says, “I wish he could know everything about me without 
my telling him,”31 her words seem to echo those of the Samaritan woman, 
who said about the provoker of her own conversion— also not robed as a 
priest of her time— “He told me everything I have ever done.”
The rest of the novel traces Gwendolyn’s arduous transformation, for 
which she seeks out Deronda’s guidance. One of the clearest markers of her 
growth is the gradual movement from a habitual desire and compulsion to 
do what she likes to a commitment to doing what she ought to do.32 Like a 
recalcitrant child or a criminal trying to turn over a new leaf she repeatedly 
pleads, “tell me what to think and what to do . . . Tell me again what I should 
do.”33 And again, after her husband’s death, “I wanted you to tell me what I 
ought to do . . . I want to be good . . . What ought I to do?”34 The extremity 
of her dependence on Deronda is intentional on George Eliot’s part, as she 
tries to demonstrate the enormity of the “change” required to effect “the 
subsidence of self- assertion.”35 In marrying Grandcourt, Gwendolyn had 
encountered a person even more intent upon pleasing himself than she is, 
but George Eliot decides to allow this shallow girl redemption. Her irrational 
fears and her almost infantile need for her mother, along with her resistance 
to sexual overtures and her claim that she is unable to love, all suggest not 
only a troubled psyche that Freud would love to analyze but a spiritual depth 
waiting to be detected. Like a composite of physician and priest— again, like 
a Jesus figure— Deronda guides and ministers to her.
Their initial conversations resemble that between Jesus and the Samaritan 
woman in their tension and her testy defensiveness as Gwendolyn presumes 
that his sympathy must be reserved for women unlike her who are always 
doing right. She scorns the lost sheep metaphor and then looks up at him 
“like a wounded animal” when he says that some people need a “shock” in 
order to grow.36 In response to her facetious question of why she should care 
to do anything other than what she likes, he tells her to look outside of her-
self, to “try to care” about other lives and other things besides herself. “Try 
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to care for what is best in thought and action,” he advises, echoing Matthew 
Arnold. With this, “a change came over her face.”37 Next she is asking, “What 
is the good of trying to know more, unless life were worth more?” and one 
can imagine George Eliot’s “indignant severity” coming through in Deronda’s 
as he tells her that it is in her power to give life meaning by pursuing “some 
real knowledge.” Gwendolyn’s response again is dramatic as she is “startled 
and thrilled as by an electric shock.” Again echoing the conversation reported 
in Emily Davies’s letter, Deronda asks, “What sort of earth or heaven would 
hold any spiritual wealth in it for souls pauperized by inaction?” He charges 
that “our own inanity” is “necessarily impious, without faith or fellowship” 
and again enforces an explicitly religious message:
“The refuge you are needing from personal trouble is the higher, the 
religious life, which holds an enthusiasm for something more than 
our own appetites and vanities. The few may find themselves in it 
simply by an elevation of feeling; but for us who have to struggle for 
our wisdom, the higher life must be a region in which the affections 
are clad with knowledge.”38
This is a highly charged moment of encounter, and its power shakes them 
both such that they feel “as if some third person had arrested them.” Daniel 
could be speaking to himself when he urges: “Try to take hold of your sensi-
bility, and use it as if it were a faculty, like vision.”39 He advises her to turn her 
suffering into a source of light and her fear into a safeguard; he is struck by 
a sense of her need of “rescuing,” seeing her as if “drowning while her limbs 
were bound.”40 She leaves this scene with strengthened resolve: “I will try . . . 
It may be— it shall be better with me because I have known you.”41
As her marriage becomes more bitter and her suspicions concerning 
Daniel’s relationship with Mirah take hold, Gwendolyn needs further reas-
surance. More desperate, she holds to her need for his “believing in me” 
and her “faith” in him;42 and later, more desperate still, as she struggles with 
thoughts of murder or suicide, she pleads, “I want not to get worse.”43 The 
intensity of her struggle is writ large in spiritual terms, particularly through 
the abundance of references to Dante’s Divine Comedy, and after Grand-
court’s death she again seeks absolution from Deronda. Again she gains 
strength from his faith in her: “I believe you may become worthier,” he tells 
her. Gwendolyn claims, “You have saved me,”44 and the narrator affirms the 
claim, calling Deronda her “outer conscience” and stating explicitly: “our 
brother may be in the stead of God to us.” The rhetoric mounts in operatic 
intensity: “You can, you will . . . be among the best of women.” His is “like 
a touch of a miraculous hand”; his presence is “her spiritual breath.”45 It is 
“as if flames had been mounting around her, and she had flung herself into 
his opened arms and clung about his neck that he might carry her into safety. 
She identified him with the struggling regenerative process in her which had 
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begun with his action.”46 The narrator makes clear that it is not romantic love 
that Gwendolyn is experiencing, but rather the Love that effects essential 
change and undergirds all others:
Mighty Love had laid his hand upon her; but what had he demanded 
of her? Acceptance of rebuke— the hard task of self- change— 
confession— endurance. If she cried towards him, what then? She 
cried as the child cries whose little feet have fallen backward— cried 
to be taken by the hand, lest she should lose herself.47
Later, as we approach Deronda’s departure and their last meeting we 
find a transformed Gwendolyn, chastened and elevated by her ordeal. She 
is “experiencing some of that peaceful melancholy which comes from the 
renunciation of demands of self” and relishing “the ordinary good of exis-
tence, and especially kindness, even from a dog, as a gift above expectation.” 
The narrator tells us that we can look at life itself as “an escape, . . . as a sal-
vation”; that “self- knowledge” may bring an understanding of “this habitual 
feeling of rescue.”48 Here we have George Eliot’s amazing transfiguration of 
the romantic, sensational, operatic motif of rescue into the wonder of the 
everyday. And even more to inscribe its significance, she is not finished with 
Gwendolyn yet. For even now she is totally self- absorbed and can only weep 
hysterically in saying her farewell to Daniel Deronda. Here we move from the 
woman at the well to the woman at the tomb perhaps as Daniel assures her, 
“We shall never quite be parted . . . I shall be more with you than I used to 
be.”49 In response Gwendolyn again cries like a lost child but then resolves, “I 
shall live. I mean to live . . . I shall live. I shall be better.”50
We know nothing of Daniel’s lasting effect on Gwendolyn, but the main 
indication of her change of heart is in her sense of having been rescued into 
the life with her family that she once took for granted and could not wait to 
be rescued from. Her kindness to her mother and sisters is that small sign of 
immense transformation that consists of “the subsidence of self- assertion” 
and the corresponding assertion of love.51 For readers of George Eliot, it is 
striking to see her using the handsome young Daniel Deronda as the fictional 
means by which she suggests the possibility that a character who is like Rosa-
mond could be redeemed to become a character more like Dorothea. For as 
far as Gwendolyn is from Dorothea, we find her at the end of the novel arriv-
ing at the place where she is beginning to see unhistoric acts as life- giving and 
herself as something other than the “rose of the world.” Particularly in light 
of her predecessor Dorothea’s revival of the mystical way of Theresa, we can 
see Gwendolyn’s arduous, contrary journey as a kind of modern- day mysti-
cism as she arrives at the place of origin and knows it for the first time. In 
these terms and in the context of the pervasive Dantean echoes, Daniel’s role 
is likened to that of Virgil. But in George Eliot’s universe the guide too needs 
a guide, and Daniel has Mordecai.
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Mordecai’s Mysticism: “An Inherited Yearning”
“Receptiveness”52 has everything to do with both Mordecai’s and Daniel’s 
visionary callings. What George Eliot aims for in the reader is modeled in her 
hero: an attitude of receptiveness to the notion of the convergence between 
the human and the divine, the seen and the unseen. For this reason George 
Eliot painstakingly lays the groundwork that explains the nature of their 
unique callings and the connection between the two men. While she does not 
represent Daniel as a messianic figure, it is clear that he is a special person 
and the disciple that Mordecai has been waiting for. While I do not wish to 
encourage any view of Daniel as a Jesus- figure, we have already added his 
name to the list of characters George Eliot invests with a special power of 
influence. It is significant that, while Gwendolyn joins the ranks of other 
women consigned to living out a newly embraced spiritual discipline in her 
own domestic sphere— Janet, Dinah, Romola, Dorothea— Daniel himself, 
instead of either reintegrating himself into his own sphere or dying, in the 
way of other influential men— Mr. Tryan and Savonarola— is set upon a 
visionary, far from everyday mission. And while he is not a Jesus- figure, Dan-
iel saves Gwendolyn by instructing her in a new way of seeing herself and 
the world, a new outlook that could be identified with the mystical way that 
Dorothea discovered by her hard experience and some unspecified action of 
grace. But it is somewhat more difficult to understand how Daniel comes to 
be schooled in this way of thinking and what draws him to find in Mordecai’s 
teachings the affirmation of his own calling.
We can see Daniel as another in— and perhaps the epitome of— a long 
line of George Eliot characters whose heroic status is based on their selfless 
ability to sympathize with others. In the case of Deronda, we are told that 
his is an almost debilitating ability to empathize, something that costs him 
success in any conventional career. He is almost dangerously egoless, it seems. 
In part at least this attitude could be accounted for by his uncertain origin, 
which causes him to sympathize with the vulnerable and the outcast, to the 
point where he almost forgets himself. But it also contributes to his unusual 
sense of having a purpose beyond or other than what is set out in conven-
tional social terms. One could say he is in the world— in all his strikingly 
handsome elegance— but not of it. He is always looking through and over 
what is happening to see what it all means. The world is offering a story to 
him, but he has yet to find the code by which to read it. Meanwhile he goes 
about being kind— with Hans Meyrick, Mirah, and Gwendolyn (along with 
his own adopted family) his main benefactors. If readers find him odd and 
difficult to believe in, it must be said that most people, other than those who 
were directly touched by Jesus, also found him odd and impossible to believe 
in. Again, I am not suggesting that Daniel is meant to be a Jesus- figure but 
only that George Eliot might want us to imagine the reception a prophet can 
expect in his own country. Like Jesus, but also like the young Marian Evans 
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herself, Daniel knows he is different and believes he is set apart for a special 
calling. And this helps prepare him to hear Mordecai’s call when it comes.
The perplexing question of Daniel’s calling is intrinsic to the unusual 
nature of this novel. George Eliot sets up the plot of his story in a way that 
can readily be faulted for improbability; the web of coincidences is too dense 
to be convincing in any strictly realistic sense. But, as Terence Cave points out 
in his edition of the novel, she has readied herself for that charge by framing 
the whole tale with references that range from Aristotle on probability to 
Jeremy Taylor on the “something more” than “mere learning” that is required 
for “divine knowledge,” and by actively embracing elements of myth and 
romance.53 As Cave notes, this novel “challenges and disrupts the canon at 
every level— social, ideological and formal”54— and does something recog-
nizably new by recovering ancient fictional modes. Cave identifies many key 
references that comprise a “network of reverberations” that link this tale to a 
wealth of cultural moments across time and place.55 One biblical text he does 
not mention comes from the Apocrypha: the book of Tobit tells a romantic 
tale of two lovers brought together by an angel; but even more romantic is 
the convergence of the story of young love with that of the vindication and 
healing of a devout old blind man. Key to the structure of the story is the 
narrator’s phrasing, “It chanced on the same day . . .” (Tobit 3:7). It is this 
kind of understanding of the working of providence, or fate, or destiny, or 
coincidence, or serendipity that has always underlain the telling of tales and, 
George Eliot wants to suggest, the stories of lives. Indeed, she opens chapter 
38, which tells of Mordecai’s uncanny expectation of Daniel, with a blatant 
“apology for inevitable kinship” as she waves the “flag” of “second- sight.”56
Further to complicate this generic web, George Eliot suggests throughout 
the novel— and not just for Gwendolyn— that it is possible to see life itself in 
terms of the age- old romance trope of rescue. When Daniel happens to be on 
site to rescue Mirah, they are both in fact rescued into another way of living. 
She and others see him as an angel, but he knows that he too is drowning and 
in need of his own rescue, which comes through Mirah as she becomes his 
conduit to Mordecai and to what both men recognize as Daniel’s calling, a 
recognition that in turn rescues Mordecai. While in the Tobit tale Raphael is 
the angelic agent of convergence and rescue, here Daniel plays a dual role as 
rescuer and rescued. One can broaden this application to include Gwendolyn 
as well, since there is in the relation between her story and Daniel’s the qual-
ity represented in that “It chanced on the same day . . .” motif. This is only 
most notable when, as he was for Mirah, he is there to rescue Gwendolyn 
when she emerges from the water in Genoa. Convincing readers of the cred-
ibility and indeed the necessity of faith in such coincidences is fundamental 
to George Eliot’s method in this novel.57
A marvelous scene of convergence that can serve to illustrate the new thing 
George Eliot is doing with this novel and this hero occurs almost exactly 
midway in the text when Sir Hugo, accompanied by Daniel, is showing his 
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guests the renovations that have been undertaken at the Abbey. Sir Hugo is 
proud of “the mixture of undisguised modern with the antique,” being in 
favor of preserving the old insofar as we can inhabit and enjoy it by joining 
it with the new, rather than either “reproducing the old” or destroying it.58 
To him, the modern surroundings that support the ancient remnant make 
the historical value of the latter all the more evident, such that the effect 
enhances the beauty of both old and new. To reproduce the structure to suit 
ancient usage makes little sense, he argues, or “You may as well ask me to 
wear out the stones with kneeling.” In other words, since kneeling is out 
of fashion, we need not reproduce the spaces in which our ancestors knelt. 
Grandcourt predictably not only agrees but mocks the idea of “wanting to 
howl litanies,” and Daniel equally predictably rejects the cynicism of this 
response: “I think that way of arguing against a course because it may be rid-
den down to an absurdity would soon bring life to a standstill.”59 He goes on 
to speak of keeping up “affection” for old things.60 This affection extends to 
a deeper feeling when they enter a choir turned stable, complete with hay, a 
few horses, and dogs. Here, Gwendolyn’s response— “Oh, this is glorious!”— 
gives words to Daniel’s equally spontaneous response of doffing his hat.61
When Daniel leads the group to the exquisitely preserved cloister, George 
Eliot has him pose a question that leads the reader from the discussion of the 
relation between the ancient and the modern to the postmodern: “I wonder 
whether one oftener learns to love real objects through their representations, 
or the representations through the real objects.”62 Though his concern here 
is the relation between nature and art, the setting encourages the reader to 
apply the speculation to religious questions such as those George Eliot trans-
lated Feuerbach as asking: What is the source of our religious feeling? Do we 
seek in our sacred spaces to represent something we believe to be real though 
unrepresentable; or to create something real that we can invest with meaning 
despite its representing nothing but our own idea or feeling? Indeed, when 
Daniel tells his guests that he does not need the specific place of his home at 
all but “carr[ies] it with [him],”63 she is taking us beyond the aesthetic and the 
cultural to the realm where both intersect with the personal and the religious. 
For while Daniel’s attitude is entirely secular, it is also an attitude that is rev-
erent enough to sanctify the secular— in short, a mystical attitude.
This scene occurs just three chapters after Daniel has visited a synagogue 
in Frankfurt and experienced his first Jewish liturgy. In both of these scenes, 
Daniel experiences the living presence of the past and the almost uncanny 
intermingling that makes “decay” and “faint beginnings” difficult to distin-
guish from one another.64 George Eliot seems to foreshadow in this insight 
the indeterminate relation between “real objects” and “representations” that 
he will draw attention to in the cloister. The synagogue scene vividly brings 
forth Deronda’s divided spirit, “wandering between two worlds,” as Mat-
thew Arnold puts it in his poem “Grande Chartreuse.” Daniel’s feelings are 
equally intense for apparent opposites— for democracy and conservatism; 
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and for “speculations on government and religion” and the treasuring of 
“long- sanctioned forms”— to the point of near paralysis.65 It is in this 
habitual frame of mind— yet newly focused after having discovered through 
Mirah “that Judaism was something still throbbing in human lives”66— that 
he enters the synagogue, “like a yearning disembodied spirit” seeking “fixed 
local habitation to render fellowship real.”67 While the service is powerfully 
moving, however, Daniel still holds himself an observer, and he is insulted 
when asked if he is Jewish. But his continued resistance to his Jewish heritage 
allows George Eliot to suggest the complexity of his attraction to Mordecai’s 
vision. This is partly because, even after he embraces his Jewish identity, Dan-
iel will resist its religious implications.
While we are privy to a few specifics of Mordecai’s vision for a united 
Israel, readers agree with Daniel that it is “nebulous in detail.”68 In fact, its 
vagueness is intentional since George Eliot does not want to suggest that 
Daniel would find any specific vision compelling. Rather, he is compelled by 
the scope of the vision itself and the faith of the visionary, which includes a 
faith in him. For just as Gwendolyn develops a faith in Daniel’s faith, Daniel 
develops a faith in Mordecai’s. Mordecai makes clear that the Gentiles have 
been mistaken in accusing Judaism of enforcing an inflexible law; instead 
“our Masters” were ever “enlarging and illuminating [the law] with fresh- 
fed interpretation.”69 In other words, what Mordecai holds out to Daniel 
is not a fixed belief system but the possibility of belonging to a commu-
nity of interpreters, a long line of questers. Mordecai’s passionate “yearning 
for transmission”70 meets Daniel’s equally passionate “yearning  .  .  . after 
the obligation of avowed filial and social ties.”71 And Mordecai’s belief 
that visionaries sustain human life, preventing its decline into “the narrow 
tenacity of insects,” inspires Daniel, pained as he is by the sight of a life like 
Gwendolyn’s that “dwindle[s] and shrivel[s] without vision.”72
Daniel is eager to receive the transmission, first from Mordecai and later 
from his own grandfather. And this connection with his mother’s estranged 
father suggests the depth of another mutual need that Mordecai and Dan-
iel’s relationship satisfies: “for the sense of spiritual perpetuation in another 
resembles that maternal transference of self.”73 It is important to note that 
Mordecai does not give Daniel what he yearns for; rather, Mordecai “give[s] 
shape” to what Daniel comes to recognizes as “an inherited yearning.”74 His 
yearning will continue but will now gain purpose and direction by being 
joined to the yearning of others. And just as the visionary is impotent without 
a disciple, Daniel’s “receptiveness,” which has been so far an impediment to 
action, can now finally achieve its “rare and massive power.”75 The power 
their relationship generates is not in anything they have but in something 
that they yearn for and, equally, in the fact of their yearning, their desire for 
“something more.”
What makes Mordecai not just a visionary but a mystic is his adherence 
to the teachings of Cabbala. He believes that the soul of a medieval believer 
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was “born again” within him, carrying with it memories of the sorrows of 
Israel throughout the centuries.76 He sees Daniel as next in line in this rebirth-
ing process by which imperfection is gradually removed and “the Messianic 
time” is prepared for, in a long process whereby “a soul liberated from a 
worn- out body [joins] the fellow- soul that needs it.”77 When Daniel finally 
discovers his Jewish heritage it is indeed as if he proves the truth of this doc-
trine: the narrator notes that Daniel is “speaking from Mordecai’s mind as 
much as from his own” when he declares, “Our souls have the same vocation. 
We shall not be separated by life or by death.”78 Such statements as these 
explain the narrator’s frequent need to concede that Daniel is “romantic,” 
not only in matters of the heart where Mirah is concerned but in these more 
spiritual realms where he meets Mordecai. And the emotional tenor of their 
conversations makes clear that, notwithstanding all their brooding over tex-
tual matters, Mordecai and Daniel’s is not only a meeting of minds but of 
hearts and spirits. Indeed, George Eliot suggests the arbitrariness of such a 
distinction when she has Daniel muse upon the equal value of “emotional” 
and “unemotional intellect.”79 And it is the recognition that “the lines of what 
may be called their emotional theory touched”80 that leads to the third mode 
of mysticism, that of imagination.
The Mysticism of Imagination
This third form of mysticism infuses and completes the other two by show-
ing how the everyday is made sacred by the working of imagination. Indeed, 
throughout the novel George Eliot is intent to show how faith and poetry 
meet in the ordinary world around us. This idea emerges in her richly 
nuanced attention to art in this novel. For while Daniel Deronda contin-
ues George Eliot’s celebration of the arts— most obviously in the singing of 
Alcharisi and Mirah and the painting of Hans Meyrick— her more inter-
esting statement has to do with the incorporation of art in everyday life. 
Continuing the story of the female singer represented in Armgart, she depicts 
Alcharisi’s choice of a professional singing career as ultimately misguided 
(though complex in its harsh depiction of the patriarchal father and its sym-
pathetic depiction of her need to pursue her art); likewise she gives Mirah 
the kind of voice that is unsuited to the public stage and instead finds its best 
venue in the private drawing room. Though one might see in this theme of 
the dangers of public performance for women a conventional bias, we may 
also note George Eliot affirming the possibilities for performing art in the 
everyday.
At the same time, George Eliot upholds the sublime value of true art when 
Gwendolyn learns through Klesmer how rare and uniquely important art is 
and how much dedication and sheer effort it requires. George Eliot pursues 
this theme of the ultimate significance of art in her representation of the 
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Meyrick family. As well as recognizing Mirah’s talent, the Meyrick women 
sacrifice their own comfort for the sake of their son and brother’s artistic 
career (a choice we might find sadly patriarchal). But, more importantly, their 
home is clearly proposed as a model for true culture. “Outside, the house 
looked very narrow and shabby,” but this poverty only serves to highlight 
“a culture the more spotlessly free from vulgarity.”81 The narrative dwells on 
this small house, where “there was space and apparatus for a wide- glancing, 
nicely select life, open to the highest things in music, painting, and poetry.”82 
The same scene makes good on this claim to the wide scope of art and culture 
in the small domestic space by including references to the reading they are 
constantly engaged in— here a popular French historical novel about a rescue 
that prepares them to receive the rescued Mirah into their midst, a text which 
Mab compares to a chapter in Revelations and to Schiller, thereby further 
blurring the line between realism and romance, popular and high culture, and 
secular and sacred text. Here too the description of their beautiful embroi-
dery further extends the definition of culture by suggesting that the typical 
domestic work might be considered art. This understanding of culture— wide 
and open yet select— provides an obvious contrast to the more materialistic 
attitude of the wealthy characters.
Later the expanse of the Meyricks’ cultural range is made literal when they 
“make space for Kate’s drawing, as well as a great length of embroidery.”83 
In this scene, Mirah is reading aloud Charles Lamb’s essay “The Praise of 
Chimney- Sweeps,” another literary reference that sharpens the cultural 
theme. For, while a great friend of Wordsworth’s, Lamb famously scorned 
the early Romantic’s devotion to nature, celebrating instead the glories of the 
city. In this way George Eliot is not only affirming the Romantic elevation of 
art but also entrenching it ever more deeply in everyday contemporary life. 
For example, she takes great pains to catalog the range of small engravings 
of famous paintings, which, together with the sunlight on the nearby river, 
turns the small parlor into a “temple.”84 The Meyricks’ home is not a temple 
for the worship of art, however, but rather a cultural environment in which 
the valuing of art is integrated into the valuing of everyday lives, domestic 
relations, and natural surroundings. The little parlor is a temple, then, in the 
sense that every space may house the sacred.
Throughout Daniel Deronda George Eliot makes explicit the notion that 
has been made current in the generation before hers by Romantic poets and 
thinkers— that we see the world that we believe in, that our imagination 
constructs our world. She intermingles poetic imagination with matters of 
religious faith in a way that vindicates the Romantic and the believing sensi-
bility, showing in various ways that one must be receptive to finding romance 
and meaning in the world— to finding a “temple” in Chelsea. The link 
between imagination and faith is suggested, for example, when Daniel, on 
a self- confessed romantic quest for Mirah’s parent, finds Ezra Cohen decid-
edly too “unpoetic” to qualify85 but then is moved to think Ezra “not utterly 
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prosaic” when he is attired for the Sabbath ceremony.86 Daniel too has made 
the ultimate importance of one’s own subjective response clear to Gwendo-
lyn when he has rebuffed Grandcourt’s cynical dismissal of sacred gestures, 
as we saw above. Earlier in the same chapter he has told Gwendolyn that 
whatever lack of meaning we find in the world is due to our own perception: 
“I think what we call the dulness of things is a disease in ourselves.”87 George 
Eliot builds up a strong case throughout the novel on the side of imaginative 
sensibility and correspondent belief, rebuffing cynics in her own right: when 
Daniel is emotionally stirred by the discovery of his heritage, the narrator 
proclaims: “Impossible for men of duller fibre— men whose affection is not 
ready to diffuse itself through the wide travel of imagination, to comprehend, 
perhaps even to credit this sensibility of Deronda’s, but it subsisted, like their 
own dulness, notwithstanding their lack of belief in it.”88
Another manifestation of the power of perception, the dependence of the 
world on interpretation, and the intermingling of imaginative sensibility and 
religious sensibility, comes as well in the central synagogue scene, when the 
narrator reminds us of Daniel’s “fervour which made him easily feel the pres-
ence of poetry in everyday events.” Here, the Jewish quarter “rous[es]” in 
him “the sense of union with what is remote,” and “set[s] him musing on 
two elements of our historic life which that sense raises into the same region 
of poetry:— the faint beginnings of faiths and institutions, and their obscure 
lingering decay.”89 This is an exquisite evocation of the ineffable influence 
of the past as well as a comment on the power of perception, in that it is in 
the eye of the percipient to decide whether this liminal, transitional space is 
the site of new birth or of death. And it is indeed the percipient whose sense 
of meaningful life is either awakening or decaying. To further underline the 
relation between imagination and faith, the narrator here explicitly places 
musings on matters of faith in “the same region of poetry.”
It is indeed up to the mind that views the world to make space (as the 
Meyricks do) for “movements of awe and tenderness” and for “fellowship 
which thrills from the near to the distant, and back again,” so that “all the 
apparatus of heaven and earth” may “make poetry” for it.90 This mind- set, 
both poetic and religious, constitutes the kind of mysticism that George Eliot 
is promoting here, and its most forceful representation comes in the context 
of but also transcends Daniel’s encounter with Judaism. The philosophy that 
underlies her approach here is a development on the artistic credo articulated 
in the famous chapter 17 of Adam Bede, in which the narrator argues that the 
aesthetic merit of a painting of a woman peeling carrots in her kitchen may 
be equal to that of a painting of angels and madonnas. In her last novel, the 
narrator pushes these ideas to a new level when she describes Daniel’s excur-
sions into the gritty, shabby Jewish quarter of London, noting that searching 
for a fair maiden’s relatives in beautiful ancient Cordoba or witnessing “a 
glorious martyrdom” far more readily evokes a sympathetic response than 
does the sight of
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commonplace, perhaps half- repulsive objects which are really the 
beloved ideas made flesh. Here undoubtedly lies the chief poetic 
energy:— in the force of imagination that pierces or exalts the solid 
fact, instead of floating among the cloud- pictures. To glory in a pro-
phetic vision of knowledge covering the earth, is an easier exercise of 
believing imagination than to see its beginning in newspaper placards, 
. . . ; and it might well happen to most of us dainty people that we 
were in the thick of the battle of Armageddon without being aware 
of anything more than the annoyance of a little explosive smoke and 
struggling on the ground immediately about us.91
It is striking here to see George Eliot— even ironically— suggesting that most 
of us do not have the eyes to see the spiritual battle that might be waging 
around us. And the explicitly incarnational aesthetic in her reference to “the 
beloved ideas in flesh” that are “really” incarnated in “half- repulsive objects” 
of ordinary life begs the question of whose ideas they are after all— not simply 
those of the novel’s author, surely. It is clear that the “believing imagination” 
has a greater challenge than simply enjoying “a prophetic vision”; rather, it 
must believe that the most unpromising and unexceptional beings are worthy 
of love and conscious attention.
George Eliot clearly endows her hero with what she calls here “the chief 
poetic energy” that allows him to discern the value and significance and 
beauty in this unlikely location. But she adds a surprising additional layer 
when she represents Mordecai as not only a prophet and visionary but as 
himself a person whose religious sensibility is inseparable from his poetic 
sensibility. This comes out explicitly in his poetry, of course, but it is inter-
esting to see George Eliot making the prophet also an artist whose vision of 
his disciple is of a beautiful creature modeled after an ideal he seeks to find 
represented in the National Gallery. Even more, his poetic nature comes out 
in a sensitivity to the beauty of his city that Charles Lamb would approve. 
That he is “keenly alive to some poetic aspects of London” means that he 
shares the “poetic energy” mentioned above and brings together a poetic 
and religious sensibility to suggest a transfiguring mystical vision. Sunset or 
sunrise amidst the busy commercial activity on the river affects Mordecai in 
the same way that “a fine symphony to which we can hardly be said to listen 
makes a medium that bears up our spiritual wings.”92 George Eliot’s insis-
tence on Mordecai’s poetic mind- set serves to ensure that readers do not set 
him up as some kind of stereotypical religious extremist; rather, her framing 
of his poetic nature brings to mind not only the Jewish poet Judah Halevi93 
but the ever- urban, ever- mystical William Blake. And when we read of Mor-
decai’s love for London’s river and his “poet’s yearning for the wide sky, the 
far- reaching vista of bridges, the tender and fluctuating lights on the water 
which seems to breathe with a life that can shiver and mourn, be comforted 
and rejoice,”94 we may think of the boldly progressive and contemporary yet 
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almost mystical art of J. M. W. Turner. I mention these associations to empha-
size how deeply the religious themes of this novel are interwoven into a rich 
artistic tapestry to produce this sense of a modern mysticism.
Daniel Deronda and “the Religion of the Future”
Like all of George Eliot’s works, Daniel Deronda promotes an attitude 
toward life; we can see the Gwendolyn- Deronda plotline as working out a 
mandate for action represented by ideas having to do with sympathy, duty, 
self- denial, and the good of humanity that hearkens back to earlier works. 
However, while Daniel’s story is grounded through Gwendolyn’s in a mission 
of present action in the world, it also goes beyond that in a way only hinted 
at in some other works, notably Romola and The Spanish Gypsy and several 
of the poems. What comes to the fore here is a belief in progress— both in a 
personal and a cultural sense— that adumbrates a belief in or at least specu-
lations about what may be called the evolution of consciousness (an idea to 
be discussed more fully in the next chapter). This energy toward the future 
is driven by George Eliot’s attention at this time to death and to questions 
such as what lies beyond death and what to make of life in the face of death. 
And whereas earlier works aim to provoke sympathy as the grounding for 
what has been called her religion of humanity, this novel goes beyond that in 
aiming to produce or re- create religious feeling. In a letter to Harriet Beecher 
Stowe at this time, George Eliot proposes that “there is one comprehensive 
Church whose fellowship consists in the desire to purify and ennoble human 
life,” a desire that transcends differences between “all narrower churches.”95 
And it does not seem to be going too far to suggest that she constructs the 
relations between Daniel and Mordecai on the basis of a shared “yearning” 
that echoes this “desire.”
My contention in this chapter has been that in representing three inter-
related modes of mysticism, George Eliot renders in her last novel the 
mysterious way and truth and life of a religious attitude that grounds its 
contemporary relevance in a constant opening to the future. She does this 
by producing characters who understand the religious life in terms of what 
she calls in a letter of this period the vital “inward light of poetry— that is, 
of emotion blending with thought.”96 George Eliot’s defiance of generic cat-
egories, suggested above, goes so far as to produce a novel that is also more 
than a novel; not only does she push her fiction into the realm of religious 
manifesto, but she also pushes her prose, as we see particularly when she 
tries to render Mordecai’s mystical consciousness, into the realm of poetry. 
But her defiance of genre is also a defiance of the strictures of rational, insti-
tutional, and ideological thought. In the same letter to Beecher Stowe, we 
find, in the context of a discussion of Goethe, a definition of mysticism that 
can be applied not only to Mordecai’s religious attitude but to that of much 
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of the novel: “the delighted bathing of the soul in emotions which overpass 
the outlines of definite thought.”97 This blurring of boundaries also applies 
to the boundary between life and death we find represented in various ideas 
and images in the novel. For example, Mordecai clearly understands the Cab-
bala to be pointing to apparent death as the means of birth, with the death 
of one person only making way for the birth of another; and Gwendolyn’s 
battling with her brutal husband is framed by references to Dante that sug-
gest the struggle with forces of death that can help bring forth new life out 
of purgatory and even hell. While this motif of life- out- of- death is a familiar 
literary trope, George Eliot invests it here with ultimate significance, requir-
ing the reader, like Daniel in the Jewish quarter, to decide whether the ruins 
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George Eliot and Teilhard de Chardin
I am a pilgrim of the future on my way back from a journey 
made entirely in the past.
— Teilhard de Chardin, Letters from a Traveler
But no story is the same to us after a lapse of time; or rather, 
we who read it are no longer the same interpreters.
— George Eliot, Adam Bede, 6:54, 472
As I mentioned in the “Introduction” and have aimed to demonstrate through-
out, George Eliot’s view of her work was deeply evolutionary, in the sense 
that she wrote from a strong conviction that her ideas were constantly devel-
oping. Each new work reveals new insights and emphases and purposes. If 
she had stopped writing novels with Middlemarch, readers would have been 
left with a sense of a worldview grounded in the ethics of human community, 
fostering hope on the basis of empathetic action and a sincere adherence to 
social duties, with what I have called the mysticism of everyday life offering 
a way to sanctification that is manifest in love. Indeed, in keeping with the 
evolutionary model I am proposing, her next novel includes and develops 
these ideas, refusing to abrogate this everyday mysticism but instead adding 
to it the forms of poetic and ethereal mysticism that I described in the last 
chapter. With Daniel Deronda she reaches beyond ordinary human experi-
ence and beyond human time as we know it, moving back into an old way of 
being— not in historical terms but in the sense that she reveals the past alive 
and active in the present in religious belief— and gesturing forward toward 
a time and place beyond the reaches of England and Europe and even of her 
own imagining. In this way George Eliot’s last novel shows her embracing the 
idea that evolution is a comprehensive force that encompasses her work and 
herself and continues beyond contemporary knowledge.
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This conviction of evolution as a comprehensive and fundamental power 
is evident throughout her work, and in a letter to Harriet Beecher Stowe in 
1869 aiming to clarify her “religious point of view,” she is emphatic:
I believe that religion too has modified— “developed,” according to 
the dominant phrase— and that a religion more perfect than any yet 
prevalent must express less care for personal consolation, and a more 
deeply- awing sense of responsibility to man, springing from sympa-
thy with that which of all things is most certainly known to us, the 
difficulty of the human lot.1
The challenge to Christianity that emerged in the nineteenth century could be 
summed up in the discovery of evolution, and throughout George Eliot’s work 
we see her embracing the evolutionary religious perspective she expresses in 
this letter. But thoughtful Christians struggled throughout this period to rec-
oncile the new findings regarding the nature of the earth and the universe 
with biblical accounts of creation and miracles as traditionally understood, 
and it wasn’t until the twentieth century that evolution was satisfactorily rec-
onciled with faith. This understanding was achieved in the work of the Jesuit 
priest and paleontologist Pierre Teilhard de Chardin, who is considered by 
many, notes scholar Louis M. Savary, as “the first to integrate evolutionary 
science and Christian theology.”2 Teilhard (as he is usually called) was born in 
1881, the year after George Eliot died. It is virtually certain that he never read 
her novels, and yet, I will argue, his work follows upon hers, and her ideas 
anticipated his in the deeply evolutionary way in which an embryo contains 
the future unfolding of a plant or animal.
The Religion of the Future
Teilhard met the challenge of evolution by formulating an evolutionary 
faith, which he proposed as the most faithful response to our knowledge of 
God and creation. Rather than being cowed by evolutionary ideas, Teilhard 
exulted in them, proclaiming, as Savary puts it: “that God from the begin-
ning created an evolving universe is a pivotal fact of divine revelation.”3 In his 
classic work The Phenomenon of Man, Teilhard traces the development of 
life and the emergence of consciousness in evolutionary terms, and notes that 
it was only in the middle of the nineteenth century— George Eliot’s lifetime— 
that a crucial threshold was crossed. Finally by then humans had begun to see 
themselves as part of the evolutionary process and to recognize that evolu-
tion is not just another system or theory but “a light illuminating all facts, a 
curve that all lines must follow.”4 George Eliot would have delighted in Teil-
hard’s key terminology and metaphors as he argues that it is in her time that 
people began to understand the “irreversible convergence of all that exists” 
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and the interrelation of every part of life, such that even “the least molecule” 
is “knit into the web of life.”5
Coincidentally (shall we say), Teilhard and George Eliot both use the 
phrase “religion of the future”; this notion illuminates a core element of their 
respective beliefs and, as such, a profound connection between them. For a 
key reason why George Eliot was unable to embrace conventional Chris-
tianity was its entrenchment in the past and in outworn doctrines and its 
adherence to the view that the task of the church was primarily to carry on 
an existing tradition rather than actively engage with a living, ever- changing 
faith.6 Suggesting a fundamentally evolutionary attitude toward religion, she 
“urge[s]” her friend Mrs. Ponsonby “to consider your early religious experi-
ence as a portion of valid knowledge, and to cherish its emotional results in 
relation to objects and ideas which are either substitutes or metamorphoses 
of the earlier.”7 George Eliot adheres to a “religion of the future” in other 
senses as well: as we see in Daniel Deronda, for example, she conceives of 
true religion as yet to be known, sending Daniel off to an unknown fate and 
Gwendolyn to what Daniel calls a “religious life” that will take shape as she 
lives it out.
At the same time, however, a “religion of the future” suggests an under-
standing that has nothing to do with temporal measurement, in the sense that 
it is a kind of religion that has always had some adherents. From its inception 
the Christian faith was about change and about an unknown and yet vividly 
anticipated future. Dante’s Divine Comedy is a classic representation of this 
spirit, and in its growing importance to George Eliot we can see evidence 
that her evolutionary perspective incorporates and develops ideas of the past. 
Crucial in these terms is the difference between the Catholic tradition that 
Dante represents and the Protestant tradition that predominated in England 
in George Eliot’s time, represented most strongly in Milton. It is curious, I 
think, that when Daniel is furnishing an apartment for Mordecai he includes 
two busts, one of Dante and the other of Milton. Setting aside what Morde-
cai was to make of this pair, it is interesting to note the differing views of the 
future that each man implies. The Miltonic view, as seen in Paradise Lost, has 
to do with a Fall that ruins an otherwise perfect paradise; according to this 
view, were it not for the Fall, humanity would have continued in an already 
complete, static bliss. Out of this comes felix culpa, the notion that progress 
and change could come only after the loss of paradise. In Dante, by con-
trast, we find another view: that even in paradise as originally created, God’s 
intention was for continuous growth and change. Here the Fall is a tempo-
rary detour corrected by Jesus, who takes humans back to where they were 
intended to be, to continue the process of developing humanity and creation.8
Dante’s view, to put this in other terms, contains evolution as part of God’s 
original creation, whereas Milton’s view results in evolution being seen as a 
deviation from creation, a product of the Fall. I wonder if this might suggest 
one reason why, while we have many references in Daniel Deronda and in 
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Romola, as well as in George Eliot’s journals and essays, to the Inferno and 
Purgatorio, she rarely refers to Paradiso.9 I suspect that she did not quite 
know how to understand Dante’s view of the future or how to incorporate it 
into her thinking. My contention is that Milton’s worldview did not satisfy 
her, but its pervasiveness prevented her from seeing the future in anything but 
only vaguely hopeful terms. Furthermore, this could be another reason that 
a more fully developed Christian depiction of the cosmic future had to wait 
for another century.
For his part, Teilhard, in the “Epilogue” of The Phenomenon of Man, 
argues for Christianity as quintessentially “a religion of the future” in terms 
that would have found a resonance— though not entire agreement— with 
George Eliot. He cites its “rootedness in the past and ceaseless develop-
ment”; he claims that in the context of evolution “interpreted as an ascent 
of consciousness,” Christianity reflects a “trend towards a synthesis based on 
love”; and he asserts that Christianity “implies essentially the consciousness 
of being in actual relationship with a spiritual and transcendent pole of uni-
versal convergence.”10
All of these terms find an echo in George Eliot’s work (as well as in 
Dante’s). In this chapter I want to draw from Teilhard’s thought in order 
to suggest the contours and key elements of George Eliot’s religious imagi-
nation. There are four ways in which Teilhard’s ideas concerning what has 
come to be called evolutionary spirituality can help us to understand George 
Eliot’s religious imagination. The first is their shared idea of the convergence 
of science and faith, which I will explore primarily through further discus-
sion of Daniel Deronda; the second is their shared belief in the evolution of 
consciousness, which will take me to Silas Marner, the text in which this idea 
is most fully developed; the other two— radical perspectives on interpretation 
and suffering— are closely related to each other and are both related to Teil-
hard’s notion of what Savary calls “continuous Incarnation.”11 These latter 
ideas are crucial throughout George Eliot’s career, and I will explore them 
with reference to a number of her works.
The Convergence of Science and Faith:  
Daniel Deronda and the Theopoetic Imagination
Teilhard’s notions of “universal convergence” and the possibility of rela-
tionship with “a spiritual and transcendent” power reflect George Eliot’s 
intellectual hopes, and in her last novel she pursues with increased urgency 
and boldness the idea of converging forces and destinies pointing to an 
overarching pattern. When Daniel is engaging in a lengthy inward debate in 
which his reason argues with his feelings, intuitions, and wishes regarding 
his connection to Mordecai (whose destiny seems to be converging with his 
own), he wonders whether the old man’s poverty necessarily precludes the 
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presence of “some spiritual force within him” and whether his passionate 
ardor detracts from the possibility of “ennobling motive” and true wisdom.12 
In other words: could this poor strange old Jewish man really be a prophet 
with something important to say to Daniel? The narrator then follows Dan-
iel’s thoughts as he extends his reasoning to the realm of science:
The inspirations of the world have come in that way too: even strictly- 
measuring science could hardly have got on without that forecasting 
ardour which feels the agitations of discovery beforehand, and has 
a faith in its preconception that surmounts many failures of experi-
ment. And in relation to human motives and actions, passionate 
belief has a fuller efficacy. Here enthusiasm may have the validity of 
proof, and, happening in one soul, give the type of what will one day 
be general.13
This application of “faith” and “ardour” to scientific method and of “pas-
sionate belief” to human relations both implies a trial- and- error and 
future- oriented, evolutionary process as fundamental to all human endeav-
ors and confirms the reliance of science on the “inspirations” of imagination.
Teilhard de Chardin is at the forefront of those scientists who are able to 
reconcile science and faith because he recognizes the dependence of all think-
ing on imagination and faith: “Neither in its impetus nor its achievements can 
science go to its limits without becoming tinged with mysticism and charged 
with faith.”14 In keeping with this, he argues that what he calls the “religion 
of science,” which captivated rationalist thinkers of the eighteenth and nine-
teenth centuries, was limited by their materialist orientation. In response he 
formulates for the post- Enlightenment what I would call a theopoetics of 
science in which scientists acknowledge the need for a “re- integration, in a 
renewed form, of those very spiritual forces they claimed to be getting rid 
of.”15 Teilhard’s work moves beyond the limits of rationalism and allows us 
to reconsider prescientific ways of understanding the world by providing a 
language that was unavailable even in George Eliot’s time. He shows how the 
either/or of creation and evolution, of faith and reason, can now be reframed 
in terms of a rationally credible synthesis. As Père Daniélou notes: Teilhard 
“preserves the essentials” of Scholasticism— “the categories of personality, 
creation and God”— but “invents for it a new language expressive of modern 
science.”16
Interestingly, Barbara Reynolds reinforces this view when, in arguing 
for the “relevance of Dante’s allegory of heavenly life,” she finds an affin-
ity between his work and Teilhard’s.17 Elegantly and persuasively, Reynolds 
elaborates on several points of connection, notably their shared visual imagi-
nation, their similar reconciliation of the philosophical problem of the One 
and the Many, and their argument for Love as the universal and fundamental 
basis of life. She sums up: “At every essential point, the image or allegory 
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which Dante’s intuition has constructed upon the basis of his admittedly 
limited knowledge of the material world touches and joins hands with this 
recent structure assembled [by Teilhard] from the disparate elements of mod-
ern scientific discovery and thought.”18
To see such an affinity is itself an exercise of “intuition,” and thus a confir-
mation of the validity and power of analogical thinking. Relying on a similar 
intuitive sense, we can move from the affinity between Dante and Teilhard 
through George Eliot’s knowledge of Dante to speculate about the affinity 
between George Eliot and Teilhard. For George Eliot, as for Teilhard, the 
categories noted by Daniélou— personality, creation, and God— were ines-
capable. As we noted in chapter 1, she accepted Darwin’s account of the 
evolutionary processes pervading nature but (like Darwin himself) knew that 
this explanation did not account for the “mystery beneath the real.” We know 
too that she was attracted for a time to Comte’s positivist explanation of 
social evolution with its motto “Love as principle, order as basis, progress as 
end.” But she was not satisfied with this essentially materialist explanation, 
which ultimately sacrificed the person to the system.19 In many important 
ways, I think she would have welcomed Teilhard’s way of synthesizing matter 
and spirit, science and faith.
In the first place, with her belief in the mystery of the natural world together 
with her deeply felt and variously demonstrated belief in the inward life of 
human beings, George Eliot would have been delighted and intrigued by Teil-
hard’s affirmation that “co- extensive with their Without, there is a Within to 
things.”20 She would also have grasped the importance of his assertion of the 
existence of spiritual energy as fundamental and of the relationship between 
external, physical energy and internal, spiritual energy. “Without the slight-
est doubt,” he says, “there is something through which material and spiritual 
energy hold together and are complementary. In the last analysis, somehow 
or other, there must be a single energy operating in the world.”21 Teilhard 
pushes this idea to a point that would have seemed only logical, not only to 
Dante, but to George Eliot’s poetic predecessors— Blake and the two Shelleys, 
and to that Jesuit poet of “inscape,” Gerard Manley Hopkins. Teilhard works 
these ideas of mutual inherence into a theopoetic shape that these poets have 
already anticipated: “the first idea that occurs to us is that the ‘soul’ must be 
as it were the focal point of transformation at which, from all the points of 
nature, the forces of bodies converge, to become interiorized and sublimated 
in beauty and truth.”22
Teilhard’s affirmation of the soul in persons and in things as the radical 
center and ground of being (“the focal point of transformation at which, 
from all the points of nature, the forces of bodies converge”) both affirms 
the inwardness of things and repositions “spiritual energy” as the source of 
material energy— just as William Blake did. We are not human beings having 
a spiritual experience, Teilhard famously said, but spiritual beings having a 
human experience. George Eliot’s last novel is similarly radical as she situates 
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its action in the soul of her characters and her readers. In this way she is 
refashioning the scope and shape of the serious novel to include a new aes-
thetic that harks back to ancient poetics from classical and Renaissance times.
This grand design of Daniel Deronda is signaled by many of the epigraphs, 
many written by George Eliot for the purpose. The epigraph to the novel as a 
whole is a short poetic piece that sounds a portentous warning to an unwary 
reader: “Let thy chief terror be of thine own soul,” where “lurks vengeance” 
to ruin “captured joys” with “pallid pestilence.” Having sounded this Gothic, 
sensational, or prophetic note, she introduces chapter 1 in a quite different 
tone with a self- reflexive, ironic, sophisticated comment that the inevitable 
“make- believe of a beginning” applies equally in the realm of Science and 
in that of “his less accurate grandmother Poetry.” And yet even here, at the 
height of contemporary understanding (“No retrospect will take us to the 
true beginning”), her echo of Faust— “whether our prologue be in heaven or 
on earth”— spins the comment toward ultimate issues regarding the “soul” 
and to the sphere of imagination, where poetry meets science.
We can think of Daniel Deronda as George Eliot’s attempt to capture 
in fiction the universe as she knew it— in all her vast range of knowledge 
in poetry, science, society, and psychology— as well as the universe of her 
own consciousness. In this venture, quite new in fiction, she is joining and 
advancing the tradition of cultural poetry modeled by Milton in Paradise 
Lost, Percy Shelley in his Defence of Poetry, and, particularly, Dante’s Divine 
Comedy. The range of erudite (and at times playful) reference— from Ar-
istotle to Copernicus to Jeremy Taylor to Jewish mysticism— suggests the 
sweep of Western culture and her interrogation of it. At the same time, the 
opening sentences of the novel proper— “Was she beautiful? .  .  . Was the 
good or evil genius dominant . . . ?”— invoke the peculiarly modern problem 
of interpretation that frames and energizes the whole interrogation.
There are three main ways in which George Eliot is shaping in Daniel 
Deronda what I would like to call a new cultural imaginary founded on a rec-
onciliation of science and imagination. Each harks back to ways of thinking 
that have lost credibility at this time in the predominant rationalist environ-
ment that gives precedence to materialist, empiricist, secular viewpoints. The 
first is an appeal to a post- Enlightenment appreciation of the link between 
science and poetry; the second is an appeal to the Cabbala, the ancient Jewish 
understanding of destiny; the third is an appeal to the medieval, prescientific 
worldview of Dante.
The first of these appeals begins with the chapter 1 epigraph that chal-
lenges the precedence of Science and reminds us of its kinship with Poetry. 
While George Eliot has always pushed the boundaries of realism and 
reminded readers of the limitations of their own perspective and intelligence, 
here she makes “the inevitable makeshift of our human thinking” a central 
and repeated theme. She discourses at various points in the novel on the fail-
ings of “the unemotional intellect,” suggesting that “perhaps an emotional 
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intellect may have absorbed into its passionate vision of possibilities some 
truth of what will be.”23 Each term here is telling: she wants to champion 
passion and feeling, a vision that is more than physical and empirical, the 
importance of placing trust in possibilities as a way toward future truths. 
Daniel is her hero because he inwardly wrestles with the hegemony of ratio-
nalism and intuits the powerful energies that lie outside of its limits, and 
because he resists the sway of his own ego by “thinking himself imaginatively 
into the experience of others.”24
The narrative affirms Deronda’s “imaginative stirring”25 by making his 
“wish- begotten belief in his Jewish birth”26 and his romantic idealizing of 
his own destiny and of the beautiful damsel who will share it come true. 
Throughout Daniel’s tale the narrator is conceding that her hero was “if you 
like, .  .  .  romantic,”27 but all the while George Eliot is asking the reader 
to think again about what we mean by “romantic” and to allow for the 
possibility that our limited view may be a function of our own “dulness of 
imagination.”28 This approach pervades the whole novel and shapes its struc-
ture: she invokes Aristotle in the epigraph to chapter 41 to ask us to rethink 
our conventional dismissal of coincidence and probability: “It is a part of 
probability that many improbable things will happen.” She even goes so far 
as to suggest in the epigraph to chapter 44 that the “finer sense” and “lighter- 
clad intelligence” of “fairy- folk” may make their ears keener than ours.
Along with this appeal to imagination, Mordecai’s belief in the Cabbala 
is the second way in which George Eliot tries to open her readers to new, 
countercultural perspectives. As suggested in the last chapter, George Eliot is 
intent to expand the reader’s understanding of imagination to include reli-
gious perspectives that have lost currency in modern Europe. Far outside 
the standard contemporary English or European worldview is the Cabbala, 
which defines human temporal experience in terms of an ongoing process 
of reincarnation that will ultimately bring about “the Messianic time.” As 
Mordecai explains:
“In the doctrine of the Cabbala, souls are born again and again in 
new bodies till they are perfected and purified, and a soul liberated 
from a worn- out body may join the fellow- soul that needs it, that 
they may be perfected together, and their earthly life accomplished. 
Then they will depart from the mortal region, and leave place for new 
souls to be born out of the store in the eternal bosom.”29
It is to George Eliot’s enormous credit that Mordecai’s expressed longing 
for this fellowship does not have the appearance of mere arcane eccentricity. 
Perhaps this is partly because his longing echoes her own in her beautiful 
poem— or, more aptly, hymn— “O May I Join the Choir Invisible.” Here she 
expresses, with a fervor equal to Mordecai’s, a longing to join “those immor-
tal dead who live again / In minds made better by their presence” and to 
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become one with those who “urge man’s search / To vaster issues.” She calls 
the mutual life of the living with the dead the “heaven” by which she longs 
to “inherit that sweet purity / For which we struggled, failed, and agonized.” 
Like Mordecai’s, her longing is charged with a belief in “that better self [that] 
shall live till human Time / Shall fold its eyelids, and the human sky / Be gath-
ered like a scroll within the tomb / Unread for ever.”
Dante’s Divine Comedy, reflecting the standard late- medieval worldview, 
is the third way in which George Eliot challenges the imaginations of her 
contemporaries. While the reader encounters through Daniel a world of 
imaginative possibility, and through Mordecai a spirit of seemingly dauntless 
hope, Gwendolyn’s story begins in the gambling casino, where emaciated, 
ghoulish, desperate figures of all shapes and types are united in a “dull, gas- 
poisoned absorption”30 that foreshadows the Inferno she is to experience in 
her marriage. Religion exists and is attractive to humans primarily because 
they seek an explanation for and a way to deal with suffering, and throughout 
her depiction of Gwendolyn’s ghastly marriage George Eliot invokes Dante’s 
Divine Comedy to remind readers of the religious understanding that domi-
nated the prescientific European world. George Eliot has often been accused of 
being unable to write about or really face “evil” because her empathetic ethic 
always compels her to urge sympathy even in the most unattractive specimens 
of humanity. In Grandcourt we find her considering the idea of unredeemed 
wickedness, a consummate egoism that does not see the world outside itself 
as comprised of anything but “admiring or envying spectators.”31
George Eliot’s reliance on Dante’s images to anatomize and diagnose 
Gwendolyn’s harrowing marital experience is striking, boldly taking the tale 
into a world unfamiliar in the “realist” novel. Grandcourt is described as a 
“lizard- like,” “dangerous serpent,” a modern Mephistopheles32 whose psy-
chological torture ranges from rigid “surveillance” to thumbscrews and the 
rack.33 His treatment of his wife leads to comparisons to a colonizer who 
knows it is “safer to exterminate than to cajole” and to an “old time” hus-
band who would consign his incompliant spouse to a lunatic asylum or a 
nunnery.34 In keeping with the overall themes of the novel, it is noteworthy 
that his loathsomeness is said to be owing to failures of his imagination.35 
He is helped in his campaign of taking absolute control over his wife by the 
fact that, whereas it has become impossible for him to see any wrongdoing 
associated with himself, it has become impossible for her to dissociate herself 
from wrongdoing: fatally, she believes she is getting only what she deserves: 
“she felt she has sold herself . . . [,] her truthfulness and sense of justice.”36
With deliberately religious language George Eliot invites us to “enter into 
the soul of this young creature”: “She had a root of conscience in her, and 
the process of purgatory had begun for her on the green earth: she knew that 
she had been wrong.”37 Ironically, it is Gwendolyn’s belief that she deserves 
to suffer that qualifies her for redemption and means that she can emerge 
from the hellish marriage, if only into purgatory. Her inner turmoil is so 
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thoroughgoing and intense as to leave her questioning whether her murder-
ous wishes are real or imagined. In another novel Gwendolyn might indeed 
have been driven mad, but with the help of Dante George Eliot represents 
her agonies as the waking dream of an all- too- sane woman, whose suffer-
ings transform her grief into a religious experience— a psychic hell “as bad as 
nightmare,”38 in which “fantasies moved within her like ghosts.”39 “In Gwen-
dolyn’s consciousness, Temptation and Dread met and stared like two pale 
phantoms”;40 but what makes her struggle redemptive is the fact that it is 
“her own wishes” and “her own hatred” that she fears, as much as and finally 
more than she fears her husband.41
Although Gwendolyn finds no help in churchgoing and is unable “to 
connect liturgy and sermon” with anything that matters,42 it is telling that 
her desperation finds her falling back on not only the moral rhetoric of 
“remorse” and “punishment”43 but the religious rhetoric of “atonement” and 
“penance.”44 And amidst the wealth of references that fill the text, it is the 
religious universe of Dante’s Divine Comedy that most resonates with Gwen-
dolyn’s plight. Notably, the epigraph to chapter 64, after she has been pulled 
half- dead from the sea, provides an image from the Purgatorio that gives 
depth and credibility to the possibility of her struggling on into new life:
“This mount is such . . . that to those
Starting at the foot it’s hard in the extreme;
The more they climb, the easier it grows.”45
It is interesting, then, that when George Eliot broadens her view in her 
last novel to consider more directly questions of ultimate meaning and des-
tiny, she deliberately affirms the transformative power of imagination and 
turns to two ancient worldviews, the Cabbala and Dante’s late- medieval 
Catholic view. She is as aware as any present- day psychiatrist that all of 
these perspectives— the imaginative sensibility that places stock in coinci-
dence, perceives convergence in circumstances, and sees wishes coming true; 
Mordecai’s passionate, intense belief in an invisible future and eternal des-
tiny; Dante’s interpretation of psychological, emotional struggles as spiritual 
battles for the soul— can as readily be seen as evidence of mental disorder 
and emotional distress. But she takes the risk in Daniel Deronda of opening 
up possibilities shaped by imagination and requiring an attitude of or resem-
bling faith.
The Evolution of Consciousness:  
Silas Marner and the Origin of Personality
The second way in which Teilhard’s understanding of evolutionary spiritual-
ity can help us understand George Eliot’s religious imagination is to be found 
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in his explanation of egoism and personality— the focus of so much of George 
Eliot’s fictional attention— and the question of the One and the Many. Teil-
hard’s fundamental idea is that “evolution is an ascent toward consciousness” 
and then to higher and higher levels of consciousness.46 This is something 
George Eliot speculated upon and tried out in her “experiments in life.”47 
Indeed, one could fruitfully analyze all of her works in terms of Teilhard’s 
fundamental law of Complexity- Consciousness— the notion that increased 
complexity leads, in the one who welcomes it, to increased consciousness— 
along with the other two components, Attraction and Connection, which 
Teilhard understood to be the preliminary steps in this evolutionary process.48
Among the implications Teilhard draws out is the idea that the universe 
must be personal and that each of us is at once the center of our own world 
and at the same time being brought constantly “into association with all 
the centres surrounding it.”49 Teilhard proclaims that “the work of human 
works” can be meant only “to establish, in and by means of each one of us, 
an absolutely original centre in which the universe reflects itself in a unique 
and inimitable way” and that “those centres are our very selves and person-
alities,” which will be reclaimed rather than dissolved at the end.50 Individual 
consciousness is essential to existence and, moreover, according to the princi-
ple “union differentiates,” individual consciousnesses become more, not less, 
themselves “by convergence.”51 George Eliot would have exulted in hear-
ing scientific arguments for a principle she reinforced in her fiction again 
and again:
To be fully ourselves it is in . . . the direction of convergence with all 
the rest, that we must advance— towards the “other.” The peak of 
ourselves, the acme of our originality, is not our originality but our 
person; and according to the evolutionary structure of the world, 
we can only find our person by uniting together. There is no mind 
without synthesis. . . . The true ego grows in inverse proportion to 
“egoism.”52
Teilhard and George Eliot understand human consciousness and its develop-
ment in ways that are mutually illuminating, as I would like now to explore 
using Silas Marner. In doing so I am deviating from my otherwise chronolog-
ical account of George Eliot’s career, but even this illustrates the fundamental 
evolutionary principle by which the seed may sometimes only latently reveal 
its potential and a fossil hold a record to be read by future explorers.
George Eliot’s parable- like tale of 1861 marks a transition in her writ-
ing and can be seen in the current context as a kind of fossil recording her 
own evolution from the consciousness of her Midlands childhood and youth 
to that of mature urban adulthood. As Terence Cave shows in his excellent 
“Introduction” to the Oxford edition, Silas Marner is at several levels a study 
of the idea of human consciousness. For one thing, Silas’s strange lapses of 
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consciousness, by placing him “so precariously on the threshold of uncon-
sciousness,” allow George Eliot “to give imaginative form to the Comtean 
notion of a gradual evolution of consciousness in human history.”53 “The 
structure of Silas Marner,” notes Cave, “is the structure of a slow emergence 
into consciousness— very slow, minimal, yet crucial.”54 Further, Silas’s move 
from the city to the countryside— even in its mirror inversion of George Eliot’s 
own move from the country to the city at this time— as well as the story’s 
source in a spontaneous childhood memory, link the tale to George Eliot’s 
own development and that of society.55 Just as the pervasive insect imagery 
plays on evolutionary models, so skeletons and linguistic dialects and cul-
tural idioms appear as “fragments of human archeology.”56 In these ways this 
“anthropological study of pre- industrial village life”57 is at the same time a 
study of the evolution of individual consciousness.
George Eliot invites this evolutionary analysis and even tells the reader 
that “Marner’s inward life had been a history and a metamorphosis.”58 
Indeed, we might say that Teilhard’s analysis of the evolution of conscious-
ness serves to “complexify” George Eliot’s insights in a way that furthers 
consciousness in the reader. As George Eliot herself has often done, Teilhard 
shows that humans are on the one hand similar to animals and, on the other, 
absolutely different. What constitutes this difference is of course “reflec-
tion,” which Teilhard defines fairly conventionally as “the power acquired 
by a consciousness to turn in upon itself.”59 He goes on to say that evolution 
would not occur— and indeed does not occur— where the advance toward 
consciousness is stayed or retarded. Crucially, “Life, being an ascent of con-
sciousness, could not continue to advance indefinitely along its line without 
transforming itself in depth.”60 George Eliot seems to share this view, particu-
larly in Silas Marner, as she explores various points at which the progress of 
human consciousness has stalled, waiting to be deepened by its response to 
complexity. In different ways she explores the liminal territory that marks 
what Teilhard calls the “borders of intelligence”61— points at which the dis-
tinction between animal and human consciousness is blurred. These are the 
periods of consciousness when a person or culture, rather than crossing what 
Teilhard calls “the threshold of reflection”62 into thought, lingers in a state of 
instinctual or emotional stasis.
Silas is clearly stranded at “the threshold of reflection” by the betrayal 
he has experienced in Lantern Yard. But his potential for evolution is para-
doxically manifest in a process of devolution as he begins “withering” more 
and more63 until he is barely to be differentiated as a human being. As if 
anticipating Kafka’s Metamorphosis, George Eliot’s narrative dwells on the 
possibilities here as she describes Silas as “like the spider” weaving “from 
pure impulse, without reflection.” Acting on physical needs alone, he gradu-
ally is able “to reduce his life to the unquestioning activity of a spinning 
insect.”64 Later, when Silas loses his gold, George Eliot describes his meta-
morphosis into “a plodding ant” that is stymied by a change to his habitual 
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route.65 Teilhard notes that what looks like thought in ants is “a paroxysm 
of consciousness” by comparison to the relative freedom of mammals; the 
insect’s “unquestioning activity” is “the exact opposite of concentration.”66 
George Eliot seems to represent in Silas at this stage the strange sight of a 
man who looks to be concentrating but is without reflection.
It is crucial for George Eliot, as for Teilhard, that a creature’s absence of 
reflection is also an absence of love: Silas’s work compensates for “the love-
less chasms of his life,” and when “thought was arrested,” “affection seemed 
to have died.”67 But it is equally crucial that Silas has a “fervid,” “intense 
nature”68 that compels him to develop relationships with his guineas and his 
beloved pot: he believes they are “conscious of him, as his loom was.”69 As 
is the case for Robinson Crusoe, Silas’s survival and eventual resumption of 
growth are a direct function of his ability to create consciousness and com-
panionship in a barren world. Teilhard would see even his companioning of 
inanimate objects as evidence of an “interior life” by which an ego remakes 
the world into itself. “So man becomes a person through personalization,” 
he writes.70 But ultimately what awakens Silas from this long deathlike sleep 
is of course his love for Eppie. She is, as Silas suspects, a “message” from 
his past— the past before betrayal— but also an invitation to a future that 
is something other than a repetition of the present. The little girl frees him 
from the bondage that “the monotony of his loom and the repetition of his 
web” have become: “she called him away . . . re- awakening his senses . . . and 
warming him.”71 Teilhard would say that Eppie reactivates the development 
of his life by “transforming [it] in depth.”
The transformation of Silas is clear, but I will mention just a couple of 
points that reinforce the evolutionary resonance. Eppie clearly makes a “link” 
for her adopted father to the social world of Raveloe, but just as crucially she 
revises his relationship to the natural world, “even to the old winter- flies.”72 
George Eliot’s descriptions of Eppie make clear that she attaches Silas to the 
human world but also that she frees him from his self- perception or, more 
accurately, his insect- like lack of self- perception, first by connecting him to 
the lives of animals. I don’t think it is merely for the sake of sentimental 
appeal that George Eliot compares Eppie from the start to “a little starved 
robin” and “a small mouse” or that her play with her friends is compared 
to that of “little dogs.”73 And when the little girl is “talking to the winged 
things” in one breath and her father in the next, she is also weaving an alter-
native world for him in which he and she and the creatures around them are 
united.74 George Eliot makes clear that “the little child had come to link him 
once more with the whole world”— and not just the human world. “There 
was love between him and the child that blent them into one, and there was 
love between the child and the world— from men and women with parental 
looks and tones, to the red lady- birds and the round pebbles.”75 Eppie indeed 
“personalizes” Silas to his world, transforming him from the “useful gnome 
or brownie” he has become into a person.76
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Although Eppie’s “refinement and fervour” make her what might be called 
more evolved than “a common village maiden,”77 George Eliot nonetheless 
emphasizes her animal energy as we witness her “laughing and frisking” and 
playing with her dog and kitten.78 As Teilhard puts it, a mammal departs 
from an insect in not being a prisoner of its physical being and instincts; it 
exhibits instead a sense of “exuberance of life and curiosity”: “it takes inter-
est, it flutters, it plays.”79 Even the fact that Eppie plays with the animals 
during dinner marks the change from Silas’s previously physically determined 
existence: dinner is now more than a means to satisfy physical appetite. They 
are human persons, yes, but this means— rather paradoxically perhaps— they 
are also like animals and even like pebbles and plants: Silas learns to care 
lovingly for Eppie as if she were “a precious plant,”80 and “as the child’s 
mind was growing into knowledge, his mind was growing into memory” 
and reconnecting with his past. “As her life unfolded, his soul, long stupe-
fied in a cold narrow prison”— like a seed long lying dormant in the cold 
ground— “was unfolding too, and trembling gradually into full conscious-
ness.”81 George Eliot’s unfolding of the evolution of Silas’s consciousness as 
activated by love resonates with Teilhard’s understanding. Fundamental to 
his analysis of the evolutionary process— as well as to Dante’s explanation of 
the working of the cosmos— is the idea that love is the universal energy bind-
ing all creatures and all creation together. For Teilhard, love is the energy that 
directs the Attraction and Connection that precede and facilitate Complexity 
and Consciousness.
Evolutionary Spirituality, Incarnational 
Interpretation, and Subjective Knowing
The third idea that George Eliot shares with Teilhard has to do with their 
understanding of the evolution of language and interpretation in relation 
to the development of religious thought and feeling. In Silas Marner she is 
intent to demonstrate the paradoxical idea that Raveloe is at once inhab-
ited by “our rural forefathers”82 and utterly devoid of an inhabitant like us, 
since our development has necessitated movement away from this past and a 
consequent inability to know it. In this respect she is following the model of 
her revered Sir Walter Scott, but updating it in light of contemporary ideas 
on evolution. What is remarkable about Silas Marner is the way in which 
George Eliot tries to immerse readers in the culture of Raveloe in order to 
reproduce the slow, painful evolution of religious consciousness. When she 
moves Silas from one “little hidden world” to another,83 the reader learns 
that every culture, while experienced by its inhabitants as comprehensive 
and even singular, is just such a little hidden world to anyone not belonging 
to it. Without Scott’s typical “enlightened” character to provide perspective, 
and with its key outsider barely able to articulate his thoughts and feelings, 
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the world of Raveloe seems to exist as a hermetically, and hermeneutically, 
sealed bubble and thus outside of the influence of evolution. In exactly this 
way, however, George Eliot is showing readers that this is their own past, 
and, crucially for my purposes, this is our religious heritage.
In a similar vein, Teilhard reminds his readers that in depicting the pre-
human world and human nature as it evolved, he is by definition without 
the benefit of a “spectator” to interpret the processes, since these processes 
occurred before the move across the threshold of reflection brought the 
advent of thought. “What I depict is not the past in itself,” he writes, “but as 
it must appear to an observer standing on the advanced peak where evolution 
has placed us.” In other words, there is no human in this past and it is only as 
an observer, with the observer’s advanced knowledge, that we can “picture” 
the past, as in a “film” in which we did not yet exist and we could not have 
survived. Nonetheless, Teilhard goes on, this “safe and modest method . . . 
suffices, through symmetry, to bring out ahead of us surprising visions of the 
future.”84
Throughout Silas Marner, the narrator is sending the reader warnings not 
to prejudge the religious cultures of the past; in other words, to be care-
ful how we interpret their efforts at interpretation. After Silas is betrayed 
by his Lantern Yard friends, for example, the narrator feels compelled to 
explain his immediate, utter despair and his lack of “independent thought” to 
her readers, whom she knows have themselves evolved— or think they have 
evolved— beyond such emotional, primitive habits of response: “To people 
accustomed to reason about the forms in which their religious feeling has 
incorporated itself, it is difficult to enter into that simple, untaught state of 
mind in which the form and the feeling have never been severed by an act of 
reflection.”85 Aside from the obvious irony here, the rhetoric is fascinating as 
George Eliot describes “reflection” as an act that “severs” form and feeling, 
which had once been “incorporated” together, causing a person to be analyti-
cal about his feelings and thus to separate out those feelings from the forms 
religion takes.86 Likewise, when, in another demonstration of the link his 
“religious feeling” forges with “form,” Silas sanctifies the hearth where Eppie 
came to him, the narrator is quick to warn readers to honor this religious 
impulse and acknowledge it as their own: “The gods of the hearth exist for 
us still; and let all new faith be tolerant of that fetishism, lest it bruise its own 
roots.”87
The reader is challenged throughout to think again about how to define 
religious thought and feeling as George Eliot represents the evolution of reli-
gious consciousness in terms of Silas’s relationship to language and the wary, 
tentative growth of his understanding of the relation of language to thought 
and feeling. Silas’s evolution clearly entails a hermeneutical education for the 
“simple, untaught state of mind” that saw him take the drawing of lots at 
face value and then revert, in reaction to his betrayal and banishment, to a 
state of “benumbing unbelief.”88 Part of his unreflective, antisocial state is an 
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attempt to recant the use of language altogether, but his reintegration into 
society necessitates language— even though it is “a stream that is almost sure 
to smack of a mingled soil”— just as it necessitates churchgoing, which is 
useful if only to provide a showcase for what the parish clerk deems “neigh-
bourly” behavior.89
The integral relation of language and interpretation to the development of 
religious thought and feeling is most evident in Silas’s relationship with his 
neighbor, Dolly Winthrop. To socialize Marner is a major reason for Dolly’s 
efforts to get him to come to church, but she also expresses a sentiment reli-
gious enough to be called a “simple Raveloe theology.” Dolly is hoping for a 
kind of conversion to sacramental religion in Silas, and she woos him with 
an appeal to his welfare: “You’d be a deal better, and you’d know which end 
you stood on, and you could put your trust i’ Them as knows better nor we 
do.” In a more sophisticated addition that is a match for any philosopher or 
theologian, she refers to “Them as we must all give ourselves up to at the 
last” and explains, “if we ‘n done our part, it isn’t to be believed as Them as 
are above us ‘ull be worse nor we are, and come short o’ Theirn.”90 As the 
narrator wryly notes, Dolly’s use of the plural pronoun to designate the deity 
is not an indication of polytheism but merely her attempt to avoid “a pre-
sumptuous familiarity.”91 Still, George Eliot uses this odd turn of phrase not 
to mock Dolly but to emphasize the inadequacy of language and Silas’s need 
to interpret this alien version of Christianity.
While Silas’s poor vision, caused by his fearful, intense focus on his insect 
world, helps to convey the difficulty of seeing clearly or understanding any-
thing beyond or even within one’s range of sight, the scene involving the 
deciphering of the I.H.S. that Dolly has “pricked” into her cakes offers a 
metaphor for the coded world that every culture is, illegible to outsiders and 
taken for granted though often unread by those within. In the context of the 
development of religious traditions, the groping for connection in this scene 
between Silas and Dolly helps to bring to light issues of interpretation and 
mediation. Indeed, in our own day readers are likely to need the help of an 
explanatory note to understand I.H.S., and spell- check is likely to transliter-
ate it into IRS or HIS, thereby confirming the overriding power of cultural 
codes. For his part, Silas has come from a religious sect that has rejected 
the state church and its clerical and liturgical forms in favor of a presumed 
firsthand reading of God’s word in the Bible. And Dolly’s illiteracy lends 
credence to the view that the adherents of the church do not actually read 
the prayer book that has come to replace the Bible as the institutionally sanc-
tioned mediator between the people and God.
It is important of course that Dolly’s efforts go beyond language: she brings 
cakes and practical help as well as well- meaning words, so that her genuine 
desire to nourish her neighbor is clear, and George Eliot makes the entangling 
of questions of spiritual nourishment and religious meaning explicit with 
their struggle over the meaning of the I.H.S. Neither Dolly nor Silas knows 
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that the letters signify the first three letters of the name of Jesus in Greek, but 
Silas does at least recognize the letters, a feat that is beyond Dolly. Still, he is 
“unable to interpret them” as anything holding religious significance, while 
she believes they are “good letters” with a “good meaning,” because they are 
found in church. Dolly does successfully convey to Silas the truly good mean-
ing of the letters, however, in a way that upholds the key principle of George 
Eliot’s religion: she succeeds because “there was no possibility of misunder-
standing” the feeling behind her use of them.92
Even though Silas barely nibbles at Dolly’s offerings, and whether or 
not we accept this as a Eucharistic scene and his neighbor as an unwitting 
priest, readers do witness here a feeding of the spirit. And while words are 
inadequate and the I.H.S. is indecipherable, he does nonetheless ingest the 
inscribed bread. Still, Dolly does not succeed in convincing Silas to come 
to church on Christmas Day, because, as this scene makes clear, she is still 
speaking a foreign language that “his imagination” cannot translate. Yet all 
of this prepares the way for the coming of Eppie, who will succeed, when all 
of the community’s words and socializing gestures cannot, in unlocking what 
George Eliot calls here “the fountains of human love and divine faith.” This 
notion is significant enough to compel her to rephrase it, to articulate more 
accurately the connection between faith and love, the human and the divine: 
in a rare change, it becomes in a later edition “human love and faith in a 
divine love.”93 It is important that instead of taking Silas to church George 
Eliot grants him what he truly needs— his own experience of incarnation 
in the person of a little child on New Year’s Eve. For it is not by words and 
human efforts alone that he will be brought back to life. “What child is it?” 
ask several ladies.94 “What child is this?” asks the Christmas hymn.
Dolly and Silas do actually connect, and Silas is actually restored to life 
because of the embodied, completely unexpected mediation of a child. In this, 
George Eliot is pointing to the limitations of even the best human efforts and 
perhaps honoring Dolly’s respect for “Them as are above us.” Certainly it is 
possible to see George Eliot’s imitation of the Christian nativity narrative, 
particularly in the context of a culture in which the name of Jesus is unrec-
ognizable, as a version of Comte’s “religion of humanity”— an affirmation 
of Christian values without the need for Christ as anything but a fetish. But 
I would argue instead that the parable instructs us in matters of epistemol-
ogy by reminding us of the importance of a kind of feeling knowledge that is 
manifest in incarnated and subjective knowing.
George Eliot’s attention throughout her work to certain characters as read-
ers helps draw our attention as readers to the hermeneutical task, which, as 
part of the evolutionary tide, had taken a new turn with the rise of scientific 
knowledge in her time. By alerting readers to a web of possibilities that have 
been written about for as long as humans have been reading (and may well 
have been talked about before that), Silas Marner points to the ongoing task 
of interpretation that predates any scientific perspective. It also makes clear 
126 Chapter 5
that the human consciousness is by definition an interpretive consciousness 
regardless of its ability to read a literal text. Reading is of course a familiar 
convenient metaphor for understanding, which George Eliot makes complex 
use of throughout her career. It is central to George Eliot’s conception of the 
religion of the future that readers must be doers, that the duality between 
word and action must be reframed in terms of an incarnational aesthetic that 
teaches readers how to act on what they learn.
That Silas Marner is frequently taken as a parable reminds us that the 
demand for readers or listeners to interpret and indeed act upon a story is an 
ancient ingredient in storytelling. In the wake of what is called the “higher 
criticism” of biblical texts, George Eliot reminds readers of a “lower” type of 
criticism that calls for a different but equally sophisticated and intelligent kind 
of interpretation. Here again it is helpful to remember George Eliot’s reading 
of Dante. Dorothy L. Sayers reminds twentieth- century readers of Purgatorio 
that their Victorian forebears are responsible for creating the “partitioned- 
off personality” that threatens to prevent them from enjoying “the mixture 
of passion, mysticism, and science in one and the same poem.” By contrast, 
she says, a medieval reader relished this integrated type of poetry, since “it 
would never occur to him that he ought to keep his head, his heart, and his 
religious experience in water- tight compartments.”95 A dangerous legacy of 
the Enlightenment is the arrogant dismissal of prescientific views as less intel-
ligent, when they are more intelligently seen as earlier models from which our 
own evolve. As Barbara Reynolds puts it in her “Introduction” to Paradiso, 
“Modern science has not superseded medieval thought about the nature of 
creation, but only the physical picture which illustrated and accompanied 
it.”96 In terms of the hermeneutics of storytelling, George Eliot is helping 
to dismantle what Sayers calls the “Victorian bulkheads”97 by reconnecting 
with the medieval imagination and incorporating key elements from it into 
our understanding of reading and thereby into the evolution of the human 
imagination itself.
We may look to biblical hermeneutics and to Dante for an understanding 
of the prescientific imagination that George Eliot is reworking for the con-
temporary reader. Firstly, in Mimesis Erich Auerbach famously shows that 
the distinctive contribution of biblical narrative to realism has to do with 
a paradoxical kind of authority that no longer holds sway after scientific 
criticism comes to the fore: “while, on the one hand, the reality of the Old 
Testament presents itself as complete truth with a claim to sole authority, on 
the other hand that very claim forces it to a constant interpretative change in 
its own content; for millennia it undergoes an incessant and active develop-
ment with the life of man in Europe.”98 In other words, the Bible is part of 
a tradition that has always practiced evolutionary reading, a tradition that 
bases its authority on the expectation of continually changing interpretation. 
Further, Auerbach argues, while the Old Testament biblical narrative itself 
is seen to be developing in relation to its readers, biblical heroes too, unlike 
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classical heroes, are “fraught with  .  .  . development.”99 Their individuality 
and identity, won through intense suffering and hardship, give them a new 
kind of grandeur as true- to- life heroes. These two principles— the reverence 
for ordinary, indeed evolving, humanity and the understanding of readers and 
texts as evolving— form the basis for George Eliot’s incarnational aesthetic.
Auerbach also writes of the “astounding paradox of what is called Dante’s 
realism” by which he creates entirely human, mortal characters who inhabit 
and achieve their essence in an eternal, timeless sphere.100 This “astounding” 
ability to make characters that are at once temporal and eternal, according 
to Reynolds, stymies post- scientific readers who are unable “to distinguish 
the figure from the thing figured.”101 Likewise, Hans Frei, in accounting for 
“the eclipse of Biblical narrative” with the rise of scientific criticism, speaks 
of the decline in credibility of figural interpretation and of narrative itself, a 
decline that is caused by a misguided correlation between truth and histori-
cal accuracy. In other words, we might say that the Bible lost credibility at 
this time largely because of readers’ lack of imagination: stories were seen as 
merely contexts for truths that could be extracted, Frei says, when in fact, 
particularly in the case of the synoptic Gospels, “their narrative rendering, in 
effect a cumulative rendering of the theme, is indispensable.”102 Frei’s point 
makes clear that the evolution of reading was a fundamental tenet of presci-
entific hermeneutics. Again, we may speak of this integral relation between 
story and subject matter as part of the incarnational aesthetic that George 
Eliot practices.
Indeed, it is not going too far to see George Eliot as demonstrating what is 
now called “story theology.” Theologians in this group identify the problem 
Frei refers to of extracting the core and seeking the message, while forgetting 
that the story is essential. Story theology also reminds us of the oral, story 
form in which the Bible was experienced, especially by the nonliterate, and 
speaks of how signs and symbols of faith— stained glass windows, liturgical 
rituals, music, and, I daresay, letters pricked in cakes— speak without words. 
As Marcus Borg puts it, “Religious laws speak of how to behave; theology 
and doctrine speak of how to understand and what to believe; but stories 
appeal to the imagination, to that place within us where our images of real-
ity, life, and ourselves reside. The great stories of the Bible image what the 
religious life is about.”103 Again, it seems to me that George Eliot in a similar 
way is reminding us of the role of imagination in awakening and developing 
the religious consciousness by demonstrating that it is both incarnational and 
evolving.
George Eliot’s effort to reproduce the evolution of religious consciousness 
as a series of stories in which we are all immersed and entangled is part of 
a fuller effort to demonstrate the complexities of knowledge that are being 
revealed in her time, particularly with regard to subjectivity. Frequently, her 
narrator acknowledges that she herself and her readers are themselves sub-
ject to interpretative processes; she makes clear, in other words, that readers 
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are interpreting but also being interpreted by what they read. Throughout 
her works, narrative “asides” are actually central in turning the text into 
a two- way mirror in which readers are continually asked to consider the 
“log” in their own eyes before judging characters in her stories or neighbors 
in real life. This ethical practice is grounded in philosophical and scientific 
knowledge concerning perception and self- knowledge. What might be called 
“the knowledge of knowledge” is constantly evolving at this time, for a key 
element in the crisis of knowledge that erupted in the nineteenth century is 
the problem of what may be summed up in the phrase “subjective knowing.”
In regard to this, it is interesting that George Eliot shares with Teilhard a 
focus on sight. As many have noted, she uses the metaphor of seeing through-
out her career to signal the problems associated with human egoism and its 
limitations. For his part, Teilhard entitles the foreword of The Phenomenon 
of Man “SEEING.” Here he argues that the crisis provoked by evolution was 
a crisis about seeing. Scientists now had to acknowledge that their seeing 
was not objective but instead that their observations are “steeped” in pre-
conceptions, that what they see may be “the reflection of their own thought,” 
that “they are caught in their own net.” In other words, in recognizing that 
knowledge could not but be shaped by the knower, scientists had to embrace 
the insight that philosophers and poets more readily appreciated: as Teilhard 
poetically phrases it, “Object and subject marry and mutually transform each 
other in the act of knowledge.”104 Or, in the words of Percy Bysshe Shelley in 
his Defence of Poetry, “All things exist as they are perceived: at least in rela-
tion to the percipient.”
In this sense, the I.H.S. scene offers a beautifully explicit rendering of the 
complexities of the relation between subject and object: Dolly and Silas try 
to read the letters in a literal and in a religious sense and then go on to dem-
onstrate their human meaning when Silas tastes the cake in which Dolly has 
pricked the letters. This scene, depicting a shift from the “what” of content 
to the “how” of embodied meaning, is one of many in which George Eliot 
explores the relationship between language and interpretation. Particularly, 
we can see linguistic dilemmas acted out in The Mill on the Floss, in which 
Mr. Tulliver, in a less benign rendition of Dolly’s “theology,” senses the power 
of language to overcome his enemies and give him a way to deal with the 
“puzzling,” hostile world.105 His children variously inherit his preoccupation: 
Tom is rather like Silas in learning the letters but being unable to interpret 
them in a way that renders them meaningful, while Maggie, with her pas-
sion for reading, imaginatively invests all texts with the potential to change 
her life. She looks for herself in texts, is discouraged at the version of self-
hood she finds in Scott’s novels, and then in desperation seeks for a “key” 
to living in Thomas à Kempis’s Imitation of Christ. Her unlikely heir in this 
regard is Casaubon from Middlemarch, who invests his life’s energy in find-
ing the Key to all Mythologies and thereby his own vindication. In response, 
the dim- sighted Dorothea takes a lesson from the blind obsessiveness of 
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her husband and invests her own faith in an embodied, lived- out quest for 
meaning.
All of these characters are caught in interpretative struggles involving the 
managing of the relationship between objective and subjective knowledge, 
and George Eliot has deep sympathy for the longing for subjective knowing, 
even in its most egoistic renderings.106 As mentioned in chapter 1, Kierke-
gaard makes heavy philosophical weather of the idea that truth is in fact 
subjectivity. In his Concluding Unscientific Postscript he notes that objective 
truth— the “what” truth of content— can be made untrue by not being held 
subjectively as true. Only truth that is made inward by our “how” of enact-
ment can be truly true. “Objectively the interest is focused merely on the 
thought- content,” Kierkegaard argues, “subjectively on the inwardness. At its 
maximum this inward ‘How’ is the passion of the infinite, and the passion of 
the infinite is the truth. But the passion of the infinite is precisely subjectivity, 
and thus subjectivity becomes the truth.”107
Kierkegaard goes so far as to connect the subjectivity of truth to the very 
existence of the individual: a person becomes an individual by making the 
truth inward, and it is this process that also makes her “subject to a dialec-
tic with respect to time” by connecting her own inwardness in the present 
moment to the eternal.
In the passionate moment of decision, where the road swings away 
from objective knowledge, it seems as if the infinite decision was 
thereby realised. But in the same moment the existing individual 
finds himself in the temporal order, and the subjective “how” is trans-
formed into a striving, a striving which receives indeed its impulse 
and a repeated renewal from the decisive passion of the infinite, but 
is nevertheless a striving.108
This idea of a striving that both defines the person as an individual in time 
and affirms her or his relation to eternity could describe the dialectic under-
lying George Eliot’s incarnational aesthetic. We could say that the search for 
a “key” by characters such as Maggie and Casaubon is based on a desire to 
experience the truth as subjective, and that characters such as Dorothea are 
more evolved (and blessed by their author) in being able to strive for the truth 
of subjectivity in a way that affirms their own relation with the infinite.
Central to Kierkegaard’s thinking is the notion that a person only exists 
as an individual insofar as his activity is “transformed” by its relation to 
the infinite. He goes even further in arguing that God does not exist except 
in relation to this dialectic of inwardness. Kierkegaard’s point is that God’s 
invisibility in creation in any direct sense compels the believer to seek him by 
activating his own response; otherwise God remains what Richard Kearney 
might call a possibility. As Kierkegaard puts it: “He is in the creation, and 
present everywhere in it, but directly He is not there; and only when the 
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individual turns to his inner self, and hence only in the inwardness of self- 
activity, does he have his attention aroused, and is enabled to see God.”109 
God is everywhere, but seeing God requires a triangular dynamic of self- 
world- God. “Nature, the totality of created things, is the work of God. And 
yet God is not there; but within the individual man there is a potentiality 
(man is potentially spirit) which is awakened in inwardness to become a 
God- relationship, and then it becomes possible to see God everywhere.”110
As paradoxically as he expresses it, Kierkegaard is restating a time- honored 
view regarding the subjectivity of faith that goes back to such a stalwart figure 
of orthodoxy as Augustine. Still, Kierkegaard reminds us of the need in the 
age of rationalism to reestablish the basis of faith in paradox and subjectiv-
ity. In this context we can say that whereas George Eliot is often understood 
to have moved beyond faith in a supernatural God, it is more accurate to see 
her in this tradition of what Teilhard might call a more complex kind of con-
sciousness. When she depicts her heroine in “Janet’s Repentance” seeing the 
ordinary “monotony” of the natural world as transformed after her conver-
sion, for example, one might see a merely subjective experience:
A very commonplace scene, indeed. But what scene was ever com-
monplace in the descending sunlight, when colour has awakened 
from its noonday sleep, and the long shadows awe us like a disclosed 
presence? Above all, what scene is commonplace to the eye that is 
filled with serene gladness, and brightens all things with its own 
joy?111
Rather, I would argue that George Eliot is here affirming the subjectivity of 
all knowing and confirming what she calls in Daniel Deronda “the emotional 
intellect” as a true guide. As Kierkegaard notes, it is mystery that both hides 
and reveals the presence of God. And it is for the percipient to see or not “the 
disclosed presence”— what Teilhard calls “the divine milieu”— in the world 
around her.
Evolutionary Spirituality and the Meaning of Suffering
These notions of embodied meaning and subjective knowing bring us to the 
fourth way in which George Eliot’s religious imagination may be reframed in 
light of Teilhard’s evolutionary ideas: their shared understanding of suffering. 
The interesting thing about emphasizing the interpretive role of the reader, 
as with emphasizing the role of the believer, is the risk of misinterpretation. 
Shifting the focus from doctrinal certainty to a dependence on the believer’s 
engagement opens the faith to a number of dangers: the believer may mis-
interpret the doctrine, for one thing, or in turn may himself be interpreted 
as having no faith at all. This very riskiness is what constitutes evolutionary 
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spirituality, according to Diarmuid O’Murchu, a Roman Catholic priest and 
writer who develops Teilhard’s principles. In his book Adult Faith, O’Murchu 
highlights three main elements of evolutionary spirituality as it has evolved 
from Teilhard’s original ideas: first, it is relational and emphasizes mutuality 
and co- creation; second, it is progressive; and third, it emphasizes imagi-
nation, feeling, and intuition. Identity, from this perspective, is built on an 
ancestral past but is always poised toward the future, thereby offering a faith 
stance for the person Susan Neiman calls the “grown- up idealist.”112
When we consider George Eliot’s fictional “experiments,” we can identify 
several religious ideas to which she strove to give a “grown- up” response. 
Marian Evans’s early preoccupations as the translator of Strauss and Feuer-
bach mirrored those of her contemporaries: the questions of the existence 
and the divinity of Jesus. For novelist George Eliot the focus shifts to Jesus 
as a model for humanity, as she turns from the question of his miracles to 
the practice of his ethics of love. As we have discussed, she speaks of being 
increasingly averse to “formulas” about beliefs and “more and more timid” 
about expressing her views except in her art:113 in this way she is both dem-
onstrating the ultimate truth of the incarnational aesthetic for herself and 
requiring the reader to respond in kind by interpreting the fictional embodied 
ideas in light of her or his own experience. In this way she is also illustrating 
David Richo’s point about mature faith: “An adult does not possess a belief 
but follows on its endlessly provocative path. Faith is more like a path than 
a platform.”114
Related to the perception of Jesus as miracle worker is the focus on his 
role as eliminator of suffering. Several aspects of this perception may inhibit 
or retard personal growth; for one thing, if Jesus is the one who eliminates 
suffering, one may denigrate the role of humans in striving to understand the 
causes of suffering and working to eliminate it. As O’Murchu points out, the 
celebration of Jesus as hero, both in miraculously healing pain and then in 
bearing all of the world’s pain on the cross, may lead to a dualistic theology 
that pits goodness against an objective kind of evil, including scapegoats and 
devils and mega- corporations, and turns our attention away from our own 
complicity in injustice and our responsibility to work against it in the here 
and now.115 At its worst, such an attitude turns the crucified Christ into a 
fetish or an idol for the kind of militant church that was Blake’s target: the 
church that is more concerned about establishing its own power and identi-
fying its enemies than alleviating the suffering of the poor, inside or outside 
of its walls.116 The shift required here (as discussed in chapter 3) is from the 
notion of God suffering for us to a more mutual, adult understanding of God 
suffering alongside us and our fellows. This latter understanding pervades 
George Eliot’s depiction of suffering, for the response she always promotes 
is empathy and sympathetic action. Just as Dinah comes alongside Hetty in 
the prison cell, so the reader is encouraged to come alongside, rather than to 
stand above, the foolish, inept Amos Barton, the vain, selfish Rosamond, the 
132 Chapter 5
hypocritical, self- satisfied Bulstrode. In this way George Eliot is always ask-
ing her readers to stand in for the Jesus who loved and forgave sinners and 
stood against injustice and prejudice.
At the same time, all of these situations exemplify another essential ele-
ment of George Eliot’s view of suffering and of what O’Murchu refers to as 
“adult faith”: that is, the conviction that suffering is an essential ingredient 
of life, without which there is no growth, no evolution. This is a far cry 
from the unhealthy kind of submission to evil that brings upon Christians the 
charge of disdain for the world and even collusion with the forces of death. 
In The Divine Milieu Teilhard works through a complex argument that rede-
fines Christian resignation as an attitude that holds in tension an unflagging 
resistance to all forms of death and an acceptance of the will of God.117 For 
Teilhard it is in this paradoxical attitude of active surrender that the Chris-
tian can achieve growth and contribute to the life of the world. We may 
compare this explanation to Kierkegaard’s argument concerning the benefits 
of suffering that turns the sufferer “inward”: “only inwardness in sufferings 
gains the eternal . . . When a person suffers and wills to learn from what he 
suffers, he continually comes to know only something about himself and his 
relationship to God; this is the sign that he is being educated for eternity.”118
George Eliot likewise, as we have seen, treats with painstaking care this 
delicate question of the possibility of suffering as a necessary and potentially 
good thing, rather than something to be eliminated at any cost. This is part 
of the only partly comical burden of her poem “My Vegetarian Friend,” as 
we saw in chapter 2, in which the narrator somewhat shamefacedly recog-
nizes the value to him of other people’s suffering. As mentioned earlier in 
reference to Daniel Deronda, religion exists because of suffering, and when 
Daniel advises Gwendolyn to “take the present suffering as a painful letting 
in of light,”119 he is voicing George Eliot’s own hard- won conviction of— 
or perhaps only hope in— the purposefulness of suffering and the ultimate 
goodness of the universe. She would understand, though not perhaps be able 
to affirm, Kierkegaard’s belief that the universe is a “school of suffering”— 
variously imagined in the doctrine of the Cabbala and the Catholic doctrine 
of purgatory— that trains humans for eternity.120 And if her appreciation of 
these faith- based explanations for suffering stopped short of certainty, the 
imaginative re- creations they generated in her fiction stand as testaments to 
her ongoing fascination with the “evidence of things not seen.”
One of George Eliot’s most thoughtful considerations of the problem of 
suffering comes in her first novel, when the narrator is working hard to jus-
tify Adam’s evolution from the pain he has experienced with Hetty to his 
happiness with Dinah. Adam moves from love for Hetty to love for Dinah, 
the narrator wants us to know, not in spite of his sorrow or by forgetting his 
sorrow but by using his sorrow— by turning his sorrow inward. As Adam 
tells Dinah, when it comes to sorrow, as with love and happiness, “the more 
we know of it the better we can feel what other people’s lives are or might 
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be, and so we shall only be more tender to ’em, and wishful to help ’em. The 
more knowledge a man has the better he’ll do ’s work; and feeling’s a sort o’ 
knowledge.”121 George Eliot takes great pains in the denouement of the novel 
to convince the reader, while Adam works to convince Dinah, that their love 
does not diminish the value of Hetty or of their suffering. The narrator argues 
that Adam is not “the same man” as he was before he suffered and, rather 
than either insisting that he remain the same or bemoaning that change, she 
urges: “Let us rather be thankful that our sorrow lives in us as an indestruc-
tible force, only changing its form, as forces do, and passing from pain into 
sympathy— the one poor word which includes all our best insight and our 
best love.”122
The idea that suffering exists for its value in producing wisdom and com-
passion is a familiar element of many religious traditions and philosophical 
schools of thought, but the conviction that we ought to “be thankful” for 
suffering is essentially bound up with an evolutionary understanding. Just 
as George Eliot proposes the idea of sorrow as “an indestructible force, only 
changing its form,” so Teilhard proposes the value of sorrow as energy that 
is waiting to be transformed and redirected for good. As he writes in his 
essay “The Meaning and Constructive Value of Suffering,” suffering is not a 
great mass of “waste”; rather it is “potential energy. In suffering is concealed, 
with extreme intensity, the world’s power of ascension. The whole problem 
is to liberate it by making it conscious of what it means and what it can 
achieve.”123
When George Eliot’s narrator describes the process of the transforma-
tion of desire into submission, she could be quoting Teilhard: “For it is at 
such periods that the sense of our lives having visible and invisible relations 
beyond any of which either our present or prospective self is the centre, 
grows like a muscle that we are obliged to lean on and exert.”124 This sense of 
ongoing, relentless growth and change, with our selves as connected visibly 
and invisibly to centers of life beyond our own, is fundamental to Teilhard’s 
evolutionary spirituality and to his own explanation of the cosmic meaning 
of suffering. We see in George Eliot’s work her agreement with Teilhard that 
as evolutionary beings it is only by consciously working with suffering that 
we experience a “sense” of connection with the whole of life and contribute 
to its “ascension.”
In this respect, it is interesting that in her last novel, George Eliot looks 
beyond Jesus and explores the religious experience of people whose Messiah 
has yet to come. This focus has significant implications for a perspective on 
suffering since, while Jewish people would like as much as anyone to avoid 
it, suffering is the story of their religious experience. For Daniel, this tradition 
offers a depth that is lacking in his high- society world. When he visits the syn-
agogue in Frankfurt he “gave himself up” to the mere sounds of the “chanted 
liturgies,” which, like Dolly with the I.H.S., he rather feels than understands, 
being ignorant of their “detailed verbal meaning.”125 Here George Eliot is 
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reminding readers of the emotional, intuitive, imaginative appeal that can be 
lost in a preoccupation with seeking a literal, rationalistic basis for religious 
experience.
But her more important point emerges in the fact that the chanted liturgies 
resonate with, rather than satisfy, Daniel’s yearning, as we notice when the 
narrator goes on to suggest that a mature religious attitude may come more 
readily to people who are steeped in a tradition full of stories of long waiting 
periods and centuries of promises:
The most powerful movement of feeling with a liturgy is the prayer 
which seeks for nothing special, but is a yearning to escape from the 
limitations of our own weakness and an invocation of all Good to 
enter and abide with us; or else a self- oblivious lifting up of gladness, 
a Gloria in excelsis that such Good exists, both the yearning and the 
exultation gathering their utmost force from the sense of communion 
in a form which has expressed them both, for long generations of 
struggling fellow- men.126
George Eliot celebrates here the prayer that seeks, not to escape from this 
world, but “to escape from the limitations of our own weakness”; the prayer 
that asks not for a supernatural God- figure to rescue us out of this world 
but for “all Good . . . to enter and abide with us”; or, failing that, this prayer 
asks just to know that “such good exists,” regardless of us and our needs, 
and finds satisfaction in sharing this “yearning” and “exultation” with fellow 
humans. Again, as in the language of Adam Bede above, George Eliot empha-
sizes the value of “a sense” that confirms “visible and invisible relations.”
In her repeated affirmations of a knowledge that is comprised of feeling 
and for which words are a feeble adumbration, George Eliot is not only 
championing the primacy of feeling— sympathy, intuitive understanding, 
imaginative responsiveness— but discovering a key element of evolutionary 
spirituality. For just as learning to use reflection to direct the energy of the 
body and the passions was an essential step in the development of human-
ity, so now, in the wake of rationalism, learning to subjugate the objectifying 
intellectual processes is the next stage of human evolution. In terms of the 
religious imagination, this realization is a rediscovery of the meaning of 
incarnation, in that moving from complexity to consciousness in light of this 
new insight requires that humans learn how to reintegrate their minds and 




The Word Continuously Incarnated
“I can’t help laughing at the imbecility of that pious dictum— that if Shelley 
had lived till now he would have been a Christian— that is, he would have 
been old woman enough for it by this time.”1 This biting comment from 
Marian Evans to her friend Sara Sophia Hennell in 1853 stands as a warn-
ing to anyone who dares to reopen the question of George Eliot’s attitude to 
religion. But while I have suggested the possibility of George Eliot’s return 
to a renewed understanding of religious faith in the “anatheistic” sense put 
forward by Richard Kearney, there would not be anything “old womanish” 
in the terms of her engagement. Rather, I have found throughout her writings 
evidence of an exploration of possible forms of religious consciousness that 
is pursued with the same rigorous skepticism that she expresses in this early 
comment.
As I have argued throughout, George Eliot considered her writing a reli-
gious vocation. From her first fictional work until the last, as well as in all of 
her poems, she is living out this calling in terms of an aesthetic that is incar-
national: she creates characters, stories, and ideas in words that bring spirit 
to life by honoring and celebrating natural beings, including the human. And 
in doing so she invests the natural and the human with a sense of sacred value 
and significance.
George Eliot continues to develop this aesthetic practice throughout her 
career, as she continues to learn through her writing what it means that it is 
her holy calling to sanctify the ordinary. Such paradoxes abound in the mys-
tical way of thinking, and it is this mystical practice that takes her aesthetic 
to a deeper level as she comes to question the distinction between the sacred 
and the secular and to experiment further with mystical ideas, particularly 
the holiness of everything and the ubiquitous presence of the sacred.
Daniel Deronda particularly is rife with experiments in mystical con-
sciousness as she conjures with such nonrational concepts as coincidence, 
second sight, wish- fulfillment, and timely rescue. But this is only a bolder 
exploration of the kind of supranatural events and insights that appear 
throughout her writing. We need only think of little Eppie coming like an 
angel to save Silas. And in The Mill on the Floss we find the narrator urging 
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readers to open themselves to a way of thinking that is beyond “maxims” and 
“general rules”: “the mysterious complexity of our life is not to be embraced 
by maxims, and . . . to lace ourselves up in formulas of that sort is to repress 
all the divine promptings and inspirations that spring from growing insight 
and sympathy.”2 In human relations, as in our relations with nature— as we 
saw in her response to Darwin— mystery hints at the divine, if we would only 
not repress it.
As I argued in chapter 5, George Eliot is always and increasingly illustrat-
ing the essential role of interpretation in shaping consciousness and belief. 
Along with all the other approaches to religious thinking I mention here, her 
understanding of interpretation reflects what has come to be called “evolu-
tionary spirituality.” As I have tried to show, evolutionary spirituality both 
recovers ancient, often forgotten or overlooked ways of expressing religious 
thinking and points to an ever- evolving, ever- emergent “religion of the future” 
that is in constant need of reinterpretation. This understanding is based upon 
Teilhard’s notion, as we noted in chapter 5, that evolution is “a general con-
dition to which all theories, all hypotheses, all systems must bow and which 
they must satisfy henceforward if they are to be thinkable and true.”3
This need for reinterpretation extends even to the key doctrines and texts 
of Christianity. Jesus himself models this mindset. For example, when the two 
disciples meet the resurrected Jesus on the road to Emmaus, he reveals his 
identity through the scriptures, showing them that they must reinterpret the 
text now that he has come. He then deepens their understanding by reveal-
ing himself in the ritual act of breaking the bread, offering himself as food 
for their journey, for they must continue to walk after he has left them. The 
truth becomes inward for them in a literal way when they eat the bread he 
has become. As Diarmuid O’Murchu says, he does not vanish into thin air 
when their eyes are opened— as if he is not meant to subsist in their more 
fully conscious perception— but rather he vanishes into them, becoming one 
with their consciousnesses, just as the bread becomes part of their bodies.
When these two disciples tell their story to the community they are act-
ing on Teilhard’s notion of what Savary calls “the continuous Incarnation 
of the great Christ body.”4 The resurrection appearances, particularly those 
recounted in Luke’s stories and in John’s account of Mary Magdalene’s 
encounter with the risen Jesus at the tomb, emphasize that believers take up 
responsibility for telling the story and, by adding their contributions, trans-
form both the story and themselves. They thus become part of the story; in 
this way future readers learn that they too must tell their story of God, that 
God’s story cannot be told without them. More mysteriously still, they learn 
that they are God’s stories, that they are the stories God tells. In this way they 
embody the continuous Incarnation of Christ.
Evolutionary spirituality explores the mysterious relationship between 
Christ and the believer by expounding the distinction between Jesus of Naz-
areth and the Christ whose body is comprised of believers. Louis Savary 
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explains that, according to Teilhard, the traditional focus on an individual-
istic relationship between a believer and God must evolve into a spirituality 
that is “collective” and “relational” so as to participate in “the full emergence 
of Christ as a Cosmic Christ.”5 This evolutionary perspective can help us 
toward a fuller understanding of George Eliot’s religious imagination. For 
whereas she has typically been understood as simply denying the divinity of 
Jesus, we might instead see her as dissatisfied with the traditional explana-
tions. When in 1869 Renan’s Vie de Jésus, a book that proposed to assert the 
human and minimize the Jewish identity of Jesus, was making quite a stir, 
George Eliot wrote to a friend that it “can furnish no new result”:
It seems to me that the soul of Christianity lies not at all in the facts of 
an individual life, but in the ideas of which that life was the meeting- 
point and the new starting- point. We can never have a satisfactory 
basis for the history of the man Jesus, but the negation does not affect 
the Idea of the Christ either in its historical influence or its great sym-
bolic meanings.6
The distinction George Eliot makes here between “the man Jesus” and “the 
Idea of the Christ,” rather than articulating an abstract spiritual concept, 
points instead to her sense that we must act on what we know— that is, as in 
the letter to Stowe cited at the beginning of chapter 5, “the difficulty of the 
human lot”— as we wait for what Teilhard would call “the full emergence 
of Christ as a Cosmic Christ.” Even her affirmation of the “great symbolic 
meanings” of the Christ Idea, rather than an abstraction, is better seen in 
light of Coleridge’s definition of the symbol as characterized “by the translu-
cence of the Eternal through and in the Temporal” and as always partaking 
of “the Reality which it renders intelligible.”
Six months before this letter, after hearing a performance of Messiah, 
George Eliot wrote to her friend Sarah Sophia Hennell of the “acme of 
poetry” achieved in Christianity in “the conception of the suffering Messiah” 
and “the final triumph ‘He shall reign for ever and ever.’ ” She goes on: “The 
Prometheus is a very imperfect foreshadowing of that symbol wrought out in 
the long history of the Jewish and Christian ages.”7 While the explanations of 
evolutionary Christianity were unavailable to George Eliot, then, her imagi-
nation responded to “the Idea of the Christ” and its evolution as represented 
symbolically and poetically and musically. And as we have seen through-
out, it is at this profound imaginative level that George Eliot’s consciousness 
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